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ABSTRACT
UNTHINK PINK: MASTER NARRATIVES AND COUNTERSTORIES OF BREAST
CANCER

Jessica C. Hume
April 17, 2017
This work examines the construction and impact of the master narrative breast
cancer which is supported and reified by the contemporary breast cancer awareness
movement. I contend that historical problematic constructions of the female body were
interwoven with the beginning of the movement around the turn of the twentieth century.
As a partial result, the female body with breast cancer is abject, and therefore subject to
policing and discipline. The master narrative of breast cancer, through pinkwashing,
enacts this policing and discipline. The master narrative expresses several distinct
messages which may be exclusive of the experiences of many people, causing those
dealing with breast cancer to struggle to reconstruct their identity in the wake of the
illness, and potentially creating epistemic injustice in which the moral agency of those
subject to the master narrative is reduced. Through counterstories of breast cancer which
resist and replace the master narrative, those who are subject to the master narrative
attempt to be included in public discourse, reconstruct their identities, and restore moral
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agency. I argue that, for this reason, we, as a culture, must bear witness to these
counterstories.
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INTRODUCTION
Early on a chilly morning in October 2009, my mother and I walked from our
parking spot on Witherspoon Street toward the massive crowd, mostly women, gathering
at Waterfront Park for the Susan G. Komen “Race for the Cure.” We came, for our first
walk, to celebrate her anniversary: five years since she'd had a single mastectomy; five
years since she'd spent months getting chemo on Fridays so she'd be in decent shape to
teach again on Mondays; five years since she'd spent hours on the phone with her
insurance company, driven to tears, because they refused to cover a decent wig; five years
since we'd celebrated my 21st birthday sitting in her bed at home, because she was too
weak to get up. It was five years since my stepfather had disappeared into the garage after
her diagnosis, and reappeared later, his head—eyebrows, hair, beard—completely,
nakedly, shaved bald; five years since I'd called to check on her and all she could do was
cry because the side effects caused by her meds were so painful; five years in remission
from breast cancer. In this place, I thought, the reality of her struggle would be
acknowledged. With these people, the complicated physical and emotional responses
associated with breast cancer wouldn't get swept under the rug or misunderstood. Here, I
reasoned, she would feel supported, safe.
Even from the distance, we saw a large pink ribbonshaped mass ballooning above
the crowd several stories in the air. “Is that a breast cancer hot air balloon?” I asked. “Oh,
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God,” she responded, her sarcasm deeply apparent. I couldn't help but wonder, What
does a hot air balloon have to do with breast cancer? All around us, people gathered in
little clusters, teams, with matching shirts in all variations of pink, in honor or in memory
of women they'd known with breast cancer. Most men wore “Save the tatas” shirts, and
one little girl, barely a toddler, boasted a shirt which said, “Save my tatas before I grow
them.” Even I wore a hot pink tshirt of my own creation, bearing the slogan, “This one's
for THE GIRLS,” with the words “THE” and “GIRLS” strategically placed on my right
and left breasts.
As we neared the registration tables to pick up her special, pink “SURVIVOR”
hat, we noticed a stretch Humvee, parked ostentatiously across the entrance to the event,
painted the special shade of Komen pink. “Is that a breast cancer Hummer?” I asked, my
incredulousness rising. “MMMMM, HM!” My mother intoned, with the long “MMM”
and short, sharp, “HM!” she generally reserves for affirmative response to the question,
“Has somebody pissed you off?” “Oh, c'mon, Mom!” I laughed, “nothing says 'I survived
breast cancer' like a vehicle that pumps more toxins in the air than any car on the road!”
“Mmmmmm,” was all she said. After we'd found my brother and affixed our race tags to
our shirts, we waited for the race to begin, standing in a patch of sunlight to ward off the
October chill. All around us, festivities surged on, culminating in a brief, prerace parade
around the park, with the survivors grouped by order of years in remission. Local D.J.s
posted near the inflatable, archshaped starting gate announced the groups: “Less than
one year!” “One year!” “Five years!” “Go on, Mom,” I said, “don't you want to be in the
2

parade?” knowing she would find it silly. “Parade?!” she exclaimed. “What do I need a
parade for? All I did was keep breathing and waking up every day. You want to give me a
parade, give me a parade for raising you as a single mother.” I sensed that she felt that the
other accomplishments of her life—raising two children, teaching for nearly forty
years—diminished, dwarfed by the fact that she was a “survivor.”
As the morning wore on, moments like these continued; we looked around, seeing
and hearing things, looking at each other, saying, “What does that have to do with breast
cancer?” It all seemed so bizarrely removed from the experience my mother had. I
wondered, how did all these women get from the brutal experience of breast cancer, to
this? It seemed so generic; so commercial; so, to use a marketing term, branded. I didn't
know it at the time, but what we felt was pinkwashing, in action.
From that point, I began my research on the ways in which our cultural
perceptions of breast cancer interact with, and are influenced by, the contemporary breast
cancer awareness movement and its strategies. Moreover, I was curious about the ways in
which our cultural perceptions of the breast cancer experience (which are so closely tied
with the ubiquitous pink breast cancer awareness movement) accurately reflected patient
experiences and stories, and whether they had any impact on people dealing with breast
cancer, treatment, or recovery. Over the course of several years, my research, which I will
detail below, has led me to the conclusion that the contemporary breast cancer awareness
movement, motivated by profit, has generated a cultural narrative about breast cancer
which excludes the narratives and experiences of many people with breast cancer (or in
3

remission from breast cancer). This exclusion is accompanied by a whole host of negative
effects for those people, including marginalization, silencing, injustice, and potential for
poor health outcomes.1 We need to resist the profitdriven breast cancer culture and make
room in our cultural discourse about breast cancer to acknowledge the narratives which
differ from the oversimplified depiction of breast cancer circulated by the contemporary
breast cancer awareness movement. In order to understand how I arrived at these
conclusions, it’s best to begin with the early questions that initiated my concern with
these issues and guided my research.
My greatgrandmother, Edna M. Teevans Conroy, died of breast cancer, which
had been untreated, in 1947. At least one of my grandmother’s maternal cousins had
suffered breast cancer and cervical cancer. My mother was diagnosed just shy of her
fiftieth birthday. At thirty, I was labeled by my doctor as high risk. I knew that one day, I
too, might lose my own breast(s), go bald, vomit for days on end, put my career on hold,
only to hope to come out on the other side feeling halfhuman again. Still, my statistical
odds of survival might be fairly good. But the story of breast cancer I saw in all the
cutesy tshirts, the sappy movies, the emphasis on breast restoration and looking
“normal,” the effeminate pink, wasn’t necessarily a narrative that matched my worldview
(nor does it now). From the time I went to my first “Race for the Cure” with my mother,
I knew there had to be other people out there feeling the same way I did.
As a writer, I had always accepted as a given the fact that the stories we tell, both
1

All of these potential effects will be thoroughly examined in later chapters.
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individually and collaboratively, defined our cultural and our individual selves, and that
our culture shaped our personal narratives as well. When I started my research, I began to
wonder about the cultural story we were telling about breast cancer. Why did these stories
almost always depict people who caught cancer early through mammograms, and were
able to fight it like heroes and warriors? Why did it appear that those diagnosed with
breast cancer came out on the other side better, stronger, happier, more enlightened? Why
were most of these heroes white and heteronormative? What about the people with Stage
IV, those who couldn’t run races or go to galas? What about the people who die, no
matter how hard they fight? What about the stories of queer people and lesbians? The
stories of those who chose nontraditional family structures, or simply hated pink? Where
were the stories of whose lives were radically altered by breast cancer?Why did all of this
seem absent from our cultural discourse around breast cancer, and in what ways was this
apparent exclusion affecting the people whose stories get excluded?
That questions prompted my research on illness narratives, and then specifically,
illness narratives of breast cancer, and I discovered that the study of illness narratives of
breast cancer existed at the interdisciplinary intersection of several fields. In order to
understand the ways in which the female breast cancer body was culturally constructed,
and the ways in which those constructions still come to bear in our cultural experiences
of breast cancer (such as the “Race for the Cure”), I would have to examine the history of
anatomy and medicine, feminist body theory, popular culture, and bioethics and
phenomenology. There were two primary histories, though, that knew must take
5

precedence. To understand the function of narrative in illness, I would need to research
the development of illness narrative and narrative theory. To expose and understand the
ways in which cultural constructions may alter or inhibit the important function of lived
or written narrative, I would have to examine the narratives themselves, starting with the
earliest modern breast cancer narratives. Below is my analysis of the development of
scholarly work on illness narrative and its theories, interwoven with a historical review of
breast cancer narratives.
Before the 20th century, there were very few detailed narratives of breast cancer,
and the extant ones were originally intended to have loved ones as their only audience
(rather than be published for the consumption of the general public). Frances Burney, the
novelist, wrote of her experience (one that lacked a refined surgical plan, anesthesia, and
2

antiseptic) to her sisters and nieces in 1812, several months following her surgery. She
recounted for them the months in which she and her husband harbored fears about the
lump in her breast (all the while, warning them that if they are similarly afflicted, they
should not wait as long as she). Burney lived another 29 years, and her account is the
only widelyknown one from this time period.
Just over 100 years later, in 1915, Katherine Lee Bates wrote and distributed an
3

account of her partner, Katharine Coman, and her experience with breast cancer. Like

Burney, Frances. Manuscript letter in the Henry W. and Albert A. Berg
Collection, New York Public Library. Text found online.
3
See Leopold, Ellen. My Soul is Among Lions: Pages from the Breast Cancer
Archives.
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Burney's, the memoir was intended only for circulation among loved ones, as Bates
explains on the title page when she says it is “for Katherine Coman's family and
innermost circle of friends...only for the eyes of those who have love's right to see”
(Leopold My Soul is Among Lions 14). The two women, both professors at Wellesley,
were involved in what was then called a “Boston marriage,” in which women chose not
to marry and simply lived together. There is no evidence as to whether their relationship
was sexual or not, but there's no doubt that they were incredibly devoted to one another,
as we see in Bates' description of her companion’s illness: “As I look back on Katharine's
martyrdom, I see no longer pain and death; I see only the shining of her spirit,” (Leopold
My Soul is Among Lions 21). In her analysis of the narrative, Ellen Leopold notes that,
while for many women with breast cancer diagnosis during that time, “the need to
collude with the demand for secrecy must have added terrible distress to the physical pain
women already faced. Coman seems to have been spared this additional suffering...such
openness must have been incredibly rare,” (Leopold, 19). Leopold also notes, however,
that that openness only extended so far, because Bates is careful not to ever name the
disease or to identify “the powerful medicine which [Coman] had been taking to prevent
recurrence of her trouble” (23). Whatever freedom Coman and Bates did have to discuss
Bates' illness, even if they could not name it or discuss it specific detail, would remain
incredibly rare for another sixty years.
Narratives like those of Burney and Bates are sparse before the midlate 20th
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century. The revolutionary environmentalist Rachel Carson was investigating her own
case, and writing privately to Dr. George Crile (a national advocate for modified
mastectomy and lumpectomy), but she refused to bring her case into the limelight for fear
it might damage the credibility of her book, Silent Spring, in which she essentially
4

proposed that pesticides cause cancer. Writing about the breast cancer experience did not
enter public discourse until secondwave feminism helped to the break public silence
about many women's health issues, and Betty Ford and Happy Rockefeller spoke in the
news about their diagnoses. In that era, medical journalist Rose Kushner published her
book, Breast Cancer: A Personal History and Investigative Report, which was one of the
early comprehensive narratives of a woman's experience with breast cancer which also
included some of her journalistic research on the subject of diagnosis and treatment
5

options. But even at the start of the movement, a tension existed between various public
depictions of breast cancer narratives. Betty Ford and Happy Rockefeller sought to put on
6

brave public faces, becoming model heteronormative breast cancer patients. So began
tension between the model breast cancer patientone who listened to her doctors,
complied easily, recovered quickly, and went back to being a “normal woman”and
women like Kushner, who demanded answers and wanted to engage in reciprocal

See Knopf-Newman, Marcy Jane. Beyond Slash, Burn, and Poison: Transforming
Breast Cancer Stories into Action.
5
See Kushner, Rose. Breast Cancer: A Personal History and an Investigative
Report.
6
See the section titled “The Ideal Breast Cancer Patient,” in Chapter 3, for more
details about Betty Ford’s depiction as a breast cancer patient.
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decisionmaking in treatment, rather than be pressured to return to femininity.
The media was drawn to the public heroism of women like Ford and Rockefeller,
but there were others like Kushner seeking to complicate the public's understanding of
breast cancer patients and their experiences. Audre Lorde was also diagnosed in the late
1970s, and by 1980 she had published The Cancer Journals, a manifesto and call for
social action which revealed her experience of breast cancer as a woman of color and a
7

lesbian. While secondwave feminism had opened up several discussions and sparked
several changes regarding women's health, the voices of the movement were
predominantly middleclass, white women who were heteronormative (people who
performed femininity as prescribed by traditional, binary gender roles). Lorde identifies
this discrepancy in The Cancer Journals when she describes her encounter with a
wellmeaning middleaged woman, a representative of the Reach for Recovery program,
who comes to visit her in the hospital to encourage her to use her lambswool prosthetic
breast: “The woman from Reach for Recovery who came to see me in the hospital...
certainly did not speak to my experience nor my concerns. As a 44 year old Black
Lesbian Feminist, I knew there were few role models around for me in this situation, but
my primary concerns two days after mastectomy were hardly about what man I could
capture in the future, whether or not my old boyfriend would still find me attractive
enough...My concerns were about my chances for survival. Would I be able to maintain
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Lorde, Audre. The Cancer Journals.
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the control over my life that I had always taken for granted?” (Lorde 175). Despite the
fact that it is nearly 40 years old, Lorde's work remains one of the very few which
highlights experiences with breast cancer from the perspective of a nonwhite,
nonheteronormative woman. The women’s movement by which her books were so well
received, focused much of its effort on reproductive rights and other women’s health
issues. In the 1980s, The breast cancer awareness movement was taken up and dominated
by big fundraising organizations like Susan G. Komen and, though it became much more
a part of public discourse, it also lost some of its feminist influences. Breast cancer
awareness was marketed, branded, and sold to the public.
In the interceding years, hundreds of breast cancer stories, in the form of film,
books, poetry, and interviews, flooded popular culture. Though some of them exposed the
public to new experiences of the illness, most of them depicted demure, compliant heroes
who were embodied mainly by their identities as wives and mothers. The popular 1983
film, Terms of Endearment, for example, brought to light some of the ways in which
breast cancer was shrouded in secrecy and silence, and was one of the first Hollywood
films to do so, but overall it reinforced standards of the white, middleclass
8

heteronormative female and exploited breast cancer to make profit for movie studios.

The main character, Emma, is depicted via her primary identity as a wife and mother:
when she visits New York City with a friend, she encounters working women who are
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See Brooks, James L., et al. Terms of Endearment.
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depicted as judgmental pantsuited villains. During her illness, when her doctor gives her
a poor prognosis, he advises that she decide who should raise her children—she is, in
fact, married to their father—and she must choose between her best friend, Patsy, or her
mother. When her husband easily agrees to this arrangement, she smiles, forgiving him
for this and all his past transgressions, in a scene which glorifies her as a longsuffering
hero. When her two boys come to say their final goodbyes to their mother (notably, there
is no scene in which she bids farewell to her daughter), she literally puts on a brave face,
having Patsy apply bright and cheerful pink makeup. Like Betty Ford, she is demure,
compliant, heroic, and hetero.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, powerful pink marketing campaigns had
become the loudest public voice in breast cancer awareness. Susan G. Komen for the
Cure had begun partnering with other large corporations to encourage rink ribbon
branding and marketing. Companies used the color pink or the pink ribbon to aid in
generating profits or good PR, but didn't actually do much (if anything) to help raise
funds or awareness (“Think Before You Pink”). In some cases, they claimed to be raising
breast cancer awareness through their pink productswhich ranged from Yoplait yogurt
to Ford Mustangsbut the products themselves (or the processes by which they were
created) actually caused cancer. As the pink ribbon was adopted by more and more
corporations, the pink ribbon became a marketing powerhouse, capitalizing on the image
of heroic breast cancer patients to sell products. The overpowering and ubiquitous nature
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of pink marketing resulted in the proliferation of pinkwashed breast cancer narratives
which also made use of the inspirational warriorhero image.
There was, however, some resistance to the depiction of breast cancer spread by
the corporate-driven breast cancer awareness movement. In 1986, Jackie Winnow and
Carla Dalton founded the Women’s Cancer Research Center (WCRC) in San Fransicso
(Klawiter 164). Winnow and Dalton had noticed a gap in resources for Bay Area women
with cancer: there were very few educational and support services. WCRC was designed
to fill that gap. In 1989, Winnow delivered the keynote address Conference for Lesbian
Caregivers and AIDS epidemic, in which she paralleled women’s cancers with the AIDS
epidemic and, according to Klawiter, “galvaniz[ed] a women’s cancer movement,”
(Klawiter 164). In 1990, Elenore Pred, Susan Claymon, and Belle Shayer founded Breast
Cancer Action (BCA), an activist organization which modeled itself after the AIDS
movement’s ACT UP activism group. According to Klawiter, this group “learned how to
make sense of articles in medical journals, how to apply pressure to pharmaceutical
companies and government agencies, and how to chain themselves to the fence if all else
failed,” (173). Organizations like these were the first groups to resist the portrayal of
breast cancer circulated by groups like Susan G. Komen and others, as Klawiter notes:
“Feminist breast/ cancer activists…drew attention to the false promises and
misrepresentations of the cancer establishment,” (175). Breast Cancer Action began the
“Cancer Sucks” campaign in 1997, in hopes of countering the oversimplified cheeriness
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of the pink ribbon (Klawiter 175). Later, BCA coined the term “pinkwashing” to refer to
corporate exploitation of breast cancer in order to sell products which may contain known
carcinogens (“Think Before You Pink”). The term was part of their “Think Before You
Pink” campaign, and they remain a watchdog organization, calling out companies guilty
of pinkwashing and trying to raise awareness of the phenomenon (“Think Before You
Pink”). Similarly, Terry Tempest Williams sought to resist oversimplified notions of the
experience of having breast cancer, trying to encourage awareness of, and resistance to,
these ideas. In 1991, she published her book, Refuge, in which she revealed her suspicion
that the women in her family had developed breast cancer because of the atomic bomb
9

testing which took place near their home. It unabashedly showed her sadness, anger, and
internal conflict, such as in the final essay of the book, titled, “The Clan of OneBreasted
Women.” The current, revitalized trend of resistance to the commercialization and
exploitation of breast cancer began, and continues, with groups like WCRC, BCA, and
writers like Williams.
Around the same time—the late 1980s and early 1990s—writers in various fields
such as medicine, sociology, psychiatry, anthropology, psychology, and ethics began to
examine and discuss stories of illness and the ways in which they a influenced patient
experiences. Arthur Kleinman's landmark book, The Illness Narratives: Suffering,
Healing, and the Human Condition, discussed the ways in which illness can have social
and personal meaning, and claimed that those meanings should be examined, understood,
9

See Williams, Terry Tempest. Refuge: An Unnatural History of Family and Place.
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and empathized with by healthcare professionals. In the early 1990s, the renowned
sociologist and illness scholar, Arthur Frank, published a book on illness theory, The
Wounded Storyteller, in which he substantiated that authentic narratives of illness were
critical to the patient's identity in recovery; he observed that it's crucial to allow those
diagnosed with illness to recount their stories without those patients being colonized by
11

either social expectations or the power of allopathic medicine.

Though she made no reference to the scholarly rise of the examination of illness
narratives and their meanings, independent scholar Ellen Leopold seemed to have an
inherent sense that public discourse about the meaning of breast cancer, in social and
personal contexts, needed diversifying if it was to do justice to a variety of women's
experiences. In 1996, Leopold published an essay entitled “Body Language,” in which
she identified one of the problems with popular warriorhero breast cancer narratives of
12

the 90s : “The journey chronicled by many of the newer cancer diaries...sends the
message that, given the right attitude, women can take charge and overcome breast
cancer. By implication, those who fail (i.e. those who die...) demonstrate a lack of moral
courage, perseverance, and all those virtues associated with a 'go ahead' attitude,”
(Leopold My Soul is Among Lions 110111). She claimed these approaches were
“Pollyannaish,” (111) and called for a more complex vision of the contemporary breast
See Kleinman, Arthur. The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human
Condition.
11
See Frank, Arthur W. The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics.
12
See Leopold, Ellen. My Soul Is Among Lions: Pages from the Breast Cancer
Archives.
10
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cancer narrative. In the late 90s, she published A Darker Ribbon: Breast Cancer, Women,
and Their Doctors in the Twentieth Century, a book which compared a selection of letters
between the famed surgeon, William Stewart Halsted (creator of the Halsted radical
mastectomy, which was considered the gold standard in breast cancer treatment from the
1890s until the 1970s) and a patient of his, to a selection of letters between the mid20th
13

century doctor, Dr. George Crile, and his famous patient, Rachel Carson. The book
revealed the roots of some of the hegemonic power in breast cancer treatment and the
resistance to change in thinking about breast cancer treatment on behalf of the American
public and the medical profession. And so, some discourse about breast cancer stories
began aligning with the feminist discourses of new groups like WCRC and BCA.
In the late 1990s, scholarly work on illness narrative theory also began taking new
directions, diversifying and expanding. In 1997, English professor Thomas Couser
14

published Recovering Bodies: Illness Disability and Life Writing, in which he claimed
that stories of illness are one way the ill could reclaim their bodies, and in which he
examined specific literary aspects, such as plot and narration, in illness stories. In the
same year, Hilde Lindemann Nelson edited the collection, Stories and Their Limits:
15

Narrative Approaches to Bioethics, in which Nelson and others in the field (such as

See Leopold, Ellen. A Darker Ribbon:Breast Cancer, Women, and Their Doctors
in the Twentieth Century.
14
See Couser, G. Thomas. Recovering Bodies: Illness, Disability, and Life-writing.
15
See Nelson, Hilde Lindemann. Stories and Their Limits: Narrative Approaches to
Bioethics.
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Arthur Frank) examined the ways in which illness narratives interacted with and
influenced the ethical sensibilities of caregivers. One shared theme of the movement to
understand illness through narrative became clear: narrative had the power to shape or
reshape identity in illness or in the wake of illness, and also the power to create
empathetic relationships between those writing them and those reading them.
The empowering facet of illness narratives was not evident in many of the breast
cancer stories of the early 2000s, which continued to oversimplify the experience.
Narratives written by women about their breast cancer experiences got a bit sassier, with
clever titles like Margaret Lesh's, Let Me Get This Off My Chest, or modern formats
Marisa Acocella Marchetto's graphic novel, Cancer Vixen, but they still worked within
narrow confines that present the breast cancer body as marginalized, subtly invoking
language (“so and so 'lost her battle' with breast cancer,” for example) which blamed the
victim, and they utilized and reified problematic constructions of the female body and the
breast cancer experience. And they still, for the most part, elided the experience of
women of color, or women of the LGBTQ community.
Simultaneously, however, breast cancer activists and scholars in sociology,
medicine, bioethics, and women's and gender studies began to publish significant works
on this phenomenon. In 2003, Barron Lerner published, The Breast Cancer Wars, in
which he examined the history of breast cancer in the United States, particularly the
relationships between patients and biomedical institutions, and the legal and ethical
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complications associated with treatment. In her 2004 book, Beyond Slash, Burn, and
Poison:Transforming Breast Cancer Stories into Action, Marcy Jane KnopfNewman
presented detailed stories of four famous women—Rachel Carson, Rose Kushner, Betty
Ford, and Audre Lorde—in order to demonstrate the ways in which their individual
16

narratives and bodies were politically situated. KnopfNewman examined the influence
these women’s experiences had on the 20th century medical practices, health law, and
popular discourse of breast cancer. In this notable book, she revealed the ways in which
breast cancer stories are political, and that how we respond to them is an ethical concern
(notably, this observation about ethics coincides with Nelson's association of illness
narratives to ethics). Maren Klawiter’s 2008 book, The Biopolitics of Breast Cancer:
Changing Cultures of Disease and Activism, in which Klawiter traced the breast cancer
movement throughout the 20th century, identified the ways in which breast cancer
17

treatment is medically managed. It also identified the discrepancies in treatment for
people of color and those who are not heteronormative, and introduced readers to new,
grassroots activism about breast cancer, the purpose of which was to resolve inequity and
dismantle hegemony. In 2011, Samantha King published one of the first fulllength texts
which examines pinkwashing extensively and analyzes its effects: Pink Ribbons, Inc.:
Breast Cancer and the Politics Of Philanthropy. In this text, she exposes several ways in

See Knopf-Newman, Marcy Jane. Beyond Slash, Burn, and Poison: Transforming
Breast Cancer Stories into Action.
17
See Klawiter, Maren. The Biopolitics of Breast Cancer: Changing Cultures of
Disease and Activism.
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which breast cancer has been commercialized, and points out the exploitation, exclusion,
and harm which pinkwashing causes.
While these scholars began work to address specific issues raised by several
women's experiences with breast cancer, and also the political and ethical nuances of the
20th century breast cancer awareness movement, others continued to bring analysis of
18

illness narrative to the fore. Nelson published Damaged Identities: Narrative Repair, in
which she described master narratives: “the stories found lying about in our culture which
serve as summaries of socially shared understandings,” (6). She observed that master
narratives are archetypal and sometimes oppressive, and contrasted them with what she
called “counterstories,” which she claimed “identify fragments of master narratives that
have gone into the construction of an oppressive identity” and “aim to alter...on oppressed
person's perception of herself,” (7). Master narratives of illness can be harmful to the ill
person. As we shall see below, my argument is that the current construction of breast
cancer experiences in our cultural discourse, particularly in pinkwashed discourse,
qualifies as a master narrative and potentially harms people with breast cancer. I will
discuss the impacts of that qualification more fully in Chapters 3 and 4.
Just a few years later, Rita Charon, published her major work, Narrative
19

Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness, in which she advocated for healthcare
providers to use the narrative skills of “recognizing, absorbing, interpreting, and being
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See Nelson, Hilde Lindemann. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair .
See Charon, Rita. Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness.
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moved by the stories of illness,” (4). She also claimed that the concept of intersubjectivity
was critical to the function of illness narratives. Intersubjectivity, according to Charon,
meant that narrative required not only a teller but also a listener, and the relationship
between the two created a kind of communion (52). According to Charon’s text, illness
stories needed witnesses in order to be of help to those experiencing them.
In 2015, Mary K. DeShazer produced what is possibly the only published book to
apply illness narrative theory directly to stories of breast cancer, specifically. She brought
us new language to talk about breast cancer narratives when she published her book,
20

Mammographies: The Cultural Discourses of Breast Cancer Narratives, which is one
of the few books to incorporate queer theory and antipink discourse. DeShazer’s book
seems to be the only extant work which brings together all these concepts in order to
emphasize the importance of alternative breast cancer narratives while also questioning
hegemonic discourses about breast cancer and the female body. To date, however, there is
not any published work which specifically identifies and analyzes the rhetoric of the
breast cancer awareness movement as a master narrative. The discourse may benefit from
an analysis the way in which the master narrative of the movement, supported and reified
by the practice of pinkwashing, marginalizes those with breast cancer and potentially
causes injustice and harm. Additionally, the discourse may benefit from discussion on
how to resist the master narrative through counterstories, which I have done below.

See DeShazer, Mary K. Mammographies: the Cultural Discourses of Breast
Cancer Narratives.
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This research into illness narrative and the culturally constructed female body of
breast cancer has currently led me to four central claims which build on one another.
First, the master narrative of the modern breast cancer awareness movement was
constructed from a foundation of problematic beliefs about the female body in which the
female body has been pathologized. Second, the breast cancer body is construed as abject
and therefore subject to discipline and policing; this discipline and policing is enacted
through the master narrative. Third, the master narrative is utilized and reified by the
practice of pinkwashing, and generates several archetypal messages which may obscure
or overdetermine the narratives of those with breast cancer who do not fit into the master
narrative. Fourth, our culture’s engagement in the messages of the master narrative may
21

result in epistemic injustice and poorer longterm outcomes for those with breast cancer;
therefore, we need to work to pluralize the master narrative in order to acknowledge the
stories of those whose lives do not match the current master narrative.
Chapter 1 provides a foundational understanding of the problematic historical
understandings and constructions of the female body. Through analysis of anatomical and
medical history, I demonstrate the ways in which the female body is historically
pathologized. Particularly, I focus on the ways in which that pathologization relates to
female body parts. Then, I analyze the ways in which that pathologization and other

Here, I refer to the work of Miranda Fricker, in which she identifies epistemic
injustice as injustice in which “someone is wronged in her capacity as a knower,” (italics
hers) (20).
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problematic perceptions of the female body as inherently ill become part of the
foundation of the modern breast cancer awareness movement at the start of the 20th
century. Finally, I use examples of breast cancer narratives, such as those of Fanny
Burney and Audre Lorde, in conjunction with historical information about the
advancement of breast cancer medicine, to expose the ways in which that pathologization
became a subtext of the early history of breast cancer. That pathologization became a
springboard for the master narrative of breast cancer.
Chapter 2 utilizes current feminist theory as a lens through which to analyze
several contemporary breast cancer narratives. Analysis of these unique narratives
demonstrates the ways in which the breast cancer body is currently conceptualized as
abject and monstrous. I use Foucauldian theory (or, more precisely, a feminist
appropriation of Foucault) to expose the ways in which this abject, monstrous breast
cancer body is subject to policing and regulation. This policing and regulation manifests
itself through the master narrative of breast cancer, and is enacted through pinkwashing.
The master narrative becomes a method by which we selfpolice and regulate one
another, and pinkwashing becomes a system which reifies that behavior and perpetuates
the master narrative.
In Chapter 3, the main messages of the master narrative of breast cancer are fully
laid out and explored. I use examples from the pinkwashed marketing campaigns of the
contemporary breast cancer awareness movement, as well as accounts from people with
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breast cancer, to demonstrate their active presence in our social discourse and regulation
of one another. This analysis brings to light four oversimplified myths expressed by the
master narrative of breast cancer: that early detection always means a cure; that primary
power lies in the hands of allopathic medicine; that those with breast cancer are expected
to be heteronormative; and that those with breast cancer must perform the role of the
ideal, heroic breast cancer patient. For each of these aspects of the master narrative, I use
examples from contemporary breast cancer narratives to show the ways in which they
contribute to the policing and regulation of the breast cancer body. Synthesis of illness
narrative theory, and analysis of the ways in which narrative contributes to the
construction of the self, shows that these messages expressed by the master narrative may
be detrimental to the ill person’s construction of identity in illness. Feminist theories,
combined with bioethics and phenomenological analysis, support the claim that these
messages, by virtue of their exclusion of the stories of many people with breast cancer,
create injustice.
This work culminates in the fourth chapter, when I argue that, beyond the fact that
the master narrative is detrimental to people’s construction of identity in illness, and
beyond the fact that it creates injustice, it may be the factor which leads to poorer
longterm outcomes for those with breast cancer. Psychological research, combined with
illness narrative theory and evidence from illness narratives of breast cancer,
demonstrates that those who feel their stories of breast cancer are acknowledged and
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witnessed by others may have a likelihood of improved outcomes for certain aspects of
their health. Therefore, I argue, those whose narratives of self in breast cancer are not
embraced and acknowledged by our culture may be potentially subject to injustice and
poorer health outcomes. Finally, I present and analyze examples of what Nelson calls
23

“counterstories,” which resist the master narrative of breast cancer. These stories
demonstrate the ways in which our cultural understanding of breast cancer should be
pluralized, and give readers a sense of the richness and depth which can be integrated into
our cultural understanding of the experience of breast cancer.
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I will address and define the specific concept of witness in Chapter 4.
This concept will be fully elaborated in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER ONE
“YOU MUST EXPECT TO SUFFER”: THE FEMALE BODY AND THE EARLY
HISTORY OF BREAST CANCER AWARENESS
Before we begin to understand the structure and implications of the modern breast
cancer awareness movement, it’s important to examine the context in which that
movement was created and the underlying structures of knowledge of the female body
onto which it was grafted when it began in the early 20th century. A brief examination of
the problematic historical representations of the female body leading up to the early
breast cancer awareness movement will demonstrate the ways in which those
constructions were exploited, overused, and then codified by the movement. In Chapter 2,
we will see the way in which those representations construed the breast cancer body as
abject, and therefore subject to discipline and policing. In Chapter 3, we will discover
how those representations developed into a multifaceted master narrative of the
24

contemporary breast cancer awareness movement. At the beginnings of western

Scholar Hilde Lindemann Nelson defines master narratives as “stories found
lying about in our culture that serve as summaries of socially shared understandings,”
(6). In Chapter 3, we will explore the construction of master narrative of breast cancer.
For now, all we will discuss are the constructions of the female body which set the stage
for the development of the master narrative of breast cancer.
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medicine, the female body was perceived as an inferior version of the human body.
Medical men like Hippocrates and Galen believed that men and women were two sexes
in two different body types: “ a single anatomical form containing both sexes,” (Libbon
80). This is what’s known as the “singlesex” model (80). To be clear, the Greeks did not
believe that the human body was hermaphroditic, but that the female body was perceived
as an inferior version of the male body, as Stephanie Libbon notes. Aristotle concurred:
“Woman is literally a monster: a failed and botched male who is only born female due to
an excess of moisture and of coldness during the process of conception,” (as cited in
Ussher Managing the Monstrous Feminine 1). Men were a superior version of women by
25

virtue of their excess heat. Here, notably, the female body is construed as doubly
inferior: the female fetus is an inferior version of the male, but the mother is incapable of
managing her pregnancy such that she can produce a male. During this same historical
era, the term “hysteria” (originally meaning “wandering womb”) was coined to apply to
women who suffered from (or appeared to suffer from) a vast array of nervous problems,
based on the belief that a panoply of problems could be caused by a woman’s womb
becoming unanchored from its location and traveling around her body. Her anatomy
(specifically, her uterus) makes her inferior to men (by virtue of the male body as the
normative and highest standard). The part of her anatomy which is perceived as

According to Libbon, who cites Galen’s Body, the Greeks devised a spectrum on
which life forms were ranked, from hottest at one end, to coldest at the opposite end.
Hotter life forms were designated as superior to those colder than them. On this spectrum,
men had more heat than women and were therefore superior (80).
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nonnormative, her womb, must therefore be causing her symptoms. Having a uterus
makes a women susceptible to a number of undefined conditions to which men are not.
Much of how western society understands anatomy, specifically female anatomy,
was undefined until after the beginning of the Enlightenment. From the time of the
Greeks until the Middle Ages, arguably little progress was made in understanding human
anatomy generally; medicine stagnated, languishing in the theories of Galen and the four
humors. Additionally, standards of modesty prevented physicians from examining living
women physically, and birth was something managed by female midwives, not
physicians (Kukla 8). So, the female body, particularly during pregnancy was, in
comparison with the male body, understudied. Female anatomy was a secret, private
space, to which doctors rarely had access, and of which they had a much more limited
understanding than that of the male anatomy. By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, because of the growing frequency of postmortem human dissection,
surgeonanatomists in Europe were making great strides in understanding human
anatomy; however, access to human bodies was still difficult well into the early 19th
century (MacDonald 1213). In England, the Murder Act of 1751 provided that any
murderer could be used for dissection after being hung. At that time, dissections after
death were considered "murder after death," because it deprived the person of the
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possibility of religious salvation in the afterlife ; thus, dissection was only suitable for
those who had committed the grave sin of murder. Often, the bodies studied were those of
criminals fresh from the gallows (so, not women). Pregnant bodies were rarely available
for dissection; when they were, it was only at the express permission of the family (often
for purposes of autopsy). Though knowledge of human anatomy and disease progressed
overall, female bodies remained far more mysterious.
As general exploration of human anatomy in western medicine progressed during
the 18th century, anatomistsurgeons began to distinguish themselves from barbers,
quacks, and charlatans; British anatomist John Hunter, for example, became surgeon to
King John III. The legitimization and professionalism of the study of anatomy which took
place during the 18th and 19th centuries meant that European social and cultural views
about dissection of the human body shifted gradually away from the “murder after death"
mentality, and those seeking to advance the study of anatomy had more opportunity to do
so. Because of the dearth of knowledge about female bodies, the human womb and its
workings were the coveted final frontier for early anatomists like John's brother, William
Hunter, who published his findings in his 1774 work, The Anatomy of the Gravid Uterus.
This move in anatomical history was important because, as Rebecca Kukla notes,
“…mother’s bodies become peculiarly public in several ways. Their insides, formerly
tucked away behind modesty and ignorance, became objects of rigorous scientific
For more information about the Murder Act and related phenomena, see Sugg,
Murder After Death: Literature and Anatomy in Early Modern England, for a detailed
history.
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surveillance and attention,” (66). Rapidly, the most private and feared parts of women
were revealed to western medical practitioners and to the public, making them subject to
scrutiny and fetishization. For example, 35 years following Hunter's work, Sarah
“Saartjie" Baartman, also known as the "Hottentot Venus,” would appear in public
forums in Europe. According to Frith, Baartman was a South African native of the
Khoekhoe population who was brought to London by a doctor named Alexander Dunlop
27

and a showman named Henrik Cesars. She was displayed, according to Frith, mostly
nude, for visitors view: “her silent displays — complete with animal skins, face paint,
and a tight body stocking — fueled European myths about people from Africa: They
were primitive. Close to nature. Exotic. Hypersexual.” Frith also notes that her
body—particularly her bottom—was an object of scientific fascination and an oddity,
and her genitalia were the subject of much speculation. While Barrtman's case serves as a
troubling example of fetishization and hypersexualization of native African women, it
also demonstrates the ways in which advances in anatomical science and growth of the
power of medicine spawned attempts to colonize, display, and exploit the female body.
On the note of female bodies being subject to empirical observation and scrutiny,
it’s essential to acknowledge Foucault’s observations about the shift in medical
knowledge at this time. He observes that during the era of the French Revolution, the
clinical gaze changed the way in which medical knowledge of the human body was

For more information, see Frith, Susan. “Searching for Sarah Baartman.” Johns
Hopkins Magazine.
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constructed:
…clinical experience sees a new space opening up before it: the tangible space of
the body, which at the same time is that opaque mass in which secrets, invisible
lesions, and the very mystery of origins lie hidden. The medicine of symptoms
will gradually recede, until it finally disappears before the medicine of organs,
sites, causes, before a clinic wholly ordered in accordance with pathological
anatomy. (Foucault The Birth of the Clinic 151)
According to Foucault’s theory, anatomical dissections and advancement meant the body
would eventually become an entirely objective, empirical thing, its ailments measured
only by anatomical changes, reducing the sick person to a pathology or set of pathologies.
Prior to this era, physicians had been forced to base their knowledge of an illness on a
patient's subjective experience of the illness, primarily the patient's symptoms, but with
increased access to the body through anatomical study and surgery, the doctor would
observe and understand the body in a way that would change perception of the human
body irreversibly:
What is modified in giving place to anatomyclinical medicine is not, therefore,
the mere surface of contact between the knowing subject and the known object; it
is the more general arrangement of knowledge that determines the reciprocal
positions and the connexion between the one who must know and that which is to
be known. The access of the medical gaze into the sick body was not the
continuation of a movement of approach that had been developing in a more or
29

less regular fashion since the day when the first doctor cast his somewhat
unskilled gaze from afar on the body of the first patient; it was the result of a
recasting at the level of epistemic knowledge itself. (Foucault The Birth of the
Clinic 169170)
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According to Foucault, through the eyes of the physician the patient becomes an object,
merely a body, a disease or set of diseases. This perception is what Foucault calls the
"clinical gaze.” At this point, it is helpful to clarify the definitions of “illness" and
“disease.” Nancy Theriot, in her work on women’s voices in medical discourse, offers
definitions derived from Arthur Kleinman,29 which are applicable here. She defines
illness as “a selfdefined state of less than optimum health,” while “disease is a scientific
representation of illness that involves both a sorting of symptoms into discrete entities
and a theorizing about causation and cure…disease is not discovered but created,”
(“Women’s Voices in Nineteenth Century Medical Discourse” 3). Applying these
definitions to Foucault’s theory of the clinical gaze in the late 18th century, we can say
that the clinical gaze means that rather than sharing a reciprocal relationship in which
they must establish together their knowledge and understanding of the illness, the doctor
now relied more on knowledge of the body and its workings to understand the way in
which the body is diseased. Medical practitioners and anatomists perceived the body
through the lens of pathology—the causes, effects, origins, and nature of an illness—and
We shall return to the discussion of epistemic knowledge in Chapters 3 and 4.
For more information, see Kleinman, Arthur, Patients and Healers in the Context
of Culture.
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considered the human body an object. Knowledge of pathology was the purview of these
medical professionals, and the general public did not have education about, or access to,
information regarding disease and pathology. Because the knowledge regarding the
primary means of understanding illness now lay with the health care professionals, the
individual's personal or sociocultural experience and knowledge regarding the illness
became secondary. The human being's social, cultural, and personal experience while
diseased became a separate aspect of illness, an aspect that was less legitimized by
biomedical professionals. This phenomenon is the “recasting...of epistemic knowledge”
to which Foucault refers above. The premier “knowers” about the body became not the
people with bodies, the people with illnesses, or their cultural leaders, but the people who
generated and held knowledge of anatomy and pathology.
Some have argued that, with the advancement of anatomization which took place in
the late 18th and early 19th centuries, clinicians were launched to a position of power
over the body such that the subjective experience of the patient fell to the wayside and
was overwhelmed by the seemingly objective, empirical, and omnipotent authority of
medicine. Arthur Frank observes that this era is the one in which we see the shift from
premodernism in medicine, to modernism, claiming that a defining feature of modernism
is that, “The story told by the medical professional is the one against which others are
ultimately judged true or false,” (5). Frank's observation intersects with Foucault's at the
point that both of them acknowledge the shift of power from the afflicted person to the
perception of the medical professional. To Frank, though, what's critical here is story.
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Prior to this era, the story was one of illness, created by the patient through the patient's
cultural language and beliefs; once pathological knowledge begins to dominate medical
knowledge, the story generated is one of disease (of pathology), rather than illness (a
story which includes not only pathology but the human experience of the illness). The ill
person is expected to give up authority of experience in favor of the pathology narrative
generated by the medical professional. Frank calls this phenomenon narrative surrender:
“…the ill person not only agrees to follow the physical regimens that are prescribed; she
also agrees, tacitly but with no less implication, to tell her story in medical terms,” (6).
While the language used to describe the experience of being sick may shift from one
which defines disease, rather than illness, Frank uses the word “surrender,” which seems
to indicate a lack of agency.
Theriot, however, takes up Barbara Duden’s challenge that, “historians...find ways
to connect the medical discourse defining individuated bodyselves with patients’
constitution of themselves both as physical objects of medical science (bodies) and as
individual subjects participating in treatment,” (italics Theriot’s) (“Negotiating Illness:
Doctors, Patients, and Families, in the 19th Century” 349). Theriot claims that, in the 19th
century, patient case studies indicate a level of reciprocity in patientphysician dialogue:
Much of this literature can be read as a double narrative, as the physician’s
interpretation of the symptoms and examination results and as a physicianshaped
account of the patient’s story…The patient's history, as told by the patient or
family member…was recorded/reported as part of the asyetunexamined data
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from which the physician would weave her/his interpretation. (351)
For example, Theriot cites a gynecologist, Ernest Hall, who records one patient's
complaints with attention to the way in which she articulated her symptoms: “she
expressed herself as feeling blue, and unable to overcome periods of despondency,
objected to being left alone, and very nervous,” (353). While the primary record and
primary voice of the account is that of the physician, we can see that the doctor is careful
to incorporate her perception, interpretation, and even phrasing, of her experience. Thus,
the narrative is one constructed by the two of them, and shaped by the physician, as
Theriot notes. She is careful to explain further that constructions of disease for women in
this era were not solely those of medical practitioners: “extramedical” factors such as
specific practices, professional politics, and often women themselves, through their
illness narratives, contributed to the construction of their diseases. So, perhaps Foucault
is accurate to note a shift in epistemic power regarding anatomical knowledge taking
place in the 17th through 19th centuries; and Frank is right that language shifted to the use
of medical jargon; but those changes may not necessarily have meant that all of the
patient’s narrative (or agency) is entirely surrendered. The patient’s agency was, to some
extent, maintained in the exercise of constructing her own history with the medical
professional. Culturally, those living under the auspices of western, allopathic medicine
still deal with the residual effects of these linguistic and epistemic structures of power;
however, they, too, may have some authority over their narratives of illness. This will
become important to bear in mind later in this work, so we can observe the ways in which
33

women enacted agency in the creation of their narratives of illness.
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According to Libbon, around the start of the 19th century, the female body was
viewed by scientists and philosophers as the opposite of the male, as we see in the work
of German surgeon Philip Franz von Walther: “The feminine is purely negative, existing
only in contrast to and through the masculine,” (as cited in Libbon 84). Later in that
century, Johann Heinroth defined women as a “necessary complement” to men (85). By
midcentury, two German scholars, J.J. Sachs and Carl Michelet, had expanded the
theory, noting the ways in which women also have complementary social roles, as we see
in Michelet’s work: “Woman leads more of an emotional life…The inner order of the
familial circle completely consumes the moral significance of woman…Woman is the
born enemy of law…the productivity for the general welfare is accorded to the man
exclusively,” (as cited in Libbon 86). Women who did not fulfill the social role of that
era, according to Libbon, would therefore “threaten not only the contemporary definitions
of womanhood, but in so doing, destabilize those of manhood,” (86). Because the western
world was, in essence, a patriarchy, destabilization of the definitions of the sexes and
genders could result in increased power for women and fueled a fear of decreased power
for men. It could change the structure of politics, law, culture, and domestic life. Sex and

In Chapter 3, we will establish and examine the archetypal master narratives of
breast cancer which are sometimes fueled by the linguistic and epistemic authority of
allopathic medicine; in Chapter 4, we will analyze examples of what Nelson calls
“counterstories,” which resist these standard power structures and their problematic
features and allow and encourage women to enact agency in their experience of the
illness.
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gender were inextricably linked; the problem was that, prior to the invention of the
31

speculum, much was still unknown about female sex organs. Thus, the medical
community sought to scientifically define acceptable social behavior in order to avoid
destabilization of the concepts of gendered behavior they had identified.
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In the nineteenth century, the medical community still believed that sex and gender
were coextensive, and thus attempted to medicalize gendered behavior. According to
Theriot, gynecologists aimed to build their profession around the “otherness of woman”
and so connected all of her symptoms and illnesses to her female organs (6). The
normalized depiction of an ideal woman included, delicacy, passivity, dreaminess, and
capricious emotions, and that description was legitimized by scientists like Freud (Bordo
16). According to Libbon, in 1793, John Miller claimed that women were the “moral
barometer and the vanguard that improved society,” and by 1870, Nicholas Cooke said
that if women’s rights increased “she will cease to be a gentle mother, and become an
Amazonian Brawler,” (as cited in Libbon 86). Female organs and their functions were
associated with behavioral abnormalities. Ussher cites the medic, Edward J. Tilt, who
claimed that menopause brought on irrational, immoral, and sometimes illegal behavior:
“During the change of life the nervous system is so unhinged that the management of the

In her article, “Women’s Voices in Nineteenth Century Medical
Discourse,”Theriot notes the ways in which specialization in gynecology, along with the
invention of the speculum, “encouraged an anatomical representation of women's
complaints,” (6).
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Libbon claims it was, specifically, sexologists who began discussing women in
pathological terms (86).
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mental and moral fibers often taxes the ingenuity of the medical confident…the
disturbance can cause normally moral women to act without principle…steal…leave their
families…brood in melancholy selfabsorption,” (Managing the Monstrous Feminine
128). Phyllis Chesler observes the close association between women and madness in
public discourse: “By the end of the nineteenth century…the portraits of madness,
executed by both psychiatrists and novelists were primarily of women,” (32). Elaine
Showalter notes that the terms “feminine” and hysterical” become almost synonymous
during the nineteenth century (129). Women were defined by their physical differences
from men, and those physical differences had been assumed to be the cause of illness, as
Theriot notes: “The practice of gynecology…encouraged male practitioners to define
their specialities to include all of women’s problems and therefore to define woman as
inherently pathological,” (“Women’s Voices in Nineteenth Century Medical Discourse”
6).
By the end of the 19th century, Western biomedicine had conflated gender and sex.
The female body had become pathologized. Because behavioral abnormalities (those
behaviors which are not typically “female” like those named above) could indicate
illness, a woman's body, as well as her behavior, was subject to scrutiny and attempted
regulation.
1. The Early History of Breast Cancer and the Awareness Movement
Once we understand the ways in which the pathology of the female body is
historically established, we can see the ways in which that construction of the female
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body influences the early modern cultural history of breast cancer throughout the 19th
century. It’s important to note, too, that the perception of the female body as pathologized
coincided with the professional rise of the surgeon (who had, in centuries past, been
relegated to the leagues of barbers and dentists, a mere step above animal butchers). The
professional legitimization of surgeons and the increase in frequency of surgery was
specifically bolstered by two key developments in the 19th century: anesthesia
(midcentury) and antiseptic (late 19th century), both of which changed surgery from an
excruciating lastditch effort which often resulted in death from a gruesome infection, to
a viable option which could spare the patient agony and also had a relatively good
expectation of success. In fact, these developments gave surgeons an important and
powerful position in the cultural hegemony of western medicine. The political scholar
and intellectual Antonio Gramsci generated the primary definition of cultural hegemony,
which is "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent
is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production,” (12).
Surgeons already held a certain cache of epistemically significant knowledge about the
human body (as we have seen from Foucault's observations above). The invention and
frequent use of antiseptic and anesthetic meant that surgeons gained the prestige and
confidence noted in Gramsci's definition, because they could suddenly offer safe and
painless methods by which to extirpate tumors, growths, and limbs which caused illness
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or debilitation. Increasingly, the masses in need of medical attention deferred to surgeons
and physicians by default, making them the “dominant fundamental group” in the context
of health care. Additionally, as we have established above, medical professionals were in
a position of authority to investigate and regulate female behavior. Because medicine
generally exercised more influence over the female body via its potential to scrutinize or
regulate behavior, surgeons were uniquely positioned to perform more surgeries on
women who were interested in that option. It’s important to note that the shift of medical
professionals to the top of the cultural hegemonic structure took place gradually, over
several generations, and was multifactorial and complex; for the purposes of expediency,
it has been somewhat distilled in this context. We should be careful to remember that
medical professionals are not onedimensional, and each doctor’s relationship to each
patient is unique and complicated. It’s also important to note that while medicine,
specifically surgery, was enjoying a golden era of power, women enacted various types of
agency in their health care, as we shall see with writer Fanny Burney, who is both
pathologized by her doctors but also empowered through her illness narrative.
The narrative of Fanny Burney, the English writer, and her “cancer of the breast”
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diagnosis and subsequent surgery is one of the earliest modern narratives of breast
cancer widely published. Burney began to feel symptoms in 1810, which she reported to
her husband, who then retained the services of a famed accoucheur (manmidwife)

Burney, Frances. Manuscript letter in the Henry W. and Albert A. Berg
Collection, New York Public Library. Text found online.
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named Dubois. Upon his initial examination and early diagnosis, Dubois offered her a
prescription (the chemical composition of which is undisclosed in her writings) and
“uttered so many charges to me to be tranquil, and to suffer no uneasiness, that I could
not but suspect there was room for terrible inquietude.” Dubois’ urgings for Burney to
remain calm and avoid distress are not at all unusual for the time. John Rodman, a
Scottish surgeon, believed that fear of cancer was a possible cause for cancer, according
to his publications in 1815. He claimed that “fretfulness of temper and superfluous
anxiety, which sharpen the mental feelings, are not uncommon as maternal legacies,” (as
cited in Aronowitz 23). He also believed, according to Aronowitz, that “the physician’s
most important role [was to actively intervene] in this causative cycle of cancer fear and
worry,” (23). Further, Rodman claimed that fear of cancer, and thus, cancer itself, could
be spread between women via their sympathy and compassion for one another: “many
feel afflictive sensations of concern whenever they heard of another being distressed with
a mammary tumor named cancer…and brooding over ideal miseries unhinges the mind,
till the frame is disturbed, and disorder commences in their own breast,” (as cited in
Aronowitz 2324). In the claims of Dubois as well as Rodman, we can see reflected the
beliefs of Buchan and Tilt, that it is the very femaleness of the body (be it the anatomical
parts themselves, in this case breasts, or the feminine disposition, which causes illness)
that is capable of threatening the populace through its femaleness; that it is the duty of the
medical man to use his authority to prevent the female body from becoming unruly and
endangering women, families, and society. Also, by virtue of the fact that a woman’s own
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behavior can ostensibly cause or exacerbate the illness, she can then be held accountable
should the illness get worse. In these moments (Burney’s retelling of her diagnosis and
Rodman’s publications), we see the power of the medical professional both in private
consultant and as public advisor, and the way in which the medical man begins to use that
authority to develop the expectations of the ideal breast cancer patient: she is calm; she is
enduring; she does not burden other women with the stress of her illness; and she does
not burden or frighten society with it either. Her emotional responses to her illness are
regulated; if she does not respond appropriately, she must bear the consequences. Not
only she, but others as well, might be affected by the consequences of her behavior and
her illness, as we have seen above from Rodman; it was common to believe that a woman
could be accountable for spreading her cancer simply through exciting the sympathies
and emotions of others. Here, as Burney notes via her suspicion that there was “reason
for inquietude” she, like so many women of the era is stuck in an incredibly difficult
catch 22: she cannot allow herself to suffer from or exhibit emotional distress—she risks
worsening her illness or potentially spreading it to others—but her doctor has just given
her news which should almost inevitably bring on such distress. This conflicted position,
of being stuck between sociocultural expectations for behavior and desiring to express
genuine responses to illness, will be (and continues to be) a common experience for
women with breast cancer in the 20th and 21st centuries.
The belief of the pathological link between illness and emotion is corroborated by
the behavior of Burney’s second doctor (for she finds Dubois intolerable), Larrey. While
40

he is much more empathetic and tender in his treatment of her, and her condition appears
to be improving, he too believes that her condition is worsened by emotional states.
When she receives the news that Princess Amelia has died, and that King George III is ill,
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she is deeply upset. Her response to these incidents are not out of line; it's reasonable
for any constituent to be shocked and saddened by the death and illness of her country's
leaders. In this case though, for women, health is linked to emotional distress; her
emotional response becomes a diagnostic lens through which her illness is perceived.
Larrey's inquiry about her emotional state is immediately followed with a diagnosis that
her tumor has worsened, as we see from her letter: “The good M. Larrey, when he came
to me next after the last of these trials, was quite thrown into a consternation, so changed
he found all for the worse…and presently, sadly, announced his hope of dissolving the
hardness were nearly extinguished. M. Ribe was now again called in—but he only
corroborated the terrible judgement…” In this passage, we see that not only Larrey but a
third health professional (an anatomist) associates her emotional response over these
incidents with the depreciation of her health and the worsening of her cancer.
Burney endured several diagnostic sessions throughout 1810 and 1811, which she
describes in letters to her sister and nieces, and in which she recounts the fact that she
finally capitulated to the surgical option (which would have meant surgery without
anesthesia, since anesthesia did not come into common use until around 1846). Burney
The complete text of the letters can be found online. See Burney, Frances.
Manuscript letter in the Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection, New York Public
Library.
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writes that Dubois (who is brought back on the scene at the request of Larrey) tells her
forthrightly, “You must expect to suffer, I do not want to deceive you—you will
suffer—you will suffer very much!—” Roughly a hundred years later, during the time of
“benevolent deception” physicians withheld diagnostic and treatment information from
patients in an effort to avoid confusing or agitating them (Skloot 63). This strategy, in
which there is a lack of transparency, will become a problem with 20th century medicine.
However, as we see from Dubois' remark above, that is not the case in his communication
with his patient. He has been abundantly clear about the pain which will accompany her
treatment. We could argue that he is merely being direct with his patient. However, this
remark, taken in context with his previous exhibitions of carelessness about, or lack of
consideration for, her feelings in other parts of Burney’s letters, and with the fact that she
essentially fired him once for that type of behavior, indicates a pattern of lack of
consideration, rather than a directness of rapport out of respect for his patient. He has
already blamed her for exacerbating her illness by waiting so long to report her condition
to physicians, and makes no pretense of attempting to minimize her pain or anxiety. More
importantly, it synthesizes one aspect of the view of the medical hegemony about a
woman’s experience of the illness, and it aligns with previous pathologization of the
female body: because of her very femaleness, a woman may be expected to endure a
great deal of pain. This expectation is the foundation for the expectation of the ideal
breast cancer patient as one who willingly endures the painful procedures prescribed by
her doctor, and is held accountable if she is not demure and quietly enduring.
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Her response to the surgeon's lack of empathy is made clear in her letters. Burney
describes her reaction to him as he enters the room to prepare her for the procedure:
My distress was, I suppose, apparent...for M. Dubois himself now softened, and
spoke soothingly. “‘Can you,’ I cried, ‘feel for an operation that, to You, must
seem so trivial?’—‘Trivial?’ he repeated—taking up a bit of paper, which he tore,
unconsciously, into a million of pieces, ‘oui—c’est peu de
chose—mais’—(‘Yes—it’s a small thing—but’—) he stammered, and could not
go on.
Here, we see how Burney felt the gravity of her situation minimized by her surgeon’s
language even though, as we see from the following passage, she describes the surgery
itself as quite severe: “...so excruciating was the agony...the air that suddenly rushed into
those delicate parts felt like a mass of minute but sharp and forked poniards, that were
tearing the edges of the wound...describing a curve—cutting against the grain...while the
flesh resisted in a manner so forcible as to oppose and tire the hand of the operator, who
was forced to change from the right to the left—then...I thought I must have expired.”
Burney’s description of her surgery is especially telling when compared with that of
an 18th century German surgeon named Lorenz Heister, as he describes the ways in
which various female patients handle the operation: “Many females can stand the
operation with the greatest courage and without hardly moaning at all. Others, however,
make such a clamor that they may dishearten even the most undaunted surgeon and
hinder the operation…the surgeon should be steadfast and not allow himself become
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discomfited by the cries of the patient,” (as cited in Mukherjee 49). Heister claims that
women who are brave are quiet during surgery (this equating of bravery with quietness
would not necessarily have held true for men), implying that women who cry out, thus
distracting their doctors, are somehow misbehaving. They are less than ideal. In this
passage, we can see the suggestion of the expectation of the ideal patient to be one who
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endures torturous pain without complaint or “moaning.” Women were expected to be
passive, demure, and quiet, not loud or selfindulgent, and an ideal breast cancer patient
should have endured her pain in silence and bravery.
During the time of Burney’s diagnosis and treatment, the surgeon had begun a rise
to the top of the medical hegemonic structure, but surgery was still considered a last
resort as far as treatment, and a dangerous one at that. Doctors were pessimistic about
surgery as far back as the Hippocratic oath, which stated that “it is better to give no
treatment in cases of hidden cancer; treatment causes speedy early death, but to omit
treatment is to prolong life,” (as cited in Aronowitz 25). Burney’s account of Dubois’
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feelings about surgery seem to match the apprehension of the ancient Greeks : “M.
Dubois had given his opinion that the evil was far too advanced for any remedy; that the
cancer was already internally declared; that I was inevitably destined to that most

At this time in history, the expectation that the “ideal patient” be quiet and stoic
was not limited to women; however, as we have seen above, it was incumbent on women
to keep their emotional reactions and responses to a minimum, lest they risk inciting
sympathy in others and potentially spreading their illness.
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See Burney, Frances. Manuscript letter in the Henry W. and Albert A. Berg
Collection, New York Public Library.
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frightful of deaths, and that an operation would but accelerate my dissolution.” In that
era, women did not recognize breast cancer as easily and readily as we do know, and
often waited a long time to see a doctor for treatment, by which time the disease had
progressed too far to be helped. Then, treatment was often palliative (KnopfNewman 3).
Buchan, on the other hand, claimed that after other treatments—bleeding and
compression of the breasts among them—were exhausted, surgery should be the next
viable option: “either by knife or caustic…the sooner it is done, the better,” (Aronowitz
26). Robert Aronowitz rightly notes that Buchan’s commentary is an early 19th century
example of the “do not delay” rhetoric which will become dominant in the latter half of
the 19th century. Over the course of the 20th century, the “do not delay” concept morphed
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into the “early detection means a cure” message and remains dominant today.
Regardless of the individual physician's opinions about surgical treatment, one fact held
true: during the early 19th century, surgery was a frightful and highrisk option until the
advent of major advancements which took place in the mid1800s. By the end of the
century, breast cancer surgery would go from a nearly hopeless, lastditch effort, to the
first and primary option for treatment. This change initiated nearly a century of
debilitating surgical procedures for breast cancer in which the “early detection means a
cure” rhetoric would become codified as breast cancer law.
The mid19th century saw two major shifts in medical practice which resulted in

The “early detection means a cure” message, as part of breast cancer awareness,
will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3.
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significant changes in thinking about, and treatment of, breast cancer. In 1846, surgical
anesthesia became widely popularized and came into common usage in western medical
applications. Anesthesia, of course, meant that patients could be unconscious during
surgery and thus unaware of the pain, making many patients more inclined to surgical
options. According to Marci Jane KnopfNewman, it also made ablation a viable option
for treatment (8). In 1869, Joseph Lister used carbolic acid as an antiseptic while he
removed a tumor from his sisterinlaw’s breast on her dining room table (Mukherjee 58),
and by the 1870s, antiseptic practices of various stripes were commonplace, cutting down
a great deal on dangerous postsurgical infections. This advancement meant not only that
patients could be made unconscious for surgery, but that it was something they had a real
chance of surviving. Rapidly, surgery became a much more viable option for the
extirpation of breast cancer tumors but, as Aronowitz points out, it brought to light many
more questions about the causes and nature of breast cancer, and the effectiveness of
surgery at various stages of the development of cancer of the breast (54). Particularly,
these advances set the stage for the popularization of the Halsted radical mastectomy
procedure, a controversial procedure which would later serve as an important symbolic
catalyst of the modern breast cancer awareness movement.
While it was visibly evident to doctors that surgery was an effective way to remove
breast cancer tumors (and thus, it seemed to them, an effective option overall), the fact
remained that women continued to relapse or die from what appeared to be the same
illness, even after surgery had been performed. Aronowitz claims that this phenomenon
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supported the theory that breast cancer was a constitutional illness. According to O'Toole,
to understand an illness as constitutional meant that it had something to do with “the
makeup or functional habit of the body, determined by the genetic, biochemical, and
physiologic endowment of the individual, and modified in great measure by
environmental factors.” The term “constitutional” encompassed many possible speculated
causes of breast cancer other than localized tumors: stress, hysteria, chronic irritation of
the breasts (such as that which occurred from corsets and laces), possible hereditary
factors, “sympathy” between organs which caused the cancer to spread, or the general
weakness of the female constitution. While some physicians believed in the constitutional
theory of the cause of cancer, others believed that cancer was localized in the specific
tumor locations. Commitment to the belief in localization, as Aronowitz recounts, was
popular among surgeons, because it supported their primary method of dealing with
illness, as William Jenner noted: “You are not to believe it because it is true, but because
it is necessary in order that you should operate,” (as cited in Aronowitz 59). But at that
point, both concepts were merely theories and the empirical data had not been collected
to fully justify either one. Doctors and surgeons simply drew on their own anecdotal
knowledge and that of other professionals (Aronowitz 59). In the late 1870s, the
Pathological Society of London reached the compromising consensus that while the
illness may be constitutional in its general origin, it is primarily local (Aronowitz 57).
This compromise was made more specific by the definition and application of the word
metastasis which, in its application to cancer, then came to mean “the transmission of the
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physical matter of cancer…cancer cells,” (Aronowitz 60). According to Aronowitz, the
acceptance of the constitution as causation could then the explain the process by which a
cancer metastasizes, but called into question the effectiveness of surgical options: “What
good was surgery if tumors may have already spread throughout the body in a latent
way?…surgeons began…asserting that there existed a discrete time interval in the natural
history of cancer during which latent metastasis had not yet occurred,” (61). In essence,
the assertion meant that breast cancer followed a predictable, logical progression, the
final stage of which was metastasis. Breast cancer had a simple timeline from beginning
to end—a timeline which Aronowitz identifies as its “natural history”and that patients
who were vigilant could catch their cancer early in this progression and simply stop it
from worsening or spreading. By the time the Victorian era had begun, surgeons
encouraged the belief that patients had a limited amount of time in which to extirpate
cancer before it began to metastasize, though they had very little reliable evidence to
support the rhetoric.
This theory of the natural history of breast cancer was handy for surgeons to
encourage the use of their services: patients who found the cancer for which they were so
vigilantly watching, could just come have it removed. But the natural history theory also
had another effect: where previously accountability for illness was laid at the feet of
women via accusations of distress, hysteria, corsetwearing, or other
constitutionallybased ideas, in this new era in which the idea of a natural progression
from local to metastatic was supported, women could still be held accountable for their
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illness by virtue of the accusation that they had waited too long to seek diagnosis and
treatment. The work of Buchan, in the early 19the century, was a precursor to this
phenomenon: “the unhappy patient conceals it too long…after the disorder has arrived at
a certain height, it generally sets all medicine at defiance,” (as cited in Aronowitz 26). We
can see the real effects of the natural progression theory in the 1891 account of Alice
James, sister of Henry and William James, regarding her breast cancer diagnosis:
Ever since I have been ill, I have longed and longed for some palpable disease, no
matter how conventionally dreadful a label it might have, but I was driven back to
stagger alone under the monstrous mass of subjective sensations, which that
sympathetic being “the medical man” had no higher inspiration than to assure me
I was personally responsible for…” (as cited in Aronowitz 71)
Alice had experienced a whole host of illnesses and symptoms, so her breast cancer took
time to diagnose; by the time she was diagnosed, there were no options but palliative
measures (KnopfNewman 3). It’s clear from this passage from her diary though, that her
doctor made her feel that she is to blame for the advanced progression of her illness. This
shift in the 19th century sets the stage for the “early detection equals a cure” rhetoric that
would become so much a part of the 20th century discourse around breast cancer. It also
forms the foundation for the subsequent phenomenon of blaming women who are
diagnosed with breast cancer: the woman who waited too long for treatment put her own
life at risk, but also risked the wellbeing of the family for which she was responsible.
Had she only come in sooner, she could have been cured. Therefore, she was responsible
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for the outcome. Finally, the “early detection equals a cure” message also empowered and
supported the common use of the Halsted radical mastectomy, the surgery which would
become the “gold standard” or breast cancer treatment until the 1970s, and which would
disfigure many women.
In the 1870s, William Stewart Halsted was already a wellknown and successful
surgeon who had studied in Europe and worked at Bellevue Hospital in New York and
Johns Hopkins in Baltimore. Because of his successful surgical practice and the amount
of patients through his doors on a consistent basis, Halsted earned himself the moniker,
“Jack the Ripper” during his early career (Imber 122). During his research trip to Europe,
he had learned about a German surgeon named Volkmann using increasingly aggressive
surgeries to treat breast cancer tumors; but he also knew that many patients had
experienced relapse (Mukherjee 64). The extensive and aggressive surgeries appeared to
have a limited effect. Halsted was also aware of the work done by Charles Moore
examining the margins around the excisions for breast cancer tumors, and Moore’s
observation that the tumors seemed to recur around these margins, indicating the
possibility that not all of the cancerous tissue had been removed (64). Additionally, he
knew of evidence that cancer spread through the lymphatic channels and that cancer was
often found in the pectoralis major and pectoralis minor muscles (Imber 121). All this
research led Halsted to one conclusion regarding the best surgical treatment of breast
cancer: the surgeon must remove the breast, the pectoralis muscles, the lymph nodes, and
even a section of the collarbone in order to reach the lymph nodes beneath it (Imber 121).
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Because they involved the removal of significant portions of chest and arm muscle, and
sometimes bones, his surgeries often left his patients recovering for months or years,
often permanently disfigured or debilitated (Mukherjee 65). Many suffered ongoing
weakness, chronic pain, or even loss of use of their arms on the side of their bodies where
the surgery occurred. Additionally, because allopathic medicine had taken up Benjamin
Bell’s Enlightenmentera claim that part of a good recovery included a speedy path from
diagnosis to surgery, surgeons performed the biopsy and then surgery (if necessary) in the
same operation (KnopfNewman 7).
To compound matters, Halsted subscribed to the belief of “benevolent deception”
articulated earlier in this chapter, in which physicians withheld diagnostic information
from their patients (relatively standard practice at this time), ostensibly for their own
good. As we saw with Burney, there was some sense on behalf of physicians that
extremes of emotion could exacerbate a malignancy; many women were not even told
they had cancer. Many of Halsted’s patients underwent this whole procedure never
having been told their diagnosis (Aronowitz 127). Women went into surgeries not
knowing what their affliction was (although their families were often informed and
consulted), and woke to find all of their breast and a good portion of their chest missing
and that their arm had very limited function, though there was no solid evidence of the
benefits of the Halsted over other methods.
Epidemiologists began gathering data to support the success of Halsted’s procedure,
and the data appeared to indicate that the Halsted method was the best option: “Those
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statistics reinforced the early 20th century belief that a woman could choose between the
Halsted radical mastectomy and death,” (KnopfNewman 8). In 1894, Halsted published
a paper in which he claimed that of 50 cases he had treated, only three exhibited local
recurrences, which was a 6% recurrence rate (compared to 50% recurrence rate found in
other surgical methods) (Imber 124). Women came rushing to Halsted for their
procedures (Imber 123) and it quickly became the standard method for treating breast
cancer. But a closer look at the reasoning behind the statistics reveals that its
effectiveness was misconstrued. First, Halsted deemphasized the idea of metastasis and
instead focused almost solely on local recurrences. He believed that metastasis
subsequent to surgery was basically irrelevant to surgery: “By positing the distinct and
separate clinical course of local disease and metastatic disease, Halsted rationalized his
emphasis of the complete operation by the absence of local recurrences rather than saving
his patients’ lives,” (Aronowitz 95). So, Halsted’s “successes” for the radical procedure
were measured by how many women did not have local recurrences after their surgery,
and some of those successes include women who died years later of metastatic breast
cancer (96). By 1898, Halsted’s own evidence had begun to demonstrate the lack of true
effectiveness of the procedure. He presented data at a conference of the American
Surgical Association of New Orleans which claimed that his method was much more
successful than any other at preventing local recurrence, but that over 76 breast cancer
patients who had originally undergone the Halsted radical mastectomy, 36 had died
within three years of surgery (Mukherjee 68). That’s a mortality rate just over 47%.
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During his career, Halsted admitted that he had performed surgery for what he termed
“moral reasons,” which meant that he would perform his surgical procedure on women in
order to preserve their hope (Aronowitz 96). This idea of the importance of the
preservation of hope in the face of breast cancer would remain a part of cultural thinking
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about breast cancer throughout the 20th century (as we shall see in later chapters).

However, Halsted was also careful to note that he never considered cure the goal of
surgery. Which begs the question, what exactly did he suppose he was offering women
hope for, if not a cure? If the goal of radical surgery is not a cure, what else could a
reasonable goal possibly be? Perhaps, since doctors hypothesized that women’s
emotional states could exacerbate their physical conditions, Halsted believed performing
the surgery could offer some emotional consolation, some semblance of control, which
might allow the patient some more time, or might alleviate pain. Regardless of the
evident problems with the Halsted procedure, it became the “gold standard” for breast
cancer treatment, and the structure of health insurance in the early 20th century continued
to support this ascendancy: extremely invasive procedures offered the most financial
benefit to healthcare providers and doctors because the insurance company paid more for
them (KnopfNewman 10).
Notably, while female and feminist writers seeking to explore the effects of the
Halsted procedure, and the possible glorification of Halsted’s views on cancer treatment,

The emphasis on hope is still prevalent. See Ehrenreich, Barbara. “Welcome to
Cancerland.” Harper’s Magazine.
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have often found great fault with Halsted and his work, contemporary male scholars
writing on Halsted tend to take an apologist approach, including the famed author of The
Emperor of Maladies, Siddhartha Mukherjee: “William Stewart Halsted, whose name
was to become inseparably attached to the concept of ‘radical’ surgery, did not ask for
that distinction. Instead it was handed to him without almost any asking…Halsted didn’t
invent radical surgery, He inherited the idea from his predecessors and brought it to its
extreme and logical perfection…” (60). Further, Aronowitz (who, like Mukherjee is male
and an M.D.) implies that Halsted has been unfairly judged: “breast cancer activists in
recent decades have often vilified Halsted and the ‘Halsted mastectomy’ which has been
depicted as a mutilating operation imposed on women by patronizing and insensitive
male surgeons,” (86). Though he makes an attempt to appear objective in his summation
of the controversy over Halsted, Aronowitz also calls him an “icon” and does not
acknowledge the fact that Halsted knowingly continued to perform a surgery which he
knew was debilitating and for which he had little to no evidence of decreased mortality.
Aronowitz does not acknowledge or include the perspectives and observations of women
who have undergone the surgery. These very recent reflections on Halsted’s work also
focus on his story and his successes and achievements: the remarks demonstrate the
paternalistic power of the medical hegemony still present in modern cultural discourse of
breast cancer and glaze over the lived narratives of the women who were subject to the
genuine brutality of breast cancer treatment. While it’s important to acknowledge
Halsted’s body of work objectively, we should bear in mind that remarks like these may
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feel marginalizing to many women who feel their stories of pain, struggle, and lifelong
debilitation may go widely unheard, even by scholars like Mukherjee who is widely
acclaimed as having written a comprehensive cultural history of cancer.
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As if the threat of surgery (which had become the primary treatment option by the
late 19th century) wasn’t enough, the Victorians feared breast cancer because they had
come to revere the breast as a symbol for home and hearth (KnopfNewman 6). The
breast, as a symbol of the woman’s own sexuality and vitality, was far less important than
the breast as representative of the maternal nurturing of the nuclear family. Ellen Leopold
notes this occurrence: “Any pleasure a woman might take in her own body or her own
life was deemed inconsequential to the culture…what did matter was the preservation of
family life. Inescapably, breast cancer put this at risk,” (A Darker Ribbon 31). The breast
was representative of a woman's responsibility to her family; therefore, the destruction of
the breast threatened by breast cancer symbolically endangered the woman's obligation to
her family. Moreover, any individual woman's desires, wants, or feelings about her own
sexuality, her own perception of femininity, or the treatment of her body, was secondary
(or even tertiary) to cultural needs to preserve women's roles as mothers and domestic
caretakers, rather than individuated, sexual beings. These ideas were the foundation for
the expectation that women with breast cancer maintain heteronormative bodies and
behaviors. Jackson defines “heteronormativity” as “institutionalized, normative
For this reason, we need to expand our cultural understanding ot the experience
of breast cancer, and culturally acknowledge the vast variety of experiences many women
have with the illness, as I shall elaborate in later chapters.
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heterosexuality” (105). In the context of this definition, heterosexual relationships are
considered the norm, and gender roles within heterosexual relationships are considered
the definitive roles. In heteronormative thinking, women are identified as wives and
mothers in nuclear families, and they perform traditional gender norms of femininity.
Women with breast cancer were expected to forego their own complex feelings about
their bodies, their illness, and their treatment in order to maintain heteronormativity, and
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expectation which remains with us today, and which we shall explore in later chapters.
The symbolic importance of the breast was one salient factor which catalyzed

breast cancer awareness. Another factor was the spread of the belief in the natural history
theory of breast cancer. The spread of natural history theory led to widespread beliefs that
women who went to the doctor immediately after finding a lump could (and inevitably
would) be cured of their cancer. This was an oversimplification: “cure” was a rather
deceptive word, because many physicians defined “cured” as having had the tumor
extirpated from the body. They did not take into account the later recurrences or
metastasis which were probable. The emphasis on the breast as a symbol for healthy
homes and families (which we saw above), coupled with the ostensible need for
immediate diagnosis and treatment of breast cancer, served as a catalyst for growing
awareness about, and discussion of, breast cancer. However, it also became the
foundation for the notion that women had a responsibility to see their doctors as soon as

In chapter three, we shall also discuss the LGBTQ community in the context of
the expectation of heteronormativity for breast cancer patients.

40

56

they were aware of symptoms, and that they could be held accountable for failing to do
so, as we shall also see in later chapters.
In 1913, the American Society for the Control of Cancer formed with the primary
purpose of spreading awareness about cancer prevention and treatment (KnopfNewman
16). In fact, Aronowitz claims that spreading the “do not delay” message was the “raison
d’être” for the society (144). Often, the “do not delay” message made use of the the
presumed importance of the female body to her husband and family in order to impress
its message upon women. An ad published by the New York City Cancer Committee, for
example, tells the story of a young newlywed man whose wife has detected a lump. She
is resistant to visiting the doctor, a family friend, but her husband tells him and he comes
to dinner: “The doctor confronts the newlywed…tells her to take off her blouse, pays ‘no
attention to her hysterical attitudes,’ examines her, and sends her…to the hospital where
she immediately has an operation,” (146). The woman in the ad is understandably
alarmed and made anxious by the fact that her husband has planned a dinner that is
tantamount to an ambush, and that her family friend orders her to remove her blouse for
an exam, and yet her response is labeled “hysterical” by the male doctor. Because she has
not behaved in a way that fulfills her social expectationsabiding the advice of her
husband and medicinal professionals to get checked—she is labeled as “hysterical.” This
word is key because, since the time of ancient Greek medicine, it has been associated
with mistaken assumptions about the ways in which female biology (specifically, the
“wandering womb”) affects behavior. This woman is doubly dismissed by the use of the
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word: first, the word implies inappropriate levels of irrationality. This woman's resistance
to her doctor's dinner ambush seems objectively rational and reasonable, yet she is
labeled with a word that dismisses her emotional response. Second, the etymology of the
word tells us that it has long been used to (mistakenly) associate female biology with
illness, to pathologize women simply for their femaleness. While we could argue that the
husband is wellmeaning and concerned for her healththere's no evidence to the
contraryit's important to note that he does not respect her privacy. Against her wishes,
he tells the doctor, and neither man seems to acknowledge the deeply intrusive nature of
what happens during dinner. Finally, the story of the illness, which is uniquely female, is
narrated by two men. And yet, the oversimplified “do not delay” message persisted.
The ASCC launched a program called the Women’s Field Army in 1933, and the
program recruited women to work in community groups to raise awareness and spread
the “do not delay” message (KnopfNewman 16). The "do not delay" message stemmed
from belief in the late 19th century theory of the natural history of breast cancer, the idea
that breast cancer followed a predictable, orderly timeline of growth and metastasis. A
quick Google search by any layperson reveals dozens of posters for the movement, many
of which emphasize early detection, such as one which reads “‘Early’ is the watchword
for cancer control.” According to Karli Jane Cerankowski, many of these advertisements
also claimed that cancer could be cured if patients only made it to their physicians in time
for proper treatment. Both of these strategies reified the belief that early detection was
tantamount to a cure, even when evidence did not support the message. The public
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latched on to the oversimplification that “early detection means a cure,” believing,
essentially, that as long as breast cancer was detected and attended to at early stages, that
it not only could be cured, but that it would be cured. On its face, the concept of
encouraging the populace not to delay in treating an illness seems fairly innocuous, but in
the case of breast cancer, the message is complicated when it intersects with other
messages and strategies of the early movement. By this simplified logic, any woman who
is not cured of her breast cancer simply didn’t detect it early enough or get medical
attention early enough, a behavior for which she can be held accountable. Additionally,
mammograms had not come into use yet, so treatment and removal of breast cancer was
fairly primitive: early detection meant surgery nearly every time. Many women with early
stage cancers may have undergone unnecessary surgeries. Some of the lumps may not
even have been breast cancer, and many women who did have cancer had recurrences or
metastasis anyway. Very little was known about the types and stages of breast cancer at
that time: sending the “early detection equals a cure” message was an overreach on behalf
of the campaign.
The advertisements added to their urgency (and played on the patriotism generated
by the war efforts of World Wars I and II) through the usage of war metaphors and battle
language. Women were encouraged to “enlist” in the group (KnopfNewman 16) and
posters often encouraged women to “fight cancer” and pictured strong female figures
wielding swords. At this point, the breast cancer awareness movement took on the role of
spreading public messages about breast cancer. The perpetuation of the “early detection
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means a cure” message, along with the usage of battle metaphors, creates problematic
cultural connotations of breast cancer that we still deal with today. The “early detection
means a cure” message implies that those who do delay are responsible for the outcome;
the battle metaphor implies that those who “lose the battle” to cancer simply didn’t fight
hard enough. Both support and encourage the problematic victimblaming which we saw
in the 19th century. This implication of the message is still prevalent today, and the
problematic nature of its usage will be discussed and developed in later chapters.
When it came to breast cancer, the young awareness movement continued to
emphasize the importance of the breasts as symbols, a focus which had begun with the
Victorians at the end of the 19th century. Breasts continued to represent the ultimate
manifestation of femininity: motherhood. They represented a woman’s ability to create
and nurture a nuclear family, contributing to the social welfare. The movement exploited
that symbolism by implying that women who did not engage properly in the construction
of such a family, got breast cancer as punishment. KnopfNewman notes this
phenomenon in her mention of a 1935 medical report (which initially appeared in the
work of Leslie Reagan) which called breast cancer “the penalty women pay for failing to
bear and...nurse children,” (18). This reportage, according to KnopfNewman, “suggested
that women had to succumb to their biological destinies as wives and mothers,” (18). It’s
important to note that now, we do know of substantial research to demonstrate that
bearing children, particularly before 30, can lower a woman’s risk for breast cancer.
However, this research had not yet been conducted in 1935. Also, this kind of advertising
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again creates an oversimplification of a complex situation. It assumes that women are not
only biologically “destined” to be mothers but also to be wives (implying that unwifely
behavior is risky, too). This assumption is also potentially hurtful and unnecessarily
frightening to women who can’t bear children for medical reasons. In 1953, a woman
named Terese Lasser partnered with the ACS to form an organization called “Reach for
Recovery,” which was meant to help women deal with the loss of a breast. While this
organization did much good work for many women, one of its early problems was that it
reified heteronormativity. Lasser, for example, when asked about the reasons she began
the “Reach for Recovery” organization, responded: “The first thing you think about is
whether or not you’re going to live…And then the second thing you think about is how
the man in your life is going to react,” (Klemesrud 46). While it’s reasonable to assume
that many women’s first thoughts after diagnosis would relate to their own mortality, the
pairing of these two things appears to imply that a person’s physical wellbeing is related
to person's ability to perform heteronormativity, that the person should focus on the “man
in [her] life” and a role in the nuclear family and household. If we relate a person’s
mortality to the ability to perform heteronormatively, we also risk the implication that the
person is responsible if they get cancer—because that person didn’t perform the proper
role. Or, at least, that person is accountable for whether or not their spouse still finds
them attractive after surgery.
While their methods may have been somewhat illconceived, the ASCC (later the
American Cancer Society) and the Women’s Field Army, had begun to spark public
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awareness about breast cancer and selfexamination. However, by the time the famed
author and environmentalist, Rachel Carson, was diagnosed with breast cancer in 1960, it
was not an illness which offered women an opportunity to discuss a shared experience;
they did not speak to one another of their experiences with breast cancer (Leopold A
Darker Ribbon 114). Adrienne Rich, in her poem, “A Woman Dead in Her Forties," notes
the significance, the burden, of this silence: “I want to touch my fingers/to where your
breasts had been/but we never did such things,” (Rich 5358.). Part of the social
expectation of polite, demure women, an expectation which had been common for several
decades, was that they not discuss or share their illnesses with one another. Leopold notes
this expectation in her commentary about the experience of Katherine Coman in the early
1900s: “Women who had to endure breast cancer surgery often hid their disease, even
from members of their own families. It was not uncommon for children to be kept in the
dark,” (Leopold My Soul is Among Lions 1819). It was still an illness mostly shrouded in
secrecy and mystery, and not one for which women found many venues of acceptable
discussion. This atmosphere enforced the social expectation that wellbehaved women
did not discuss their cancer; they fulfilled the expected social role, and the role of ideal
patient, by enduring silently. It should be observed, additionally, that members of the
LGBTQ community would not generally have discussed their sexual identity publicly,
either, and so were doubly silenced by social norms if they acquired breast cancer.
Carson, however, rebelled against many of these conventions, enacting agency and
demanding a reciprocal relationship to her doctors. She insisted that full disclosure of her
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diagnosis be given to her so that she could investigate options and participate in treatment
decisions (Leopold A Darker Ribbon 116). It was through her investigation of these
options that she came across Dr. George Crile, Jr. Like Carson, Crile, too, flew in the face
of his peers when it came to their beliefs about breast cancer. In his book, Cancer and
Common Sense, he claimed that the Halsted mastectomy was overly radical, not
necessary, and ineffective. Further, he encouraged women to insist that their doctors be
transparent with them regarding their diagnosis and treatment outcomes: “Do not be
afraid to ask your surgeon to tell you the truth…If you do not ask him, he may evade the
issue,” (Leopold A Darker Ribbon 117). A survey of medical professionals around this
time reveals that, with regards to cancer diagnosis, 90% still applied the concept of
benevolent deception, and chose not to tell their patients about their diagnosis of cancer
(122).They avoided the word “cancer” itself and, when pressed, used euphemisms like
“lesion” and “mass,” arguing that this choice was in the patient’s best interest (Leopold A
Darker Ribbon 122123). Conversely, a report by the Canadian Cancer Society reveals
that when women were asked if they would want to know their diagnosis, twothirds
claimed that they would (123). Notably, 20th century physicians rationalized the choice
to mislead patients using very similar logic to that of their 19th century counterparts: the
patient might become depressed, emotional, or despondent (123). While this evasiveness
on behalf of physicians would have been fairly normal behavior with regard to all cancer
diagnoses (not just breast cancer), it's important to understand the context and atmosphere
in which Crile was voicing his opinion. His book was specifically directing women,
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breast cancer patients, to utilize their voices, empower themselves, and demand
transparency (KnopfNewman 1011). The phenomenon of note here is not the
benevolent deception which, shocking as it may seem to us now, was fairly standard;
rather, it was that Crile flew in the face of that professional standard, specifically when it
came to breast cancer treatment, and that that flouting of professional standards was one
of the major actions which earned him the ire of agencies like the American Cancer
Society, the American Medical Association, and the National Cancer Institute
(KnopfNewman 10). As Leopold notes, Crile's work angered his peers in the medical
field, as one fellow physician noted: “The trouble with Crile is that he advocates so many
goddamn different things…He has introduced a sense of chaos into breast treatment. Now
any surgeon can do anything he please for breast cancer and call upon Crile as his
authority,” (A Darker Ribbon 117). What this man may have been identifying as “chaos”
is an upset of the maledominated medical hegemony to which so many physicians had
become accustomed. Additionally, in his work, Crile exposed the fact that the structure of
health insurance meant that extremely invasive procedures offered the most financial
benefit to healthcare providers and doctors, and therefore health insurance inadvertently
supported the frequency of such a procedure, which also didn’t gain him much popularity
among his peers (KnopfNewman 10). The American Cancer Society, the American
Medical Association, the National Cancer Institute, and the American college of surgeons
all took issue with his revelations, citing their belief that he should not have shared his
theories with the laypeople (KnopfNewman 10). Though Crile’s arguments were
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wellreasoned and supported by evidence, his peers in these prestigious and renowned
agencies all took sides against his disclosures, which might be a maneuver on behalf of
the medical hegemony to retain some of its power.
Carson had read Crile’s work, so she got in touch with him. She had already
undergone a Halsted radical mastectomy, but her prognosis was not good and she sought
further advice from Crile (Leopold A Darker Ribbon 118119). Carson’s action, pursuing
a second opinion (and doing so without using one’s husband as an intermediary or
representative) was rare for women (118119). Carson, sadly, died of complications
related to breast cancer in 1964 and, though Crile stopped performing the Halsted
procedure (and instead favored modified radical mastectomies or lumpectomies) and a
few surgeons followed his lead, the majority of doctors continued to use the Halsted into
the 1970s. Many doctors continued using the Halsted procedure throughout the mid and
latter 20th century because they were simply resistant to change or had grown
accustomed to the lucrative nature of such a procedure, even though there was little to no
evidence that it was more effective than other procedures. In the case of the Halsted
mastectomy, we see that biomedicine has a great deal of power with regard to breast
cancer treatment. While some women—like Burney—had been enacting agency in their
own ways for many years, the imbalance of power between medicine and patients would
really begin to dissipate during American secondwave feminism in the 1970s, when the
women’s health movement began to encourage women to seek further agency and
empowerment in their diagnostic and treatment processes.
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By the late 1960s, the power of the medical establishment had begun to change.
Mukherjee elaborates: “By the late 1960s, the relationship between doctors and patients
had begun to shift dramatically. Medicine, once considered virtually infallible in its
judgement, was turning out to have deep fallibilities—flaws that appeared to cluster
pointedly around issues of women’s health,” (199). In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
America was in an uproar as various groups resisted hegemonic power structures like the
military, medicine, and government. Women began to seek more and better options with
regard to their health care, rather than accepting the status quo. Women with breast
cancer, for example, specifically, sought to eliminate the “onestep” procedure (in which
women went under anesthesia for a biopsy but, if a malignant tumor was found, also had
a Halsted radical mastectomy performed in the same procedure). Rose Kushner, a
journalist who had also had breast cancer, advocated against this procedure through an
article in The Washington Post, in which she asked, “Why do surgeons feel they have the
right to make the decisions for their unconscious patients? Why not allow them to wake
up, be told the diagnosis, and the alternatives and options available?” (as cited in
KnopfNewman 89). According to Barron Lerner, Kushner also took on the American
Cancer Society by criticizing Terese Lasser’s “Reach for Recovery” program: she
claimed that it distracted women from their presurgical options. Lerner notes that the
ACS, predictably, took a stance against her. Kushner, like Crile, also objected to the
Halsted radical mastectomy, and some physicians had begun to believe likewise, such as
Bernard Fisher who, as chairman of the National Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel
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Project, began research to demonstrate the lack of efficacy in the procedure (Mukherjee
200).
First Lady Betty Ford’s experience, and her intersection with activist Rose Kushner,
offers much to consider with regard to women’s simultaneous agency and oppression. In
1974, Betty Ford, wife of thenPresident Gerald Ford, was diagnosed with cancer. Ford
made her diagnosis public eighteen days after her husband pardoned former President,
Richard Nixon, in an effort to divert the public’s gaze from that event (KnopfNewman
59). Though her overt intent was to distract from what may have been perceived as a
scandal, a side effect of her disclosure was that suddenly breast cancer was a matter for
public discussion. Because of her position, Betty Ford was able to effectively break the
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public silence about breast cancer. In this way, the First Lady demonstrated some use of
her privileged position: as a public figure, she had the power to open the discussion for
other women which had not been previously open to them. However, though she may
have been going against the tradition of silence, it would be inaccurate to say that she
became a fullfledged breast cancer rebel. In fact, according to Barron Lerner, Rose
Kushner attempted to use private contacts to get in touch with the First Lady to inform
her of her options and discourage her from having a radical procedure but was told “that
the President had already decided that his wife would have the onestep radical
procedure.” So, in this case, First Lady Betty Ford’s body was subject not only to

Knopf-Newman analyzes this phenomenon thoroughly in Slash, Burn, and
Poison: Transforming Breast Cancer Stories into Action, pages 72-76.
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presidential politics, but also to the legacy of medical power.
Ford’s position in the public eye meant that her behavior in response to her breast
cancer would have been widely scrutinized; she was expected to perform the role of the
ideal breast cancer patient. And that she did, as we see in several examples, not the least
of which is story told by the picture taken of herself and her husband shortly after she has
had her radical mastectomy surgery (KnopfNewman 7475). The President and First
Lady are at a Washington Redskins game and the team has signed a football for the
President to give to the First Lady. In the picture, President Ford has just thrown the ball
to her, and she is pictured, right arm aloft and reared back, holding the ball and about to
toss it back to her husband (75). This physical movement following a Halsted procedure
would have been, at worst, nearly impossible, given the muscle removal and nature of the
injuries; it would have been, at best, incredibly painful. And yet, First Lady Ford smiles
and throws the ball, at once fulfilling and reinforcing the concept of the ideal breast
cancer patient (by enduring her pain without complaint) and the good wife (by standing
by her man and making him look good for publicity). Ford may have been integral to
breaking the silence so that women could start to speak with others about breast cancer,
but the longstanding cultural norms and expectations surrounding the illness were still
highly influential and a part of many people’s experience.
The shift in use from the Halsted procedure to the modified radical mastectomy or
the lumpectomy was the result, primarily, of the coinciding of the secondwave feminist
movement of the 1970s with open discourse about breast cancer and its treatment; the
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standard procedure changed because patients advocated for change with their doctors.
Finally, in 1981, physician Bernard Fisher published a definitive study that included
1,765 patients. The study divided women into three groups: those who had been treated
with Halsted radical mastectomies; those who had been treated by simple mastectomy;
and those who had been treated with surgery and radiation (Mukherjee 201). The study
revealed that there was no difference in rates of recurrence, relapse, death, and distant
metastasis for any of the three groups. While the Halsted fared no worse than other
procedures, by this measure, it also fared no better; its more invasive method was proven
no more effective than any less radical treatments (201), which means that the most
debilitating aspects of the procedure, such as removal of arm muscle and chest muscle,
were unnecessary. After nearly 100 years of medical science clinging to the procedure,
the Halsted mastectomy finally fell out of practice.
By the late 1970s, Kushner’s work and the public discussion of Betty Ford’s breast
cancer had meant that many women had begun to voice their concerns about radical
surgery, and that many had begun to resist it. Audre Lorde, the black, lesbian, feminist
poet, was one of those women. In an era in which women had only recently begun to
speak publicly about breast cancer, and in which they still struggled mightily to get out
from under the power of allopathic medicine, Lorde came forward to claim space in the
discourse about breast cancer, but also to attempt to stake a claim in that space for black
women and lesbians, too, as she writes: “For…women of all ages, colors, and sexual
identities who recognize that imposed silence about any area of our lives is a tool for
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separation and powerlessness, I have tried to voice some of my feelings and thoughts…”
(The Cancer Journals 7). Lorde scrutinized and criticized the major trends which may
impose silence on people about their breast cancer. She resisted the power of medicine by
demanding a twostep procedure, in which those with breast cancer could be biopsied,
come out of anesthesia, consider options, and then schedule another procedure if
necessary (KnopfNewman 110). The ideal breast cancer patient is demure, quiet, and
defers to medical authority; Lorde calls into question the problematic role of the ideal
breast cancer patient by refusing to wear a prosthetic breast in her doctor’s office after a
nurse told her that it was “bad for the morale of the office” (60). Lorde observes the
expectation that breast cancer bodies return to heteronormative femininity through her
criticism of the reach for Recovery organization. When the representative comes to her
hospital room to show her how to wear her prosthesis, Lorde wonders how her lover will
react to her altered body (Lorde 4243). She also notes that she cannot relate to this
woman: “I ached to talk to women about the experience I had just been through…But I
needed to talk with women who shared at least some of my major concerns and beliefs
and visions, who shared at least some of my language,” (42). Lorde’s emphasis on
language here shows her feeling that her experience is not represented in the
contemporaneous discourse of breast cancer. She is not looking for voices exactly like her
own, necessarily, but she is craving voices which “share some of [her] language.” She is
seeking more plurality in which to identify an experience, a voice, to which she can
relate. Finally, Lorde dismantles the victimblaming inherent in the “early detection
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means a cure” mentality by noting that the cultural reaction to breast cancer bodies may
cause those with potential breast cancer to delay: “…for the incidence of early detection
and treatment to increase, American women must become free enough from social
stereotypes concerning their appearance to realize that losing a breast is infinitely
preferable to losing one’s life,” (63). Here, Lorde points out that women are still subject
to the emphasis on the importance of the breast and appearing normal, and that appearing
abnormal is still so highly stigmatized that it may threaten a person’s ability to seek help.
The cultural prevalence of heteronormativity, and the stigma which accompanied
nonnormative appearance or behavior, may have endangered people's lives.
Lorde’s empowerment in telling her own story was a major leap forward on behalf
of those with breast cancer. However, her story still remains one of the few widely known
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breast cancer narratives from both people of color and lesbians. It opened the
opportunity for some to speak out and reveal their own experiences, and it sparked some
revolutionary thinking in small pockets, but would take decades for larger contingents of
people to profoundly consider breast cancer in the way that Lorde had. In the meantime,
the dominant hegemonic discourse, always bolstered by the authority of medicine and
further supported by the burgeoning pharmaceutical industry, would give rise to the
contemporary breast cancer awareness movement, the pink ribbon, and series of
narratives which perpetuated the problematic construction of the breast cancer body.
In Chapter 4, we will identify and explore works by other women of color and
other non-heteronormative women. We will also identify areas in which current discourse
about breast cancer is still lacking diversity.
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In 1981, inspired by her sister's experience with breast cancer, Nancy Brinker
founded the Susan G. Komen for the Cure Foundation and began speaking publicly about
her sister's experiences with the illness and her own. She very quickly became the public
face of the contemporary breast cancer awareness movement. By the beginning of the
1990s, she had led Komen to partner with Estee Lauder to begin the pink ribbon
marketing campaign to raise awareness (and money). According to Sandy M. Fernandez,
Pink ribbons were given away at Susan G. Komen events and distributed to customers at
Estee Lauder sales counters. From the very beginning, the pink ribbon was associated
with corporate fundraising and the promotion of feminine, middleclass white women.
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Fernandez recounts the story of the ribbon's inception and rise to fame. First, in
1979, Penny Laingen, inspired by the song “Tie a Yellow Ribbon Round the Old Oak
Tree,” tied a yellow ribbon around a tree in her yard to represent her wish that her
husband, a hostage in Iran, would come home safely. The trend caught on, and in 1990,
when Jeremy Irons wore a red loop on his lapel to the Tony Awards to represent AIDS
awareness, the use of lapel ribbons to represent causes took off . In 1991, according to
Fernandez, the Susan G. Komen Foundation, already distributing pink visors at their
“Race for the Cure” events, distributed pink ribbons at the New York City race.
Simultaneously, Self magazine editorinchief, Alexandra Penney, had stumbled upon the
concept of creating a pink ribbon, and enlisted Evelyn Lauder, Estee Lauder executive
In her piece, “The History of the Pink Ribbon,” originally published in MAMM
and reprinted via Breast Cancer Action, Sandy M. Fernandez gives a detailed history of
the pink ribbon, which I have summarized, here.
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and breast cancer survivor, to help with production and put the pink ribbons at cosmetic
counters around the country. Penney then heard about Charlotte Haley, a 68yearold
woman who had started a small, grassroots movement creating peach ribbons in her
home. Fernandez notes that each ribbon came with a card which noted the small amount
of National Cancer Institute funding directed to cancer prevention, and requested that
citizens contact their legislators to encourage further funding for breast cancer research.
Penney contacted Haley about collaboration, and Haley refused for two reasons: Self
wanted her to relinquish the concept of the ribbon to them, and because the SelfEstee
Lauder venture was too commercial. Penney contacted attorneys, who advised her to
simply choose another color.
According to Fernandez, it is unknown who made the final color choice, or why,
but the 1996 comments of Amy Langer, Executive Director of the National Alliance for
Breast Cancer Organizations, may shed some light on the subject. When asked about the
choice of pink for the ribbon, she responded, “It’s about body image, it's about nurturing,
it's about femininity…” Thus, the famous pink ribbon was born, and has since
skyrocketed to stardom in the breast cancer movement. The story of the creation of the
ribbon makes evident its historical roots in corporate involvement, and its investment in
traditional ideas of femininity as a means of furthering its message about breast cancer.
With the rise of the breast cancer awareness movement and organizations like
Susan G. Komen, and the advent of the famous pink ribbon, breast cancer and its
accompanying narratives occupied more and more space in the public discourse of
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women's health. Still, most of these narratives circulating in the popular discourse are
tidy tales which could be easily categorized as “inspirational,” or “selfhelp.” They often
include saccharine moments meant to encourage those with breast cancer to endure their
ordeal bravely (echoing early beliefs that those with breast cancer should endure breast
cancer without expressing their emotional or physical distress). The majority of that
discourse continued to focus on the ways in which women could restore themselves to
healthy, stereotypical femininity, like the ribbon itself. Langer's quote above makes this
rhetoric evident. This quote is frighteningly reminiscent of Victorian mentalities about the
importance of the breast and breast health which found their way into nowantiquated
materials put out by the Women’s Field Army. The word “nurturing" demonstrates the
remnants of that era’s connection of the breast to home, hearth, nuclear family. Through
its identification of the pink ribbon and breast cancer with femininity, this language
places a major emphasis on the expectation that those with breast cancer represent
traditional social constructions of female, and on the female’s role in the nuclear family.
This rhetoric does not apply to those who choose not to present as stereotypically female
and heteronormative, marginalizing several segments of diverse women and trans*
people from the movement. Organizations like this which allege that their purpose is to
help those with breast cancer may actually be hindering the conversation by investing in
and supporting deeplyrooted hegemonic and patriarchal values.
Few public discussions of breast cancer (if any) address the complicated legacy of
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factors which could be a cause of breast cancer, or the experiences of
nonheteronormative people, or the ways in which breast cancer treatment and awareness
emphasized (and still does) the value of breast as a sexual and symbolic object over the
value of a person's life. Many narratives of breast cancer demonstrate (but don’t explicitly
articulate) the ways in which their authors are made to feel marginalized and abject by
these discussions (or lack thereof) of breast cancer. Conversely, many narratives also
support and encourage oversimplified narratives and hegemonic values like the ideas of
“nurturing” and “femininity” encouraged by organizations like the Komen foundation.
We know that, by the beginning of the modern movement, the female body was
pathologized, and that that pathologization, coupled with other factors (like the
professional legitimization of surgeons and specialists) contributed to specific messages
sent about breast cancer and women with breast cancer in the early movement. From this
chapter, we can see the ways in which historical perceptions of the female body shaped,
molded, and remained present in the 20th century breast cancer awareness movement. In
the following chapter, contemporary illness narratives of breast cancer will be analyzed
through the lens of contemporary feminist theory of the body, and they will demonstrate
the ways in which current illness narratives of breast cancer show the breast cancer body
as abject and monstrous. As we shall see in Chapter 2, the abject breast cancer body is
subject to Foucauldian policing and discipline, much of which is actually enacted through
the oversimplified expectations for people with breast cancer set by the current breast
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cancer awareness movement.
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CHAPTER TWO:
BEYOND ABNORMALITY: BREAST CANCER BODIES AS ABJECT
In the latter half of the twentieth century, medical treatment for breast cancer has
rapidly advanced, and the breast cancer awareness movement has made the topic of
breast cancer increasingly accessible to the public. In the last thirty years, breast cancer
has moved to the forefront of American awareness. In the late 1970s, women like Rose
Kushner and Audre Lorde sought to bring to light critical questions regarding the
treatment of and public discourse about breast cancer. By sharing her experiences in the
media, First Lady, Betty Ford, catalyzed public discussion about breast cancer. Since the
early 1980s fundraising, research, and writing about, breast cancer has increased
exponentially. While much progress has been made with regards to discussing breast
cancer as a medical concern, there is still room for much to be said in the discussion of
breast cancer as a cultural and feminist concern: current public discourse and writing
about breast cancer supports problematic constructions of the female body, as we noted in
the previous chapter. Elements of those constructions are evident in contemporary
discourse about breast cancer, and they create unjust expectations for the ways in which
those with breast cancer should behave or manage their bodies. The presence of these
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concepts in contemporary discourse, contributes to a master narrative of breast cancer.
The ways in which these concepts lead to marginalization, policing, and discipline of
people with breast cancer (as we shall see below) indicate that further exploration is

necessary in order to complicate and revise them. Only in doing so can we pluralize the
master narrative of breast cancer, which we will discuss in Chapter 4.
Once we see the historic problematic constructions of the female body (and how
they found their way into the early breast cancer awareness movement) we have set the
stage for an understanding of how the breast cancer body is constituted in the context of
the current breast cancer awareness movement. Because we are analyzing contemporary
constructions of the female body, it is material to apply modern feminist theory. One
specific aspect of feminist theory is particularly germane: in the last few decades,
scholars like Julie Kristeva, Mary Russo, and Jane Ussher have developed our
understanding of the abject feminine and examined the ways in which the abject body is
reified and supported by patriarchy and hegemony. They have furthered analysis of this
construction by applying these concepts to contemporary feminist concerns such as the
representation of the female body in media and the treatment of the female body in
healthcare and narratives of illness. Application of theories of the abject feminine to
contemporary breast cancer narratives reveals the ways in which some discourse about
breast cancer reifies concepts of the female body retained from the early years of breast

A definition of “master narrative” can be found in Chapter 1, but we shall also
discuss the concept of the master narrative further in Chapter 3.
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cancer awareness around the turn of the 20th century. It will demonstrate the ways in
which some breast cancer patients are subject to these mistaken notions during their
breast cancer experiences. According to contemporary feminist theory, the breast cancer
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body is publicly construed as abject. If the breast cancer body is abject, it is (according
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to Ussher) subject to surveillance and discipline. As we shall see in Chapter 3, that
discipline is enacted through a master narrative of breast cancer which has been codified
and exploited by the contemporary breast cancer awareness movement and its
pinkwashing strategies. The current discussion, however, is simply aimed at identifying
the ways in which the contemporary breast cancer body is abject and monstrous and
therefore subject to discipline.
Narratives of illness are often called “pathographies”; scholar Mary de Shazer has
coined the term “mammographies” for illness narratives of breast cancer. Analysis of a
selection of these mammographies which includes stories, poetry, and visual art, brings
to light the ways in which the breast cancer body is constructed as abject. That
construction leads to surveillance and discipline of any breast cancer body which does
not conform to established sociocultural expectations. For our purposes, it is best to
investigate a wide variety of types of narrative texts in order to show that abject breast
cancer bodies are not isolated to one type of story or experience; rather, those with breast
cancer are constituted as abject in several different situations and express that abjection in
Concepts of abject and monstrous will be elaborated further below.
Surveillance and discipline, particularly as they are laid out in Foucault’s
Discipline and Punish, will be expanded and explored further below.
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diverse narrative styles. The examples below will show abjection from two perspectives:
first, when the woman identifies her own body or the body of another woman with breast
cancer in a way that fulfills the definition of abject (which will be elaborated below); and
second, when a woman recounts an instance in which she has been made to feel abject by
people with whom she interacts.
One of the key characteristics of the abject body, according to Kristeva, is that it
represents a breaking down of boundaries, a collapsing of meaning: “Abject...the
jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning
collapses...on the edge of nonexistence and hallucination,” (Kristeva 2). The abject body
is so “radically excluded,” so marginalized from the norm, that it blurs the boundaries
between concrete, commonplace perceptions of the human body and those instantiations
of the human body which are less normalized, which the brain struggles to reconcile with
its straightforward, everyday perceptions of the body. Kristeva claims that this collapse of
meaning is particularly represented by the reproductive female body: “...the height of
bloodshed and life, scorching moment of hesitation (between inside and outside, ego and
other, life and death) horror and beauty, sexuality and the blunt negation of the sexual,”
(155). Here, it may help to imagine that Kristeva is speaking specifically about childbirth.
In most daily instantiations of the human body, we think of it as representing life or
death, inside or outside, horrific or beautiful. In the moment of childbirth, however, the
female body represents both sides of many binaries at once: death through bloodshed, and
life through the new life of the child. The body represents inside and outside because the
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infant is, at the moment of birth, literally inside her and outside her. She represents horror
because the process her body is going through can be shocking, unpleasant, or even
brutal, but the power of what her body can do, has done, is also beautiful. She represents
sexuality because a baby is a product of sex, but negates sexuality because childbirth is
generally perceived as a sexually unappealing moment. Kristeva extrapolates that belief
further, though: the female body, not merely in the moment of childbirth but because of
its symbolic representation of being capable of childbirth, represents this collapsing of
boundaries. For Kristeva, the abject body is the body which is radically marginalized,
living in the space where critical existential binaries—life/death, horror/beauty,
inside/outside—collapse into one another. The female body, in its potential to give birth,
collapses meanings of life/death, inside/outside, horror/beauty in this way. For Kristeva,
the female body, capable of reproduction, is the primary site of abjection.
Ussher concurs with Kristeva, and uses her definition of abject to note the
ambivalence with which society has viewed the abject fecund female body: “Central to
this positioning of the female body as monstrous or beneficent is ambivalence associated
with the power and danger perceived to be inherent in woman's fecund flesh, her seeping,
leaking, bleeding womb standing as a site of pollution and a source of dread,” (Managing
the Monstrous Feminine 1). Ussher's definition may add some clarity to Kristeva's
comment that the abject is “radically excluded and...on the edge of nonexistence and
hallucination.” Ussher's observation that the fecund female body is both monstrous and
beneficent, both powerful and dangerous, parallels Kristeva's claim that the body
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collapses meaning and boundaries. Ussher, however, simplifies the concept of the fecund
female body existing in our minds “on the edge of nonexistence and hallucination”; she
notes that we confront this collapsing of boundaries with ambivalence, dreading the
mental conflict with which it presents us. Ussher's observation of the power and danger
of the fecund female body recalls the ancient Greek belief that women were responsible
for the sex of their fetuses in the womb: they were meant to keep the womb warm enough
to create a male child (which was considered superior). The womb, then, improperly
managed, had the power to “pollute” the fetus, making it female, an occurrence which
may also be dreaded. Many other cultures, throughout history, have revered, feared, or
misunderstood the female reproductive organs in a variety of ways. As we saw in the last
chapter, the female reproductive organs were, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries in
the western world, one of the longstanding mysteries of human anatomy. While we must
be precise with our terms and note that historical pathologization is not equivalent to the
current definition of abjection, early pathologization of the female body may have
contributed to its current construction as abject.
Ussher expands the definition of “abject” further, claiming that fecundity of the
female body associates it with excess: “Women's bleeding, and the embodied changes
that come with pregnancy, birth, and menopause, are irrevocably connected to the
discursive positioning of female fecundity as a site of danger or debilitation, with these
signs of fecundity standing as signifiers of feminine excess,” (Managing the Monstrous
Feminine 4). All the features, characteristics, and cycles of the female body which allow
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her to reproduce also represent the physical “too muchness” of a woman who is growing
another person inside her. Her entire body represents excess by virtue of the fact that it
can create and grow its own additional person. This level of physical excess is dangerous
because it cannot be controlled: it is not an experience which falls into binary categories
or labels. Rather, it collapses them. Female bodies are perceived as debilitated because
they are out of control. This notion of women as debilitated by their reproductive organs
harkens back to the late 19th century pathologization of the female body, when their
behavioral abnormalities were associated with their female organs or reproductive cycles.
Behavior which might be considered “excessive”—staying out late, too much
reading—might have been either the cause or the symptom of some malfunction in those
organs or cycles. Women, because of their fecundity, are inherently excessive and prone
to being outofcontrol; they are therefore debilitated. So, we can see how historical
pathologization of the female body may have paved the way for our current construction
of the abject, as in this example of excess as a characteristic of abjection.
In a 2015 study, Parton, Ussher, and Perz offered further nuance to our
understanding of the abject. They applied Kristeva's definition to women with various
types of cancer, expanding the definition of abject to include bodies which they call
“beyond abnormality.” Citing a number of previous studies on female cancer patients,
they point out evidence that “bodies affected by cancer and cancer treatment can be
constructed as out of control, breaching the material and symbolic boundaries which
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position bodies as ‘normal.'” They note that in their current study, “the abject body
refers to embodied experiences that were positioned outside the norms of bodily
functioning...the use of such language suggests that the body is constructed not only
outside discourses of normality but that these bodily experiences are unfamiliar” (493).
Finally, they observe that women with cancer use language which alternates between
positioning their bodies as subject and positioning them as object (492). So, we know that
abject can also mean bodies which are beyond the literal and figurative standards of
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functioning, and for which the bodily experience feels personally abnormal and that this
abjection can be demonstrated by selfpositioning which fluctuates between subject and
object.
From these works, we can conclude overall that connotations of the abject feminine
include collapse of the boundaries between life and death, horror and beauty, inside and
outside; seeping, pollution, and excess; and existence “beyond abnormality,” sometimes
indicated by a change in subject position.
Ussher notes that the problems created by the construction of the fecund female
body as abject are evident when we incorporate Judith Butler's theory that (to borrow
Ussher's paraphrase) “gender is a performance, discursively constituted, something one
does rather than what one is,” (Managing the Monstrous Feminine 3). Butler's theories

See Parton, Chloe, Jane M. Ussher, and Janette Perz. “Women's Construction of
Embodiment and the Abject Sexual After Cancer.” Qualitative Health Research.
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In this case, we would define “personally abnormal” as any occurrence which is
different from the way that person's body typically functions.
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mean that “gender” (in this case, female gender) is a performance which a female body is
expected to execute. We know from the last chapter that, by the end of the 19th century,
problematic constructions of the female body had resulted in the conflation of gender and
biological sex. All people who were identified as biologically female would have been
expected to perform specific features of female gender roles (such as being
representatives of domesticity, of home, hearth, and family). This conflation of biological
sex with gender, and the subsequent expectation that biologically female bodies perform
female gender roles, is an oversimplification which persisted throughout the 20th century,
and from which we are still attempting to extract ourselves, socially, culturally, and
academically. It is also a problem which surfaces in the contemporary breast cancer
awareness movement, when specific sociocultural expectations for women’s behavior
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during or after breast cancer are based on stereotypical female gender roles.

According to Ussher, who draws on Butler and Mary Douglas, failure to properly
execute the performance of femaleness results in disruption of the social order: “...the
fictions framed as facts that circulate about the fecund body are central to the definition
and maintenance of social order...the limits of the social are defined by that which is 'out
of place'substances deemed dangerous and polluted, which threaten the symbolic sense
of order,” (Managing the Monstrous Feminine 5). Proper execution of femininity
supports the social order in our society; improper execution of femininity results in a

In Chapter 3, we will identify and examine these specific socio-cultural
expectations and their implications.
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threat to the social order. Abject female bodies do not properly perform femininity, and
thus threaten the social order. Threats to the social order must be controlled. Thus,
“women who fail this control, who fail to perform femininity within the tight boundaries
within which it is prescribed at each stage of the reproductive life cycle, are at risk of
being positioned as mad or bad and subjected to discipline or punishment,” (4). The
presence of this risk of “being positioned as mad or bad” and therefore subject to
discipline, appears to be a residual effect from the late 19th century construct that a
woman needed to follow certain behavioral guidelines in order to keep herself well; if she
exhibited alleged behavioral abnormalities—abnormalities which, Ussher would likely
note, are failures to perform the prescribed definition of femininity—it was assumed that
she was mentally or physically ill. The basic idea that those with breast cancer are
expected to follow certain behavioral guidelines (and are subject to discipline if they fail
to do so) is one that also appears in the modern breast cancer awareness movement. For
example, the sociocultural expectation for those who have had a mastectomy is that
those people will, generally, make an effort to restore their breasts to their appropriate
feminine appearance through reconstructive surgery or the use of prosthetics. Those who
cannot do so, or choose not to, are subject to stares, whispers, judgment, and possible
ostracizing by others.
In order to understand the ways in which the abject breast cancer body is subject to
surveillance and discipline, we first need to understand specifically what we mean by the
terms “surveillance” and “discipline.” In his work, Michel Foucault describes Jeremy
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Bentham's concept of the Panopticon, the ideal prison:
…at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced
with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the periphery
building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the
building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the
windows of the tower; the other on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell
from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a
central tower…one can observe from the tower…the small captive shadows in the
cells of the periphery. (Discipline and Punish 200)
Foucault claims that Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon serves as a figurative
representation for modern power structures such as the hierarchies found in medicine and
education, but also used generally by society at large. One of the fundamental aspects of
the Panopticon’s functionality (as we might infer from the root word, optic) is the ability
to see and watch the individuals who are kept inside its cells: “The panoptic mechanism
arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize
immediately…Full lighting and they eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness,
which ultimately protected,” (200). Foucault notes that the major effect of the Panopticon
is “to induce in the inmate the state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the
automatic functioning of power,” (201). The Panopticon facilitates surveillance, and also
careful and ongoing observation of the “inmate.” This observation is recorded: “It must
be possible to hold the prisoner under permanent observation; every report that can be
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made about him must be recorded and computed,” (249). In the Panopticon, the prisoner
is not only constantly surveilled; his behavior becomes a compilation of recorded
knowledge about him, and that knowledge is what gives significant power to the agents
of the Panopticon and they wield that power over the inmates. In fact, Foucault claims
that “surveillance and observation” and “security and knowledge” are themes of the
Panopticon (249). Documentation supplements surveillance, and is integral to its power.
As the allegedly deviant individual is continually and repeatedly captured on the page,
the agents of the Panopticon gain more knowledge about that individual, and therefore
gain more power. The idea of the relationship between surveillance and
writing/documentation is important and will be discussed in later chapters; for now, we
can conclude that surveillance, according to Foucault’s appropriation of Bentham, means
that a person is (literally or figuratively) fully exposed and visible, and that the person is
aware of this visibility, such that the person monitors their own behavior to meet the
expectations of those in power who could be watching. Moreover, it means that the
agents of the Panopticon record their observations about the prisoners into a compendium
of knowledge which means their knowledge equals power, and that their power increases
as they observe and record more. It is important to note that, Foucault’s transliteration
means that the figurative societal Panopticon is one to which anyone is subject, not only
prisoners. For example, if we imagine that the concept of the Panopticon figuratively
represents social expectations for female body image, it's fairly clear that those
imprisoned within the Panopticon are any people who are surveilled and disciplined when
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their bodies deviate from the norm perpetuated by several various agents such as the
media. But those who bodyshame others, for example, then represent agents of the
Panopticon, because they are observing and noting whether or not people abide social
expectations for body image, and then disciplining those who are deviant. These are
people who have internalized the expectations and discipline of the Panopticon. As they
are observed, those inside the Panopticon learn which behaviors are unacceptable and
modify the behaviors in advance of being disciplined by the agents of surveillance. The
monitoring and adjustment of behavior to which the people (in Bentham's literal
description, the prisoners) involved in the Panopticon are subject, is known as
internalized selfpolicing.

50

Discipline, then, according to Foucault, is the type of power/knowledge system that
utilizes surveillance to regulate behavior and assure that those within the panoptic system
meet the expectations and follow rules of those in power. Foucault calls it a “functional
mechanism that must improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid,
more effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come,” (Discipline and
Punish, 209). He claims that this system of discipline spread through western society in
the 17th and 18th centuries, creating what he terms a “disciplinary society” (209).
Perhaps most importantly—at least, for the purposes of the discussion in this
work—Foucault notes that discipline, as a system, is a mode that can be utilized by

The concept of internalized self-policing is one that will appear again in later
chapters.
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institutions: “…it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set
of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets…And it may be
taken over either by specialized institutions…or by preexisting authorities that find in it
51

a means of reinforcing or reorganizing their internal mechanisms of power,” (215).
Discipline, in the context of this discussion, should be noted as a system of

power/knowledge (sometimes used by institutions) which uses surveillance to trigger
internalized selfpolicing to ensure that those within the system follow its behavioral
expectations.
Here, it’s important to note that Foucault also claims that power can (and should) be
challenged and resisted. He notes that, while discourse can be involved in the reification
of power systems, it is also key to resistance of systems of power:
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against
it…We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby a
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance,
a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy.
Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and
exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart. (The History of
Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge 1001)
In later chapters, we will examine the primary discourse of the power systems of the

In Chapter 3, we will examine and elaborate on specific ways that institutions in
the breast cancer awareness movement use surveillance and create disciplinary systems.
51

90

breast cancer awareness movement, the master narrative, and the ways in which it
supports and reifies the power systems; however, we will also emphasize the importance
of the discourses of resistance to that power, and I will argue that, by the nature of the
fact that they are resistant, we should take care to incorporate them into the larger public
discussion around breast cancer experiences, pluralizing the dominant master narrative.
For now, though, we will focus on establishing the breast cancer body as abject and
subject to discipline.
For our purposes, we will apply Foucault’s theory of disciplinary society, and the
use of discipline by institutions, to contemporary United States society and the
institutions which are part of it, particularly those which are stakeholders in the breast
cancer awareness movement. We will be analyzing the American culture as a disciplinary
society, particularly when it comes to illness, and specifically when it comes to breast
cancer, healthcare, and the contemporary breast cancer awareness movement.
Notably, according to Foucault, systems of discipline are generally incompatible
with nonbinary labels; in other words, disciplinary systems force things (or people) to
labeled according to binaries, and function better that way: “Generally speaking, all the
authorities exercising individual control function according to a double mode; that of
binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal),”
(Discipline and Punish 199). So, those occupying subject positions which are nonbinary,
which are not clearly one or the other, confound the principles of a disciplinary society.
As we already know from our above definition of “abject,” those who occupy the abject
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subject position are exactly that: nonbinary. Instead, they represent the collapsing of
extremes, which means that, in a disciplinary system, they risk being categorized as
abnormal by default, as Foucault notes in a 1975 interview: “If you are not like
everybody else, then you are abnormal,” (“Je Suis Un Artificier”).
The abject female body, according to Ussher’s application of Foucault and Butler,
is one which threatens the social order and must be therefore surveilled and subject to
discipline. If we can establish that the breast cancer body is abject, we will also have
established that it is therefore subject to surveillance and discipline. In the next chapter,
we shall see the ways in which surveillance and discipline become evident via the
omnipotence of the master narrative of breast cancer. First, we must focus on
substantiating that the breast cancer body is abject.
The primary way in which the breast cancer body is abject is that it collapses the
boundary between life and death. We know that by the end of the 19th century, the female
body had become pathologized; by virtue of the fact that the female body simultaneously
represented illness and the capacity to give and nurture life, it was already collapsing the
boundaries of life and death. Additionally, by way of Ussher, we noted above that the
fecund female body collapses a number of binaries, including life and death, horror and
beauty, and inside and outside. The female body itself, was, is, and has already been
established as abject. So, what makes the breast cancer body more powerfully abject than
simply the female body, generally?
The body with breast cancer is out of control, and thus needs disciplining. This
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chaos is embodied by the cancer itself: cancer is, essentially, a cluster of cells which are
growing out of control, to excess. The lack of control inherent in any type of cancer may
be enough to qualify a body as abject, of course; but in this case, the lack of control, the
excess, the representation of mortality and fatality, is happening in exactly the physical
location which has come to be arguably one of our culture’s most emblematic symbols of
life, nurturing, and fecundity: the human female breast. For many, the breast symbolizes
womanhood. It not only represents motherhood as a symbol, the nurturing of children,
but it is also the exact physical location at which many women spent early months caring
for, and bonding with, their children; that same location where, almost certainly, a woman
experiences intimate caresses with a lover. The breast is not only a symbol; it’s a body
part and the symbolic locus of many important aspects of a woman’s life, and the horror
inherent in losing that should not be overlooked, either for the physical impacts of an
amputation, or for the loss of a body part which can be so emblematic of so many aspects
of womanhood and identity. When the breast suddenly becomes, not the symbol of life,
but the exact cause and location of potential death, a cognitive discord occurs in the
minds of the public, who see the breast as a so lifegiving and womanly: how can
something that is so representative of beauty, motherhood, femininity, and life also
generate something—cancer—which so iconically represents mortality? The woman who
is possibly losing her breast is forced to confront the cognitive dissonance her body, her
breast, now creates for her. She must also confront the public’s distress over the life/death
breast, and to mourn her own precious body part. The breast cancer breast powerfully
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symbolizes the ways in which life and death are collapsed into one bodily location; the
thing which is lifegiving is also the apparent cause of death.
Additionally, it’s now fairly common knowledge that increased exposure to
estrogen, produced by the ovaries, also increases lifetime risk for breast cancer. Many
who are high risk choose prophylactic oophorectomies in order to reduce their lifetime
exposure to estrogen. So, again, the biological essence of femaleness, estrogen, the
ovaries, also represents the potentially fatal threat to the body in which it exists. Life and
death are collapsed together again, and once again that collapse is represented by the
lifegiving element of female anatomy. In many contemporary mammographies, readers
observe that those with breast cancer feel representative of both life and death in the
course of their experience with breast cancer.
A woman with breast cancer is alive, but her breast contains a potentially fatal
disease, so she represents both life and death simultaneously. Writer Joan Halperin notes
feeling this way in her poem “Diagnosis”: “I am a moth/ready to burrow in winter
clothes/surrounded by white nuggets/Camphorized,” (7). Her figurative image of herself
as a camphorized moth indicates that, while she is alive, her experience causes her to feel
her own mortality, to feel dead. Like the moth, she has attempted to live her life, but finds
herself overtaken by a force which makes her feel euthanized. Marian S. Irwin, in her
poem, “PostMastectomy, Week One” also describes the feeling of existing in the space
where boundaries are collapsed, writing “I am my own unknown,” (32). The words “my
own” signify her ownership of her body, a body which was familiar to her and which may
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have represented the importance of motherhood or her own sexuality, as it does for many
women. The word “unknown” may connote her mortality (death is the greatest
unknown), but it also indicates that, without her breast she loses herself, her identity.
In her mixedmedia piece, “Physician's Report II,” Violet Murkami uses visual art
to show the ways in which her body represents life and death to her physicians. Murkami
has layered physician's reports with fullbody bone scans, resulting in a page of
handwriting about her diagnosis which is overlaid with an eerie, darkred, xray image of
her body, in which her bones are visible through the flesh (73). Finally, representation of
the collapsing of the boundaries between life and death is most clearly exemplified by
graphic novelist Marisa Acochella Marchetto in Cancer Vixen: A True Story. In a series of
panels, the writer/artist depicts herself, young, vivacious and preparing for her wedding,
but in alternating panels, readers see a faceless grim reaper sneaking into her life. Finally,
we see a panel in which the reaper smashes through the doorway, accosting the heroine
and screaming “Cancer your wedding! Cancer your career! Cancer your life!” (63). This
series of panels demonstrates that, having been officially diagnosed with cancer, Marisa
feels herself as existing in the collapsed boundary between life and death. In each of the
sentences, the word cancer is juxtaposed with something that represents a celebration of
life or a vital part of living, indicating the collapsing of the boundaries between life and
death. The following fullpage panel makes the message even more clear. Marisa is
depicted in two sidebyside images, one of her in a white dress and veil, and one of her
in a frumpy hospital robe. The language above the images reads: “Instead of shopping for
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a wedding gown...I see myself in a hospital gown,” (65). Marisa's position as abject
makes it impossible for her to perform what are considered socially normal activities
(fantasizing about and then purchasing a white gown for her wedding). Again, an
experience that is lifeaffirming occurs simultaneously with one that is lifethreatening
and the boundaries between life and death are collapsed. These people, in their
experiences of breast cancer, feel identified as simultaneously representing life and death,
thus demonstrating the abject subject position. Additionally, the potential loss of this
particular body part, the breast, for Marisa also signifies the figurative death of several
aspects of her identity. This image represents the death of the kind of wedding and
marriage she’d envisioned for herself, of the kind of bride and wife she would be. Later,
she fantasizes about saying goodbye to a fictional infant to whom she’s never given birth,
her potential future child (205). She acknowledges that breast cancer (and its subsequent
treatments) will likely terminate her ability to bear and nurture a child. In addition to the
very real threat of mortality, the experience of breast cancer, because of the importance of
the breast to female identity in many contexts, can also bring about a series of figurative
deaths (deaths of identity) with which a woman must cope.
Women with breast cancer also feel themselves as existing in the collapsed
boundary of horror and beauty, which is another indication of the their abject position.
Writer Elizabeth Hurst describes the ways in which cancer is both beautiful and
horrifying: “Cancer is a complicated gift, unaskedfor and undeserved. Imported from the
rich mines of the underworld, it sheds metaphors and ideas, as well as murderous cells.
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Cancer is also a generous disease...It is time's Philosopher's Stone, and a meteor flung up
from hell; a serial killer's wet dream, DNA's idea of a joke—a squirming handful of
chaos which I may or may not still own,” (80). Here, readers can see that Hurst identifies
collapsed boundaries and binaries present in her cancer experience. It is rich and
generous but also the tool of a killer. She see something beautiful—metaphors and
ideas—and also something horrifying—murder. The word “generous” may be a subtle
allusion to the fact that cancer cells are those which multiply, constantly giving more, but
it gives too much and too chaotically. Murder and the threat of the overwhelming
multiplication of cancer cells are both horrifying; rich metaphor and generosity are both
beautiful. Cancer has collapsed those two binaries. Lois Tshetter Hjelmstad notes the
horror in losing a part of her body which she considers beautiful: “The night before my
first mastectomy, I wept as I wrote a goodbye poem to my beautiful breast,” (55). Here,
we can see that the breast is vital to Hjelmstad’s identity as a woman and a person,
possibly her femininity, sexuality, and motherhood. The breast itself is beautiful, and the
thought of losing it is horrifying, but so, too, is the disease which has affected it. In these
cases, the breast cancer body represents the collapsing of horror and beauty.
Others note the horror of undergoing such an frightening amputation, like Maxine
Kumin, who says in her piece “Off” that she is “as a lamb to the slaughter,” or Patricia
Goedicke, in her poem “100,000 Upon 100,000”: “One by one we are taken to the
hospitals/In silence, in secret/The surgeons whet their knives,” (Kumin 18; Goedicke 61).
Certainly, surgeons are not butchers, nor do they literally whet their knives in eagerness;
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they actually intend to help their patients in the long run. However, the fact that these
people feel this way—as though they are about to have an important, beautiful body part
butchered—indicates that they occupy the abject position. Marlene Gharbo Linderman's
painting, “My Surgery,” visually depicts her narrative of horror regarding her mastectomy
(27). The painting shows a surgeon looming large in the foreground, using a serrated
blade to cruelly saw off her breasts, while technicians hang other amputated breasts on
meat hooks in the background. On the hooks, the breasts are painted in soft, warm pastels
and they look soft and tender, even pretty, aside from the rough, bloody edges. This
image, too, shows horror and beauty collapsed. Because the breast cancer body quite
literally embodies the collapsed boundary between horror and beauty, it is abject.
The female body, particularly the female body in cancer, also experiences the abject
position by being placed “beyond abnormality,” according to the study done by Parton,
Ussher, and Perz. The study, again drawing on Kristeva, notes that, many women
describe their postcancer bodies in similar ways, but that the socially ordered structure of
normal versus abnormal cannot appropriately encompass their positioning: “...women
attempt to manage the abject body by positioning it outside of normality, their accounts
suggest on ongoing unease around their use of this discourse,” (49394). In other words,
the social order expects those with breast cancer to be able to identify themselves, and
their bodies, somewhere within the accepted continuum which has the binaries of
“normal” versus “abnormal” at either end. People understand this binary because it’s
been socially inculcated: they have a notion of what a “normal” body versus an
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“abnormal” body looks like, according to the binary categories. However, when they
consider their breast cancer bodies, they cannot easily categorize their breast cancer
bodies into one of these binary categories, or even onto the continuum. They cannot see
themselves as normal, but they also don’t fall into preconceived notion of “abnormal”
because their experience is more extreme, more pronounced, more different, than even
simply being “abnormal.” For example, the study identifies one interviewee, Christine,
who describes her reconstructed breast as “odd...it still looks normal. I try to think, you
know, it's okay, but I don't see it” (4). Christine feels that her normallooking body is
abnormal, but also can’t relate to her new breast as a part of herself. Being defined as
abnormal would mean, at least, that her body falls into a binary category which is
familiar, but it is beyond even her conception of abnormal, so far that she can't even
relate to the body part. From this study, we know that a woman's attempt, in her breast
cancer experience, to locate her body relative to the normal versus abnormal binary,
indicates her abject position. She can't fit anywhere on the predetermined, familiar
continuum. We see an example of this “beyond abnormal” positioning in the case of
Greta, when she comments on her experience during chemotherapy and radiation. First,
she notes the strangeness of the changes in her taste buds: “I don't crave things like
everybody else does. I just go, 'Oh, that sounds okay,'...It's painful, it burns, it's salty, and
it's just bizarre,” (Abel and Subramanian 20). Further, Greta describes the specific
experiences related to her female body: “That's the one that's the weirdest, the most
peculiar...I went into chemoinduced menopause. It's what they call crash
99

menopause...And when it happens, you don't even know if it's the chemo or what's going
on,” (Abel and Subramanian 20). Here, Greta uses words like “bizarre,” “weird,” and
“peculiar,” to attempt to position herself relative to abnormality, but what her body is
doing is even outside of her preconceived notion of abnormal, as we can see from the
latter part of her comment, “you don’t even know if it’s chemo or what’s going on.” In
both cases, she is reduced to generalizations like “bizarre” and “you don't even
know....what's going on” because she can't even position herself as abnormal. Because
she is experiencing something “beyond abnormality,” her body is abject.
Artist Sylvia Colette Gehres uses her artwork in an attempt to position herself
relative to the abnormal as well. Her work, “Reflection,” a piece done in sketchy chalk
pastels, shows a bald woman with one breast and her eyes closed. In her caption, Gehres
says, “I had to get used to this strange new head and body, so I put it on paper. It's easier
to look at the picture, which is once removed from reality. The earrings are important
because they were favorites in the years 'before the cancer.' They function as the
'familiars' in the piece,” (54). Gehres attempts to position herself in the ordered realm of
normal versus abnormal, but rather than simply falling on one end of the spectrum into
abnormal, she can’t even relate to her own body and instead feels like her body parts
don’t belong to her, making her abject. The reference to the earrings is important because
it indicates that even in attempting to position herself as abnormal, she feels unsettled
about her body, and needs a familiar image. Here, in Gehres story, we also see her shift
between subject and object. She is the subject when she knows she must get used to her
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body and when she puts it on paper; she is the object when she says that she has a
“strange head and new body” and when her own body is once removed from reality by its
depiction as art. She sees herself simultaneously as subject and object.
The abject body is also characterized by its lack of control; Ussher, drawing on
Kristeva, makes this point clear: “Kristeva argues that bodily fluids and emission—sweat,
pus, excreta, breast milk, semen, blood—stand as signifiers of the abject, of the body
without boundaries which threatens the illusion of the contained, controlled, rational
subject, and as such, threatens stability and social unity,” (Managing the Monstrous
Feminine 6). Parton, Ussher, and Perz noted a manifestation of Kristeva's theory when
they interviewed several women with cancer as part of a study: “The abject body was
often positioned as being out of control in the women's accounts, through corporeal
experiences such as disfigurement, excess in bodily weight, menopause, a seeping
wound, a stoma, or leaking excretion and urine,” (495). One survivor of breast cancer
recalls her experience with having to wear a drain in public: “...I had to keep measuring
and emptying that [drain], and mine got clogged a couple of times, so I had to go to the
emergency room for that...I wear big clothes anyway, so I had the big clothes with the
drain hanging out. And the bandages. It was kind of scary to get in the shower because I
didn't know what that was gonna do. So it was the unknown, the unknown,” (Abel and
Subramanian 24). This survivor's drain, the seepage of her body, socially signifies her
body’s lack of control: she is then connoted as a “subject which threatens stability and
social unity.”
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The piece “Don't Touch Me,” by Arlene and Michelle Linder, profoundly
demonstrates the abject, outofcontrol body. The artwork is a black and white sketch of a
bald woman in a hospital gown, vomiting into a nearby toilet (Linder 86). The I.V.s and
other medical instruments to which she is attached are drawn at harsh, exaggerated
angles, while the female figure is composed of more curved, organic forms, drawing
attention to the apparent lack of control represented by her body, versus the regimented
control demonstrated by medicine (86). In the background of the picture are words
describing the patient's thoughts about her bodily secretions: “My bucket is my best
friend,” and “I watch that green goopy stuff coming out of my mouth. I can't go on,” (86).
This portrait demonstrates the extent to which the woman depicted in it feels that her
body is out of control. Socially, the idea of the female body being out of control is
problematic—it represents, again, the threat of excess in the female body. The “too
muchness” associated with sickness, secretions and vomiting, signify frightening and
threatening unknowns, and also associate that fear and threat with her symbol of
femininity: her breast. Women are supposed to be wellkept and in control of their bodily
functions; they are supposed to be sexually appealing to men; and they are supposed to
represent idealized motherhood, the bearing and nurturing of children. A person who
cannot maintain these norms has failed at enacting her expected role in society. Again,
breast cancer threatens the social order, and a person who cannot keep her body in control
(or at least hide the fact that it is out of control) is representative of that threat.
The breast cancer body threatens the social order by being, according to Parton,
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Ussher, and Perz, “outside femininity”: “For many of the women, cancer resulted in a
loss or threat to embodied signifiers of femininity...in a cultural context where women
tend to be defined through bodily appearances, the loss of feminine signaled a loss of
subjectivity for women, positioning their bodies as being of less value,” (494). The
feeling of loss associated with femininity is demonstrated in Lois Tschetter Hjelmstad's
poem, “Double Amputee”: “Strange it is to seem/A sexless child/Again,” (55). Here, the
loss of her feminine signifier, her breast, makes her feel unsettled and reverted to a
helpless, childlike position. Similarly, Pamela Post, in her essay “Cancer Says,”
demonstrates feelings of deep loss associated with her femininity when she is faced with
the possibility of a mastectomy: “It had to do with the part of me that first responded to
the touch of my teenage boyfriend. It was where my two babies fed and nuzzled and
drifted into sleep for the first year of their lives,” (Post 4). Post specifically identifies her
breast as representative of herself as a sexual being and a reproductive female body, and
implies a loss of identity as feminine by the loss of her breast. Lorraine Vernon, in her
poem, “Slant,” notes that the loss of her breast makes her feel less feminine:
Or maybe I'm becoming
(androgynous)
precocious female—
child woman man
transforming Woman
with the little
103

(left
(Vernon 34).
The poem's ending—the word “left” with one parentheses on the lefthand side which is
never closed—is a visible, linguistic replication of the appearance of her chest, which is
left with one curved left breast. The fact that that ending is preceded by the phrase “with
the little” implies that Vernon feels her value as feminine is diminished by the fact that
she has only one breast. Even the title of the poem itself, “Slant” indicates her feelings of
bodily imbalance. The feeling of loss of value derived from loss of femininity appears in
Marchetto's work when, after her single mastectomy, the grim reaper appears again, only
this time, the figure is not faceless; it has a face which, though gray, harsh, and eyeless,
has blond hair and a facial structure like Marisa's own; it is she. When her fiancee
neglects to call immediately following her surgery and she wonders why, it lingers over
her bed shouting, “I'll tell you why...you're damaged goods and he found someone better
to do! Damaged goods! Damaged goods!” (Marchetto 120). The fact that Death
personified looks like Marisa indicates that she has internalized messages which label her
as abject—representing collapsed boundaries between life and death—and the fact that
the reaper uses the phrase “someone better to do,” (in this case, “do” being a euphemism
for sex) indicates that she views herself as having less value sexually, from the male
perspective. Thus, Marisa has internalized the societal perspective of the definition of
female sexual attractiveness. The hegemonic values which Marisa has internalized
regarding her femininity are demonstrated most profoundly, however, in the series of
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frames near the end of the book in which she discovers, at 44, that she will need to take
Tamoxifen for five years postsurgery, and thus will not be able to have a child. After she
hears this, the following frames show her, gazing upwards to a starry sky where an infant
body floats. She looks at the infant: “I'm so sorry...I thought I had all the time in the
world, when all I had was the blink of an eye,” and in response, the infant says
“Goodbye” and disappears (205). The next few frames show Marisa and her mother
crying over her loss of reproductive ability. This is certainly sad news for any woman
who wishes to have children, and these feelings of loss and sadness are valid. However,
her presentation of her loss of reproductive ability indicates that she feels of less value
without it, that she feels ashamed for having made the decision to wait to have children.
This presentation is another indication that she has internalized the reproductive value,
the accepted type of femininity, which our social order attributes to her.
When the hegemonic social order is threatened by bodies which do not meet its
expectations, those bodies must be surveilled and disciplined. Abject bodies, including
the breast cancer body, must be surveilled and disciplined because they threaten the
symbolic order. Foucault claims that this surveillance and discipline, in previous
centuries, was conducted primarily through two institutions: “Religious groups and
charity organizations had long played this role of disciplining the population,” (Discipline
and Punish 212). But, he notes that “one also sees the spread of disciplinary procedures,
not in the form of enclosed institutions, but as centre of observation disseminated
throughout society,” (212). Ussher claims that, in modern times, one of the entities to
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which disciplinary procedures have been disseminated, particularly when it comes to the
female body, is medicine: “In contemporary western culture, theories of biomedical
science...serv[e] to regulate the monstrous feminine...through positioning the female body
as inherently pathological, necessitating rigorous application of technological
investigation and intervention—with medical experts firmly in control,” (Managing the
Monstrous Feminine 15). Because the female body has been established as pathological,
it stands to reason that healthcare would be the source of surveillance and discipline for
deviant female bodies; women, more than men, are expected to subject themselves to the
authority of medicine. Medicine inadvertently disciplines the abject female body, as
Ussher notes: “diagnostic categories...conveniently attribute female distress to the
deviance of the reproductive body, legitimating medical management of the reproductive
excess, and implicitly of the monstrous feminine...we are told that medical management
of the fecund body is the answer for all ills,” (17). This is a rich and bold claim, which
we should parse out and discuss in the context of breast cancer. First, risk factors and
potential causes for breast cancer are often associated with “deviance of the female
reproductive body.” Public discourse focuses on the fact that women who have children
after 30, or who don’t have children at all, are at higher risk; we hear that increased
exposure to estrogen, produced by the ovaries, increases risk. While both of these claims
have solid scientific evidence behind them, they are overemphasized in public discourse,
which implies that the cause of breast cancer lies inside the person’s own body,
inevitably. We don’t hear much about potential environmental causes of breast cancer.
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Instead, “medical management” is our cultural default option when it comes to this
illness. While medical management is the cultural default option for many types of
cancer, and even other illnesses, it is specifically problematic in relation to breast cancer
because of the iconic symbolism of the breast in our culture. As we have mentioned
above, the breast has always connoted motherhood, nurturing, sexuality, and idealized
femininity; breast cancer and the postmastectomy body threaten those associations and
the social expectations and norms which result from them. Therefore, we are more alert
to the implications of breast cancer, more uncomfortable with the discord it creates, and
more emphatic that it be medically addressed. Those with breast cancer are expected to
subject themselves to medical management because breasts are so socioculturally
important to our model of the archetypal woman: they can’t be risked. For example,
many medical institutions recommend mammograms to screen for breast cancer. The
American Cancer Society recommends that women start getting yearly mammograms at
45 and then get a mammogram every two years after turning 54 (“American Cancer
Society Guidelines...”). The United States Preventative Services Task Force recommends
one every year from 4049, and one every two years from 5074 (“Final
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Recommendation Statement: Breast Cancer Screening”). That’s about 22 mammograms
over the course of an American woman’s lifetime. That’s roughly 22 exposures to
radiation, when medical radiation is the only thing actually proven to cause breast cancer,
It should be noted that, at the completion of this text, these recommendations
were paired with recommendations that patients consult with their doctors about potential
risk for breast cancer versus risks associated with mammograms.
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and causes about 2,800 cases per year (Committee on Breast Cancer and the
Environment: The Scientific Evidence, Research Methodology, and Future Directions;
Institute of Medicine 294). In actuality, mammograms aren’t really as helpful as we may
believe. In fact, a British study by Miller et al., the largest done to date on this topic,
found that “annual mammography in women aged 4059 does not reduce mortality from
breast cancer beyond that of physical examination or usual care when adjuvant therapy
for breast cancer is freely available.” Additionally, mammograms have been shown to
lead to overdiagnosis and overtreatment. According to Neighmond, one recent study
showed that of 700,000 women screened for breast cancer using mammograms, 75,922
had “suspicious” mammograms that resulted in follow up treatments, but it turned out
they didn’t have cancer at all, and they had to deal with the anxiety and physical pain that
comes with overtreatment. Mammograms, in this case, are a figurative and literal form
of surveillance to which abject breast cancer bodies are subject; agencies and institutions
who reify the overemphasized belief in mammograms, are all part of the disciplinary
system which administers that surveillance and assures that we meet the expectation to
get our mammograms. People have internalized selfpolicing for this behavior as well:
often, you can hear women ask each other if they’re getting their mammograms; when a
person is diagnosed with breast cancer, one of the first questions someone asks is whether
or not that person has been getting mammograms regularly.
Maxine Kumin, for example, notes feeling subject to the disciplinary system in her
account of breast cancer in the early 1990s. When her doctor, who she has previously
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described as not treating her like a human, calls to tell her she has been diagnosed with
cancer, he says that, “It means you have three choices. You can do nothing. You can take
Tamoxifen. Or you can have a mastectomy. You'll have to come in and let me explain this
to you,” (19). In this case, it is the physician who serves as the administrator of power in
the disciplinary system. The fact that his options for treatment are limited and his
responses are so curt indicates that he sees medical management of the abject body as the
only legitimate option; the fact that he insists on being her primary source for information
regarding these options supports his authority. Later, he refuses to send Kumin her
pathology report at her request, even though she knows it is her legal right to have a copy
of the document, and she tells him so: “Two days later, [I received] a onesentence letter
from Dr. X indicating that he would have to talk to me facetoface to interpret the
report,” (20). In this case, the medical professional exercises power over her body and her
choices. He believes that the only legitimate interpretation of the report is his own; he
puts himself in charge of her narrative. Other writers, in their descriptions of breast
cancer, use figurative language to describe the ways in which they feel contained or
controlled by medical treatment: “you stretch on a table/wondering how you got into this
cage/the room with the xray machine,” (Kennedy 4). This poem by Terry Kennedy,
called, “Mammogram,” indicates that Kennedy feels physically, bodily contained by the
medicalization of her breast cancer. She is in a cage, a figurative cell, not unlike the one
described in Foucault's Panopticon. She feels trapped, surveilled, and overpowered by the
disciplinary system which administers the mammogram.
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Medicine, in some cases, becomes the system which administers the surveillance of
the abject breast cancer body. This surveillance can sometimes lead to internalized
selfpolicing, as we see with mammograms. Policing of the abject female body, as a
mode of discipline, can also be administered through other institutions or groups, as
Foucault’s comment demonstrates: “Discipline…may be taken over either by ‘specialized
institutions…or by preexisting authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or
reorganizing their internal mechanisms of power,” (Discipline and Punish 215). Policing
of the abject breast cancer body is not always administered by the authority of
biomedicine; sometimes it is administered by other groups or social structures.
Policing often takes place in the form of shaming, which publicly hurts or
embarrasses those who do not behave within the system’s prescribed order or
expectations. After they have been publicly shamed, they are more likely to behave
according to the expectations of the system in order to avoid further hurt and
embarrassment. Sometimes, shaming comes from the very organizations which claim to
support those with breast cancer. In the case of shaming, these organizations can
represent the disciplinary system; the shaming has been internalized, and then is
administered, by those involved. One example of covert shaming is the continued usage
of battle or war language referring to breast cancer patients. For example, the Susan G.
Komen website features a woman, Nikki HammondsBlakely, whose personal profile
pivots around the repeated phrase “found her strength,” and her story tells us “I have
battled breast cancer for over 20 years,” implying that she is a longterm fighter (Susan
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G. Komen). Patients in treatment are often encouraged to think of themselves as
“fighters” and “warriors” in a battle against breast cancer; when and if they die as a result
of cancer or cancer treatment, they are said to have “lost their battle with breast cancer”
or (in polite circles) to have “succumbed” to cancer. Persistent and pervasive use of this
language implies that any breast cancer patient who does not take on the “fighter” mantle
is a coward, and that anyone who dies as a result of breast cancer is a weakwilled failure.
For example, the documentary, Pink Ribbons, Inc., which is based on Samantha King's
book of the same title, features a group of women who call themselves the “IV League.”
(Pool, Dir.). These women are all living with stage IV breast cancer, meaning the cancer
has metastasized and is terminal. They claim they feel hurt, dismissed, and marginalized
by the “fighter” language often used by the contemporary breast cancer awareness
movement, because it implies that they've given up, that they aren't worth acknowledging
(Pool, Dir.). What is being policed, in this case, is the attitude or emotional reaction
people have to their cancer publicly. Their bodies are deviant because they are both alive
but actively dying, simultaneously. They don't fit neatly into the life/death binary. They
are expected to fight, to behave as warriors, according to the current disciplinary system.
If they don’t, they are subject to this form of shaming via the use of “fighter” language.
The abject breast cancer body is policed by new socially ordered expectations of how a
person is expected to respond to the illness.
Readers see similar policing through a social group (as opposed to an organization
like Komen) in Marchetto's, Cancer Vixen, when Marisa's friends learn about her
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diagnosis. A fullpage image, with Marisa's face at center, shows several of her friends
(as floating heads around her) asking if she's taken the proper steps to start dealing with
the disease. All of their questions begin with the words “HAVE YOU...” in all capital
letters, emphasizing their concern with whether or not she has taken the requisite steps
(73). The next page shows the same image, except that all of her friends are now united
in one voice, shouting, “WHEN ARE YOU GOING TO START FIGHTING THIS
THING?!” (74).The expected and condoned role of the abject breast cancer body is that
of “fighter,” and those who chose not to frame themselves that way transgress the
expectations established by the social order.
Those with postmastectomy bodies (sometimes called “mastectomees”) must cope
with the pressure, administered by these disciplinary systems, to appear physically
feminine via the use of prosthetics or reconstructive surgery. Marchetto's graphic novel
shows a frame in which Marisa consults a woman who has had a double mastectomy to
ask if she (the woman, Hilary) is OK. Hilary responds, “I'm more than OK...Now I've got
the greatest tits!” This brief segment demonstrates that Hilary has internalized the value
of breasts as signifiers of femininity to the point that the most important part of her breast
cancer experience is her takehome prize: great new tits. While many feel constantly
pressured to alter their bodies to fit more idealized concepts of femininity through
cosmetic surgery, the pressure is slightly different in the context of breast cancer: our
current disciplinary system makes people feel more than pressured, obligated, to ensure
that their bodies match the norms of femininity constructed for them. Because of the
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symbolism of the breast as representative of life and nurturing, we are often disturbed by
missing breasts: it creates the cognitive discord and unease noted earlier in this chapter.
Those with breast cancer who’ve had mastectomies are obligated to set us at ease by
wearing prosthetics or having cosmetic surgery. When people cannot adequately modify
their bodies to conceal their mastectomies and signify the feminine, they feel unsettled,
like one mastectomee, June, who is unnerved by her prosthetic: “...all of a sudden you've
got this great big weight hanging down in your bra,” (Parton, Ussher, and Perz 8).
Similarly, Zona Gale's poem, “Does It Eat, Too?” demonstrates the pressure a person
feels to appear feminine: “Anne's first night out/in full prosthesis/salad drops down
front/laughter dissolves us/almost to tears/tension eases/after months of fear,” (Gale 35).
Though the woman in the poem and her friends are able to find humor in the situation,
that doesn't negate the fact that she felt the obligation, even among friends, to go out
publicly wearing full prosthetics. She, too, has internalized the policing of her body,
feeling the pressure to ensure that she is behaving as expected within the disciplinary
system. All of these people, by virtue of the fact that they choose prosthetics, are aware
that their bodies are being surveilled, observed, and judged for meeting the standards of
femininity.
Much progress has been made in feminist criticism and breast cancer discourse in
the last few decades; however, the work of understanding the impact of breast cancer on
the identities of those who are diagnosed, and the sociocultural impact of the breast
cancer awareness movement is not yet exhausted. Application of feminist theories of the
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abject, fecund female body to breast cancer discourse reveals that the breast cancer body
is also an abject body, and that, while people's voices in breast cancer are heard today
more than they ever have been before, there are still disciplinary systems in place which
surveil bodies and attempt to regulate their behavior so that it meets the system’s
expectations. Much current public discourse about breast cancer is influenced by the
disciplinary system, and reifies its values or demonstrates that those with breast cancer
feel subject to hegemonic values through the policing and regulation of their bodies. But
many have resisted this public discourse, creating for themselves new and innovative
narratives of self which resist to our current system, as we shall see shortly.
In the first two chapters, we established the history of the problematic
constructions of the female body which the early breast cancer movement inherited, and
then established the ways in which the breast cancer body is abject in current discourse
about breast cancer. Further analysis of this subject is critical and will include an
examination of the extent to which some people enact their agency and make choices to
transgress the disciplinary system and its expectations of the abject breast cancer body,
and the methods by which they do so. In the following chapter, we will build on the
discussion from the first two chapters by demonstrating the ways in which public and
literary discourse—particularly the discourse generated by the breast cancer awareness
movement and its marketing strategiesreify and support the construction of the female
body as abject. This discourse has helped to codify and foster a master narrative of breast
cancer which sets sociocultural expectations that many struggle to meet or simply refuse
114

to engage in. As a result, they feel marginalized, as though their experience is not
reflected by (or acknowledged by) the society in which they live, and that experience can
be painful and detrimental.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MASTER NARRATIVE OF PINKWASHING AND THE
BREAST CANCER AWARENESS MOVEMENT
In the last chapter, we saw that application of feminist theories of the abject,
fecund female body to breast cancer discourse reveals that the breast cancer body is an
abject body, and therefore subject to disciplinary systems. While public awareness of
breast cancer and its resultant mortality has risen significantly over the last thirty years,
disciplinary systems which attempt to regulate abject breast cancer bodies have not
diminished or receded, nor has awareness of those systems markedly increased. Instead,
those disciplinary systems have generated a master narrative of breast cancer, based on
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flawed hegemonic, patriarchal constructions of the female body. As I will explain, that
master narrative has several parts, key concepts which present themselves in the
contemporary breast cancer awareness movement. The master narrative of breast cancer
has become the expectation by which we judge abject bodies of breast cancer and by
which people with breast cancer are policed and police each other.
The modern breast cancer awareness movement is powered by causemarketing
strategies and corporate sponsorship. Causemarketing and corporate campaigns

Chapter One includes a definition of a master narrative, but the definition used by
Nelson will also be fully articulated below.
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involving breast cancer awareness take advantage of the concepts which comprise the
master narrative, using them to sell products and (ostensibly) raise money for breast
cancer awareness and research. Because the marketing and corporate use of pink and the
pink ribbon is ubiquitous, it massively influences public discourse about breast cancer;
therefore, the master narrative, ever present in pink marketing, creates the expectations
for behavior of the breast cancer body that are dominant in our society. The disciplinary
systems are enacted, paradoxically, through the modern breast cancer awareness
movement. This master narrative potentially silences the voices of people, those who, for
a multitude of reasons, do not conform to its expectations, and that silencing has real and
lasting implications for the physical and mental health of those with breast cancer. In the
next chapter, I will demonstrate the potential impacts of the master narrative on those
with breast cancer in order to substantiate that we should pluralize the master narrative
rather than letting it dominate our cultural perceptions of the illness; I will also analyze
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stories which resist the master narrative in order to demonstrate the ways in which these
stories can enrich and complicate our discourse about breast cancer.
1. Illness Narratives and Social Identity
Several scholars in medical anthropology, sociology, and narrative medicine
concur that the social aspects of illness are integral to understanding the function of
stories of illness (known as illness narratives). Our lives do not happen in a vacuum; we

Nelson calls stories which resist the master narrative “counterstories,” as we shall
see later in this chapter and in Chapter 4.
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are (at least to some extent) defined via our relationships to others. Additionally, illness
has various sociocultural connotations (for good or ill) that influence our experiences in
illness; by the same token, in illness, we make choices and behave in ways that change
the fabric of our social worlds. In order to understand the potentially deep and
multifaceted effects of the master narrative on illness experience, we must first
understand the relationship between story and self, self and other, and narratives and our
social worlds.
According to Frank, “selves are perpetually recreated in stories. Stories do not
simply describe the self; they are the self’s medium of being,” (53). Stories then, are not
merely vocalized or written experiences, they are phenomenological compositions.
Phenomenology, according to Smith, is a branch of philosophy which is concerned with
“structures of experience, or consciousness…the ways we experience things, thus the
meanings things have in our experience.” Stories, then, are the way in which we
construct and give voice to our very being; they constitute our existence, as Frank says:
“The self is being formed in what is told,” (55). Frank, relying on the work of
psychoanalyst Roy Schafer, goes on to claim that, while stories are selfconstitutive, they
are not entirely isolated or individuated. The self also needs others to hear the stories, for
reaffirmation: “The selfstory is told both to others and to one’s self; each telling is
enfolded within the other. The act of telling is a dual reaffirmation. Relationships with
others are reaffirmed, and the self is reaffirmed,” (56). The concept of selfstory Frank
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introduces here is important: the selfstory is not only a story of the self. The selfstory,
and thus the creation of the self, is defined and made secure by a person’s relationship to
others. Susan Brison, in her discussion on recovery from trauma, also notes the
significance of the relationship between self and other in the recreation of identity in the
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wake of serious bodily harm. She claims that survivors need autonomy, but also need to
be reconnected with humanity in order to navigate their worlds safely: she notes, for
example, that following her sexual assault, she needed others to help her make
arrangements that would make her feel she could function safely at the gym and at work
(61). These arrangements encouraged her autonomy, but also helped her understand
relationships to others as they relate to personal autonomy: “These ways of enhancing my
autonomy…reinforced my view of autonomy as fundamentally dependent on others…the
right sort of interactions with others can be seen as essential to autonomy…The
autonomous self and the relational self are thus shown to be interdependent, even
constitutive of one another,” (61). The selfstory is not an entirely individuated or
autonomous construction; rather, the selfstory is a symbiosis between the autonomous
self and the self’s relation to others (61). The self, according to Brison, is relational (61).
Rita Charon’s work echoes the importance of sharing the selfstory with others in
her emphasis on the phenomenological concept of intersubjectivity. She claims that
intersubjectivity gives meaning to the narrative exchange. According to Charon,
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See Brison, Susan J. Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self.
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intersubjectivity includes “the cognitive acts of perception and interpretation…the
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personal transformations incurred by virtue of human relation,” (51). Charon puts it a
bit more simply, claiming that intersubjectivity “occurs when two subjects, or two
authentic selves, meet. It is in meeting with the other selves that the self comes alive,”
(51). This claim aligns with Frank’s claims above: stories comprise our being; in order to
be, we need others to authentically engage with our stories. We need the subjectivity of
others to open itself to engaging with our subjective experience. Havi Carel elaborates on
the concept of intersubjectivity, noting that intersubjectivity must also include
acknowledgement of the bodies of those involved in the exchange, their “shared
corporeal foundation” (Phenomenology of Illness 53). This intersubjective perception of
others’ bodies (which Carel calls “intercorporeality”) allows for understanding the social
aspects of illness: “…the lived body encompasses not only one’s experience but also the
social aspect of one’s experience of one’s own and others’ bodies, as well as how others’
experience of one’s own body might impact on their own experience of their body,”
(Phenomenology of Illness 54). The acknowledgement of others’ corporeality returns us
to Charon’s discussion of phenomenology, in which she notes that a critical aspect of
phenomenology is the concept of being, existing, with one another: “…joint
beingintheworld grants fellowship to its cohabitants, in both their mutual regard for its
objects and their becoming objects for one another’s regard and experience,” (51). In

Charon’s claims are directly drawn from the phenomenological work of
Heidegger and Husserl.
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order to have our selfstories, our bodies, our beings, validated and made real, we need
others and we also need to acknowledge the beings and bodies of others.
Intersubjectivity, including intercorporeality, is crucial. Charon tells us that it allows both
the ill person and the audience, reader, or listener, to engage in a “powerful and
transformative connection” (52). Carel notes that the “experience of empathy is crucial to
this exchange,” (Phenomenology of Illness, 54). Selfstory, then, is constructed by
ourselves and by others. Moreover, it is ideally constructed intersubjectively with others,
in such a way that acknowledges lived and corporeal experiences and “joint
beingintheworld.” Selfstory, in this context, can have a terrific impact on the ill
person’s attempt to successfully create and negotiate a new identity in illness.
Understanding stories through a phenomenological perspective helps us to
understand that they are all the more critical when utilized in illness. Frank claims that
the lives of the ill are “narrative wrecks”: “the conventional expectation of any
narrative…is for a past that leads into a present that sets in place a foreseeable future. The
illness story is wrecked because its present is not what the past was supposed to lead up
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to, and the future is scarcely thinkable,” (55). The ill person’s narrative of self, narrative
of being, is blown apart, not only at the mere moment of diagnosis; the past is useless and
fragmented because it did not lead to the present expected by the self; the present is
traumatic; the future nonexistent. The ill person’s story, and thus the ill person's
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Frank’s work draws heavily on the theories of the philosopher, Ronald Dworkin.
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phenomenological experience, the self, is shattered. Frank claims that the way out of this
narrative wreckage is to tell stories to others, to recreate the narrative structure of our
lives. Brison concurs:
In order to reconstruct selfnarratives we need not only the words with which to
tell our stories, but also an audience able and willing to hear us and to understand
our words as we intend them. this aspect of remaking a self in the aftermath of
trauma highlights the dependency of the self on others and helps to explain why it
is so difficult for survivors to recover when others are unwilling to listen to what
they endured. (Brison 51)
The narrative self in illness needs others. It forms a network of intersubjective
relationships and and an understanding of one's body through a social lens which help the
ill person redefine the self, as Brison notes: “On this view the self is both autonomous
and socially dependent, vulnerable enough to be undone by violence and yet resilient
enough to be reconstructed with the help of empathic others,” (38). Similarly, Charon
acknowledges the importance of narrative to our identity as a human community:
“…narrative knowledge and practice are what human beings use to communicate to each
other….a major source of both identity and community…bearing witness to one
another’s ordeals, celebrating our common heritage as listeners around a campfire,” (11).
Thus, narratives of self in illness (or, illness narratives) can be unique and autonomously
created, but they are also always created through relationships to others, generating a
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network of relationships which forms a larger community.
2. Impact of the Master Narrative
Many of our stories, including illness narratives, are generated from frameworks
or stories which are already part of our world, as Frank says: “People tell their own
unique stories, but they compose these by adapting and combining narrative types that
culture makes available” (75). Thus, to create our new stories in illness, we often build
from, recycle, or remodel, elements of stories that have been part of our cultural lives.
Some of these elements may be taken from stories that Hilde Nelson calls, “master
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narratives.” Nelson claims that master narratives “are often archetypal, consisting of
stock plots and easily recognizable character types…[such as] Our culture’s foundation
myths—the Passion of Christ...the bestknown fairy tales…great literature, movie
classics," (7). In the same way we use these types of master narratives to negotiate things
like spirituality, morals, romance, and other aspects of our lives, we may use others,
specifically those that pertain to illness and are socioculturally constructed. We know
that illness narratives are created, to some extent, through a network of relationships with
others and in the context of communities, as we have noted above. Because others and
communities are involved in the creation of illness narratives, it follows that
sociocultural experiences would come to bear on understanding illness narratives. So, at
this juncture, it’s important for us to examine the ways in which elements of master

Here, we revisit and elaborate on the definition of master narratives which we
first encountered in Chapter 1.
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narratives influence personal illness experiences.
Master narratives, according to Nelson, are “the stories found lying about in our
culture that serve as summaries of socially shared understandings. Master narratives are
often archetypal…repositories of our common norms,” (6). While Nelson is quick to
clarify that master narratives “need not be oppressive,” she notes that they can
“contribute to the construction of an oppressive identity” (7). In the context of master
narratives about medical professionals, Nelson gives the example of a master narrative
about nurses, in which physicians perceived nurses as “touchyfeely” and in which the
anecdotes they believed and repeated about nurses cast them as “subservient to men, as
emotional rather than rational, as mothers, rather than scientists,” (4). These ideas are part
of the detrimental and oversimplifying master narrative about nurses; in this particular
case, the nurses sought to resist the master narrative. In his discussion of patients and
illness narratives, Frank, too, notes that we must be careful of narrative elements which
“risk creating yet another ‘general unifying view’ that subsumes the particularity of
individual experience,” (76). In other words, we should avoid ascribing to patients
identities which are reductive and obscure their personal experiences. So, while master
narratives are a critical part of our culture and not, by definition, harmful, they have the
potential to be when they overwhelmingly shape the perception of a person or group, and
when they obscure individual experience. Carel notes this phenomenon in her description
of living with lung cancer: “Instead of choosing what you disclose about yourself, you

124

become a passive vessel of information provided through your own betraying body, a
body that cannot keep a secret. A stranger takes a glance at you and already knows so
much…as a result the person may be reduced to her illness,” (Illness: The Cry of the
Flesh “The Elephant in the Friendship”). Reducing a person to the features of her illness
in this way is dehumanizing, and severely limits the ways in which we can
intersubjectively interact with that person. Master narratives are ubiquitous aspects of our
culture which we utilize perhaps without even realizing it; however, because they rely on
archetypal simplifications and reductions, they can be problematic, and we should be
aware of the ways in which master narratives about breast cancer may be oversimplified,
reductionist, and dehumanizing to the people dealing with the illness.
It’s crucial to note that, by virtue the fact that master narratives are “repositories
of common norms” we often subconsciously make use of them in constructing our
personal stories. It is pertinent, here, to return to Foucault’s concept of the Panopticon
which was introduced in Chapter 2. Foucault claimed that, while the tactics of the
Panopticon may be utilized by specific institutions (medicine and education among
them), they may also become disseminated throughout society via what he called the
“disciplinemechanism”: “a functional mechanism that must improve the exercise of
power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion of
society to come…the gradual extension of mechanisms…their spread throughout the
whole social body, the formation of what might be called a disciplinary society,”
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(Discipline and Punish 209). Master narratives are also “common norms,” gradually
extended through the social body. If we combine Foucault’s theory of the
disciplinemechanism with Nelson’s definition of master narratives as “repositories of
common norms,” we see that oppressive master narratives may serve as a mechanism of
discipline: they are socially disseminated norms which may contribute to an incorrect,
reductionist, or otherwise problematic identity. The oppressive master narrative becomes
the set of expectations given by the disciplinary society (such as the example of the
nurses, above, in which the nurses are expected to be nurturing and emotional, rather than
scientific and rational). We internalize these expectations and may perform according to
them ourselves; because they are part of social norms, we may also use those
expectations to police others and their behavior as well as our own.
Additionally, there is a secondary aspect of Nelson’s definition of master
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narratives. Drawing on several scholars, she claims that master narratives have moral
import: “we use them not only to make sense of our experience…but also to justify what
we do…As the repositories of our common norms, master narratives exercise a certain
authority over our moral imaginations and play a role in informing our moral intuitions,”
(6). Oppressive aspects of master narratives may infiltrate the consciousness of the
person or group to whom they are attributed (such as the nurses mentioned above)

From Nisbett and Ross (1980) Nelson concludes that, “we use them to make
sense of our experience”; from MacIntyre (1984) she draws that we use master narratives
to “justify what we do,” (6).
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causing a lowered selfperception of selfworth. Again, we should take Nelson’s theory
in the context of Foucault's theory of the disciplinemechanism. If oppressive master
narratives are the expectations by which we surveil and police others, they also have the
potential to lower the perception of selfworth of the people who are subject to them.
Then by engaging in the surveillance and discipline elicited by the master narrative, we
may also be engaging in the lowering of others' selfperception of worth. Further, because
we use master narratives to “inform our moral intuitions,” we may use them to form
moral judgments of others who refuse to abide the expectations of the oppressive master
narrative. Our moral intuition has been shaped by the master narrative in such a way that
we believe that the expectations that are part of it, are morally right; and therefore,
anyone who refuses to follow them is deemed morally wrong, or amoral. We use the
oppressive master narrative as a mechanism by which to surveil, police, judge, and
finally, marginalize those who don’t abide it.
Foucault and Nelson both note that resistance to these oppressive elements of
social life—the Panopticon and the master narrative—is possible. While Foucault’s work
on power and resistance is extensive, one particular aspect is worth highlighting here.
Foucault claims that in a disciplinary society, mechanisms of power are diffused
throughout, and that members of the society are imbricated in the structure of that society
and those mechanisms of power: “...the circuits of communication are the supports of an
accumulation and a centralization of knowledge…it is not that the beautiful totality of the
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individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the
individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and
bodies,” (Discipline and Punish 217).
According to Foucault, because the elements of the disciplinary system are so
diffuse, the resistance to that power must also be diffuse. He tells readers that resistance
to power comes in the form of “spontaneous organizations, coalitions—anything which
may establish horizontal conjunctions,” (italics mine) (Discipline and Punish 219). These
horizontal relationships oppose the panoptic power structure, according to Pickett’s
analysis of Foucault: “Power, by its very nature, must be hierarchical and egalitarian. In
contrast, Foucault repeatedly links resistance with ‘horizontal conjunctions’ and
equality,” (459). Equal, balanced relationships of power, as opposed to those in which the
power is asymmetrical, may help to resist panoptic structure.
My suggestion here is that that illness narratives, by virtue of their
intersubjectivity, may be one way in which to create and foster the types of “horizontal
conjunctions” to which Foucault and Pickett refer. These horizontal conjunctions may
resist the power system of the disciplinary society. Notably, with regard to equality and
horizontal relationships of power, Nelson’s theories about resistance to master narratives
appear to concur with Foucault’s theories about resistance of the disciplinary society.
Nelson claims that the way to resist master narratives is the telling of
counterstories. By way of definition, she says that counterstories have two essential parts:
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the revelation of the master narrative, and a retelling of the story “about the person or
group to which the person belongs in such a way as to make visible the morally relevant
details that the master narrative suppressed,” (7). Nelson claims that this second part may
allow a new respect for the person (or group) about whom the master narrative was
initially generated: “If the retelling is successful, the group members will stand revealed
as respectworthy moral agents,” (7). This revelation of the person or group members as
“respectworthy moral agents” may create the type of “horizontal conjunction” to which
Foucault refers: the relationship of power between the storyteller and the listener
becomes more symmetrical. Additionally, Nelson tells us, resistance to master narratives
through counterstories is a method by which the oppressed person may change
selfperception, and thus increase feelings of personal moral worth (7). Resistance,
according to both Foucault and Nelson, is possible, and may help to resolve some of the
problems generated by the master narrative. So, we need illness narratives which are
counterstories in order to resist and pluralize the master narrative of breast cancer. The
notion of resisting disciplinary mechanisms and master narratives through counterstories,
and how we restore worth, will become more important later in this work. After we have
seen the ways in which the master narrative utilized by pinkwashing can be destructive,
we will discuss the ways in which counterstories can be useful in resisting and pluralizing
the master narrative. In the final chapter, we will discuss the importance of counterstories
and their potential for resistance. We will also analyze some examples of counterstories
which demonstrate the point. For now, all we need to bear in mind is the idea that master
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narratives are often oversimplified and archetypal, have the potential to be oppressive and
disciplinary, and shape our perception of our own moral worth and that of others.
In the first chapter, we saw the inherited problematic constructions of the female
body which became embedded in the nascent breast cancer awareness movement in the
early part of the 20th century. The second chapter demonstrated the ways in which the
breast cancer body, throughout the last several decades, has occupied the abject subject
position. These two trends of perception of the female body have intersected in the
context of the contemporary breast cancer awareness movement to foster a master
narrative about breast cancer which serves to discipline the abject breast cancer body, to
keep it within systemic expectations for behavior, and to internalize selfpolicing. One
specific and definitive aspect of the breast cancer awareness movement of recent decades
has been the pink awareness campaign and the partnering of charities with forprofit
corporations in order to ostensibly raise awareness and generate funds for research and
treatment. Foucault notes that the tendency of charities to occupy positions which allow
them to enact discipline is not a new one: “Religious groups and charity organization had
long played this role of ‘disciplining’ the population. From the CounterReformation to
the philanthropy of the July monarchy, initiatives of this type continued to
increase…their aims were religious…economic…or political,” (Discipline and Punish
213). There is historical precedent for charities performing as controlling forces and
creating behavioral expectations for the populations they represent and, as Foucault notes
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in the passage above, it may have been in effort to raise money: “…discipline increases
the skill of each individual…coordinates these skills…tends to increase aptitudes, speeds,
outputs, and therefore profits; it exerts a moral influence over behavior…introduces
bodies into a machinery, forces into an economy” (Foucault Discipline and Punish 210).
In short, the discipline enacted in a society is meant to increase production, to create and
support productive bodies which participate in, and promote, commerce. In the case of
breast cancer awareness charities, we know that their aims are primarily financial: they
seek to raise money. Through their use of disciplinary tactics and the master narrative of
breast cancer, they seek to discipline bodies into being productive bodies, bodies that
participate in breast cancer awareness commerce. Let’s examine, for example, the social
expectation that those with breast cancer should be enduring, stalwart, strong, and heroic.
This was an expectation of feminine behavior in illness which we saw in Chapter 1 (and
we will explore below, in detail, the role it plays in the master narrative of breast cancer).
A person in this position might demonstrate this heroism, this strength, by leading a team
in a charity walk, or attending or helping to plan a major fundraising event. Or, a person
with breast cancer might simply demonstrate strength and endurance by disguising the
effects of treatment using wigs and makeup, and going through daily treatment routines
without complaint. All of these actions, though, mean that this person is a productive
body, participating in the movement and in commerce in ways potentially resulting from
the expectations created by the master narrative.
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These pink campaigns, motivated primarily by fundraising, have made use of,
and reified, the concepts of the master narrative of breast cancer through their
ubiquitous marketing, but why? To what end? Frank acknowledges the beneficial
potential in what he terms “general unifying views” (which overlap with Nelson’s
definition of master narratives): “The advantage is to encourage closer attention to the
stories ill persons tell. Listening is difficult because illness stories mix and weave
different narrative threads. The rationale for proposing some general types of
narratives is to sort out those threads,” (76). In the case of the breast cancer awareness
movement, however, the opposite has happened: the master narrative has constructed
or made use of easily recognized archetypes which make it simpler and more efficient
for the campaign to reach the general public. Many stories of illness, including stories
of breast cancer, create what Frank terms “chaos narratives,” (97). Chaos narratives
are stories in which “the plot never imagines life getting any better,” (97). Chaos
stories are hard to hear because they provoke anxiety: “…they are too threatening.
The anxiety these stories provoke inhibits hearing,” (9798). Chaos narratives are
difficult and frightening for us to hear because they remind us “how easily any of us
could be sucked under,” (97). These kinds of stories, which are existentially
threatening and difficult to engage with, don’t make for good and efficient advertising.
Instead, consumers want stories that are easily accessed and not existentially
threatening. They crave stories in which illness is vanquished like an enemy, or in
which it becomes something useful and productive, or results in lifealtering wisdom.
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Stories that genuinely confront us with our own own mortality don’t sell. It’s easier
for consumers to access a series of generalized, archetypal notions of breast cancer
which make illness a productive, nonthreatening experience.
Pink awareness ads and products are unavoidable; advertisers bombard the public
with their messages and nonthreatening archetypes. Making the concerted effort to hear
and confront alternative narratives is a difficult venture (particularly over the din of
advertising), and not one which many of us have the existential and emotional endurance
to do all of the time. Additionally, many people legitimately identify with aspects of the
master narrative. But we should be mindful of the context and frequency with which we
accept the master narrative. By accepting the master narrative and the social expectations
comprised in it, we may expect that all people’s experiences of breast cancer match the
archetypal stories we see told through the breast cancer awareness movement. We may
resist engaging with those who need us to acknowledge their stories. In doing so, we
have internalized policing behavior. That behavior, as we shall see later, is demonstrably
harmful to people with breast cancer.
The master narrative of breast cancer subjects those with breast cancer to
regulated social and behavioral expectations, generating a number of compelling
problems for people seeking to tell or enact their breast cancer illness narratives for the
purposes of reidentifying themselves. In the context of this analysis, we will examine
several major problems which arise from the master narrative of breast cancer: people
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with breast cancer may internalize the lowered worth of themselves communicated
through master narratives, and they may lack witnesses, leaving their illness narratives
unacknowledged and unheard. Thus, they are subjected to injustice. They may be shamed
or scapegoated for their illnesses or for their behavior in response to their illnesses. For
the lack of having someone to bear witness to their narratives, some may pay a price of
decreased mental, emotional, or physical health, or poorer outcomes of recovery.
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It should be noted, here, that one feature of the breast cancer awareness movement
in the United States, and the master narrative it utilizes, is that it has been historically
predominantly white. The discussion below and the implications of pinkwashing and the
master narrative apply to all who experience breast cancer, including people of color. Of
people of color, black women (in comparison with Latina, Asian, or Native American
women) experience breast cancer most frequently, and a good part of the work examining
women of color and their experiences with breast cancer is about black women,
specifically. So, that population is what the current discussion will focus on in its address
of issues of women of color and the master narrative of breast cancer.
The ways in which the influence of the pinkwashed breast cancer awareness
movement manifests itself in the lives of black women, and their experiences of the

In the opening section of the final chapter, we will examine several studies done
on women and their emotional and physical outcomes during and following breast cancer
and treatment.
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illness, may differ from those of white people. Black women are subject to the effects of
a historically different relationship to the medical hegemony. They live in
socioeconomic and environmental conditions which may affect their risk of illness or
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their mortality. The ways in which their communities address illness vary as well. A
comprehensive examination of the ways in which the master narrative of breast cancer
affects women of color would (and should) require much more historical context
regarding the problematic constructions of black women's bodies, specifically, and the
dark and complex history of the relationship between the medical hegemony and black
women's bodies in the United States. It would also require a closer examination of the
ways in which black women's bodies can be construed as abject. Laying out those
histories and contexts individually and thoroughly would take much more than the
current discussion can address; however, the experience of black women with breast
cancer, particularly in the historical, socioeconomic, and cultural contexts, merits further
work by myself and others in the future. What I have done below, in explaining each of
the main concepts of the overarching master narratives of breast cancer, is to note one or
two significant examples of the ways in which each concept may manifest differently in
the lives of black women. Through this method, readers can see the ways in which
women of color are subject to some of the same oppressive features of the master
narrative of breast cancer, but they can also see the ways in which black women's
See Gattison, Annette D. Madlock. Health Communication and Breast Cancer
among Black Women Culture, Identity, Spirituality, and Strength.
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See Eisenstein, Zillah. Manmade Breast Cancers.
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experiences of those features are distinctive and worth examining independently.
3. Cause Marketing and Pinkwashing
Before we can begin to uncover and analyze the master narrative of breast cancer,
we must see and understand the foundational principles upon which the breast cancer
awareness movement operates. Then, we can begin to know the motivations of nonprofit
organizations driving the movement and the reasons they execute specific strategies that
make use of the master narrative. These nonprofits, organizations like Susan G. Komen
for the Cure and the Avon Foundation for Women, partner with forprofit companies like
Ford, BMW, Yoplait, or KFC (among many others) in a practice called causerelated
marketing (or cause marketing). Cause marketing occurs when corporations partner with
nonprofit fundraising organizations to raise some amount (however small) of money for
the nonprofit, while also generating good publicity for the corporation and encouraging
sales. Cause marketing allows for the “integration of a corporation’s philanthropic
activities with its drive for profit,” (King 9). According to Samantha King, corporations
began taking advantage of causerelated marketing in the mid 1990s, as a way to “‘cut
through the clutter’ of increased competition…to attract the attention and loyalty of the
consumer who is understood to be increasingly adept at reading marketing messages,”
(10). So, marketing is advantageous for corporations because it gets consumers’ attention.
Additionally, cause marketing appeals to a shift of American consumer sensibility,
according to Bill Laberis, editor of Computerworld magazine: “they want something they
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can believe in…[It’s] a kind of spirituality,” (as cited in King 11). Cause marketing is
helpful to corporations not only because it gets consumers’ attention, but because it offers
a belief system in which the viewer can invest. As we noted above, part of the appeal of
master narratives is that they present methods to make sense of our experience, ways of
negotiating our experience that also form our moral intuition. Understanding the ways in
which cause marketing appeals to consumers’ belief systems may be easier if we return
briefly to Frank and note two other types of illness narratives: restitution narratives and
quest narratives. According to Frank, restitution narratives share the same plot line:
“Yesterday I was healthy, today I’m sick, but tomorrow I’ll be healthy again,” (77). In
these stories, ill people expect to get better or do get better. Quest narratives are stories in
which the ill person casts herself as the hero on an adventure, a journey, from which she
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will return improved, wiser, having gotten something from it. These stories “accept
illness and seek to use it,” (italics Frank’s) (115). Frank claims that people want to hear
restitution stories (77) and that, “most published illness stories are quest stories” (115).
These types of stories are familiar to the public and heard often. Both of these types of
narratives (which are frequently used in advertising) offer consumers “something they
can believe in” (to return to Laberis’ claim). In the case of restitution narrative, they can
believe in health, the power of medicine to heal, the ability of the human will to conquer
illness. In the quest narrative, they can believe in a hero and the wisdom the hero garners
Frank’s theory of quest narrative is derived directly from Joseph Campbell’s
theory of the “journey of the hero” or “monomyth,” from his well-known work, The Hero
with a Thousand Faces.
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from her journey; they can believe that illness is valuable, useful, or productive. By
buying an item that uses stories like these for endorsement, consumers can feel as though
they’ve supported the search for a cure, praised the endurance of the human spirit, or
helped share the wisdom a person gained on the figurative journey. The Yoplait “Save
lids to save lives” campaign is a powerful example. The slogan itself is a restitution story:
purchase this and you can help people get well. The master narrative provides an easily
digestible archetypal story about breast cancer, and also informs the consumers' moral
belief systems. Consumers of the product get to literally buyin to the belief that their
purchase has helped save a life.
Some activism and awareness groups resist these depictions of breast cancer, noting
the clear influence of capitalism in the booming breast cancer awareness industry (Lerner
262). According to Klawiter, Women’s Cancer Research Center and Breast Cancer
Action are two such groups (168177).64 In fact, BCA coined the term “pinkwashing.”
(“Think Before You Pink”). Pinkwashing is a phenomenon which has recently arisen as a
result of cause marketing related specifically to breast cancer and the famous pink ribbon
campaign. The term, according to Breast Cancer Action, originally meant, “a company or
organization that claims to care about breast cancer by promoting a pink ribbon product,
but at the same time produces, manufactures and/or sells products that are linked to the
disease,” (“Think Before You Pink”). But the definition has changed and broadened as
For more information on early resistance against the pinkwashed breast cancer
awareness movement, see the Klawiter’s chapter, “Patient Empowerment and Feminist
Activism.”

64

138

global and popular culture has embraced it. In 2011, the Hindustan Times defined it as
“adopting the color pink and pink ribbons to imply that they support breast cancer
research,” (“Companies Adopting Pinkwashing for Profit…”). This definition includes all
companies and institutions who may use the pink ribbon to generate corporate support,
not just those who manufacture products linked to breast cancer, and it includes
companies and institutions who give the pretense of “support” through promotion, but not
necessarily financial commitment to the cause. Gena Asher, columnist for the
Bloomington HeraldTimes, breast cancer survivor, and facilitator of the website,
BreastCancerFYI.org, defines pinkwashing as “using pink ribbons as a sales tool,”
(“Pinkwashing Obscures Breast Cancer Message”). A news release from the U.S. Federal
News Service contextualized the definition by noting the ubiquitousness of the color
pink, pink ribbons, and breast cancer awareness materials during the month of October,
and called pinkwashing “corporate exploitation of breast cancer,” (“Pinkwashing Depicts
Ideal Patient in Breast Cancer Awareness”). This last definition, the broadest one, allows
for the most comprehensive discussion of the ethos of breast cancer awareness marketing.
Given the history of the pink ribbon, which will be articulated below, this definition is
probably the most apt.
While the term, “pinkwashing” is relatively new, corporate exploitation of breast
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cancer began with the pink ribbons themselves. Since the inception of the ribbon,

Readers saw this phenomenon in chapter one, when Estee Lauder and Self
magazine first began using the ribbon at events and cosmetic counters.
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several companies have gotten in on the pink action. A quick Google search reveals
multiple pink ribbonthemed merchandise sites where consumers can purchase party
supplies, clothes, and jewelry, all purportedly in effort to promote breast cancer
awareness. Consumers can purchase breast cancer awareness Yoplait yogurt with a pink
lid, a pink eyelash curler from Sephora, or a perfume from the Susan G. Komen
foundation called “Promise Me.” TV viewers can watch NFL players clad in pink cleats
and wristbands, and paradegoers can see the shiny, pink stretch Humvee and the
gloriously huge pink ribbonshaped hot air balloon, all while they eat KFC chicken from
a Komensponsored bucket. According to Anastasia Pantsios, even fracking company
Baker Hughes in Texas has joined the fray, with its “Doing Our Bit for the Cure”
campaign, in which it created a distributed 1,000 hot pink fracking drill bits for use
worldwide, and donated $100,000 to the Komen Foundation. That specific shade of pink
is nearly everywhere, especially in October during Breast Cancer Awareness Month.
Undeniably, pinkwashing is effective in its efforts to increase awareness and funding:
Revlon's support of research led to the development of a powerful new treatment, and
Vera Bradley's Foundation for Breast Cancer has raised $12 million for research
(“Pinkwashing—Breast Cancer Awareness Month Inspires…”). Fernandez notes that the
Susan G. Komen Foundation has raised $685 million for research since its inception in
1982. It would appear, from cursory assessment, that cause marketing for breast cancer
has been a beneficial strategy.
Pinkwashing, though, creates serious ethical issues which merit attention.
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According to Westervelt, studies have linked several pink ribbonthemed items directly to
toxins which cause cancer, including Estee Lauder cosmetics, the Komen perfume (which
Komen vowed to reformulate before reintroducing to the market) and Yoplait yogurt
(which contained rGBH and has now been reformulated). Because of the association
between fracking and the carcinogenic toxins it adds to our environment, the pink drill
bits should also be named in this litany of pinkwashed products. According to Kinsman,
KFC partnered with Komen in 2010 to launch its “Buckets for the Cure” campaign,
telling consumers that fifty cents of each purchase of a bucket of chicken would go
toward cancer research and awareness (though, at the bottom of its website, the “Buckets
for the Cure” campaign acknowledged that contributions would not be determined by the
number of individual consumer purchases, but by the number of buckets purchased by
restaurant operators). KFC is widely known for its highfat, highcalorie products, and
being overweight or obese is linked to increased risk of breast cancer in postmenopausal
women, according to the American Cancer Society website (“Lifestyle Related Cancer
Risk Factors”). The irony of this venture and others like it was not lost on Elizabeth
Kucinich, wife of thencongressman Dennis Kucinich, who wrote Nancy Brinker
(founder of Susan G. Komen) to request an end to the campaign: “Selling chicken in pink
buckets to benefit breast cancer research is like selling pink cigarettes to benefit lung
cancer research or selling bottles of pink liquor to support Alcoholics Anonymous.” The
use of causemarketing to peddle products which have actually been linked to breast
cancer, while claiming to help people with breast cancer, is so ironic it’s nearly laughable.
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Or at least, it would be, but for the fact it’s actually quite tragic: while the Komen
foundation sold “Buckets for the Cure,” over 40,000 women in the U.S. died from breast
cancer in 2015 (“Cancer of the Breast {female}: Cancer Stat Facts”). Exposing and
resolving this unethical practice of pinkwashing is paramount in the efforts to direct
fundraising to expanded treatment and research on prevention. Several articles and books,
including Pink Ribbons, Inc., by Samantha King (and the eponymous 2012 documentary)
have been written and produced on these issues. The watchdog group, Breast Cancer
Action, continues to monitor and call out pinkwashing practices. This is significant work
which must be supported and should continue. However, there is another problem at hand
with pinkwashing: the master narrative, which is utilized by these nonprofits and
corporations through pinkwashing, is detrimental to the reconstruction of identity in
illness and supports other unethical practices. The purpose of the current project is to
analyze these occurrences.
The corporate narrative (which makes use of the master narrative) of the breast
cancer experience has now become entwined with public discourse about breast cancer.
Thanks to the ubiquity of corporate advertising, the master narrative of breast cancer is
nearly all the general public is exposed to. Because the master narrative is a method by
which people are surveilled and disciplined about their unique breast cancer experiences,
it threatens to overwhelm and obscure individualized or alternative stories. If the master
narrative of breast cancer can potentially cause internalized lowered moral selfworth of
those with breast cancer, and difficulty reconstructing narratives of self in illness, then
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pinkwashing, in its support and reification of the master narrative, is causing a great deal
of emotional and moral harm (to say nothing of the association between “pink” products
and carcinogens) to those with breast cancer.
4. The Master Narrative of Pinkwashing and the Breast Cancer Awareness Movement
Pinkwashing threatens to delegitimize the lives and identities of the people whose
breast cancer experiences do not fit into the mold of the master narrative. In order to fully
comprehend the ways in which it does so, we must define and examine the master
narrative of breast cancer and examples of that master narrative at work. In the context of
the present discussion, we will delimit four major concepts of the overarching master
narrative (though, this list is certainly not meant to be exhaustive). The first is the
massive oversimplification that early detection inevitably means that a person’s breast
cancer will be cured. The second concept is the myth of the omnipotence of medicine
and the idea that the knowledge of the patient about their own experience should be
subjugated to that of medical professionals. The third is the expectation that people will
maintain heteronormativity in their bodies and behaviors during and after their breast
cancer diagnosis and treatment. The fourth and final problematic concept of the master
narrative is the notion of the “ideal” breast cancer patient, who is heroic, strong,
enduring, and full of hope. As we shall see below, those who don’t fall into this category
are scapegoated or subject to victimblaming for their behavior. Each of these concepts is
related to the nature of breast cancer bodies as abject. Each of them have, embedded in
them, methods by which to police behaviors of the abject breast cancer body. If we take
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together the criticisms of the master narrative of breast cancer with examples of
pinkwashing, and juxtapose those against the stories of those speaking from outside the
master narrative, we can see the ways in which pinkwashing polices and regulates the
behavior of people with breast cancer, minimizing the importance of their alternative
stories in the sociocultural context.
5. Early Detection Means a Cure
In the previous chapter, we saw that the abject breast cancer body is a body out of
control, a body which is considered deviant. Foucault notes that one of the features of
disciplinary systems is that they can be (and are) utilized by institutions such as medicine,
and we have established, via Ussher, that the monstrous feminine body is subject to
medical management of its excess. In the context of the breast cancer awareness
movement, the “early detection means a cure” message is the way in which the abject
female body is subject to policing and discipline through medical management of illness.
We already examined strong evidence of such in the previous chapter’s exploration of
mammograms: they are recommended often and fairly frequently, even though they are
not as accurate as the public seems to believe, and there is a significant occurrence of
misdiagnosis and overtreatment resulting from mammograms. Mammograms are an
excellent metaphor, here: they are a figurative and literal example of the way in which the
abject breast cancer body is surveilled and then subject to medical management and
discipline.
Maren Klawiter notes pinkwashing’s support for the “early detection means a cure”
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message in her observation of the Komen “Race for the Cure,” an event that (along with
corporate partners) raises money for breast cancer treatment and research: “In the
discourse of the race, survival is a matter of individual choice as responsibility. Regular
mammograms never fail to diagnose breast cancer early and women diagnosed with
breast cancer never die…breast cancer may constitute a momentary setback, but it is not
a debilitating, recurring, or chronic disease,” (“Racing for the Cure…” 145). Even the
race itself, by virtue of the fact that it is a physically competitive event which requires the
strength and endurance of a relatively healthy person, implies that a person can somehow
control disease and is capable of willing oneself to achieve physical goals. So, one of the
earliest key features of breast cancer’s popular narrative is the message that, essentially, if
a person sees the doctor in a regular and responsible way, that person simply will not die
from breast cancer. This message is an old one, in the history of the breast cancer
awareness movement, used from the inception of the movement to urge the pathologized
woman to subject her body to medical management to control its deviance.
Features of the master narrative of breast cancer appear as early as the campaign
against breast cancer begun by the American Society for the Control of cancer (ASCC) in
1913, (KnopfNewman 16) of which the main message was, essentially, that early
detection equals cure (Gardner 1). The ASCC (later known as the American Cancer
Society), endorsed by several allopathic medical groups, operated as a clearinghouse for
information and promoted the cause (Gardner 2). Traditional medicine at the time
followed the simple belief that early treatment offered the best opportunity for a cure, so
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that idea became the foundation for the ASCC’s early campaign, as we saw in Chapter 1.
But this message fostered two mistaken beliefs that contributed to the popular discourse
of breast cancer: that physicians had the power to actually cure the disease (which they
didn’t, at the time), and that a woman ignored symptoms at her own peril (Gardner 3).
According to Gardner, “The message was repetitive, didactic, simple, and in hindsight,
profoundly naïve,” (3). At that time, many women died from breast cancer, regardless of
detection and treatment. As of 2006, about 25% of women diagnosed still died from the
disease (Herndl 236). That percentage appears to solidly controvert the master narrative’s
message that, “early detection equals a cure.” We should take a moment to discuss and
examine survival rates for breast cancer; the impact of these numbers can’t be
underestimated. Reported survival rates often seem relatively high, for example the
National Cancer Institute (NCI) statistic that the relative survival rate for breast cancer is
89.7% (“Cancer of the Breast (female): Cancer Stat Facts.”). But these numbers can be
misleading: according to Soerjomatarm et al., a “long term survivor” is a person who has
lived five years after diagnosis. Survival rates are often reported in terms of fiveyear
survivors (as is the NCI relative survival rate above). In their 2008 study, Soerjomatarm
et al. showed that the fiveyear relative survival rate for breast cancer was 88%, but the
tenyear relative survival rate for breast cancer was 77%, meaning that ten years
postdiagnosis, 23% of women in the study had died from breast cancer. The National
Cancer Institute estimates that in 2016, more than 40,000 women died from breast cancer
(“Cancer of the Breast {female}: Cancer Stat Facts.”). The deluded and oversimplified
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idea that curing women of breast cancer was not only possible, but nearly guaranteed, as
long as they empowered themselves to visit the doctor is one that, like most features of
the master narrative of breast cancer, we still see today. The presence of these
oversimplified notions is noted by a user who goes by Abbeyfighter in the
BreastCancer.org forum: “…everything I read says that my survival can be prolonged but
I will probably die from breast cancer and within the next 10 years. I supposedly have
good prognostic factors…but honestly does not seem to matter. I don’t want 5 or 10
years. I want to live to old age and see my beautiful family grow up. I feel I have been
robbed. I am angry and disillusioned. Why have they not found a way to prevent this
coming back?” (“Topic: Is There Any Hope for Long Term Survival?”). As we can see
from Abbeyfighter’s comments, the term “survival” often connotes something very
different from the fiveyear range that statistical experts use. This woman’s remarks
demonstrate that, while treatment and prognosis have improved since the middle of the
20th century, the reductive message that, “early detection equals a cure” may be
detrimental, and it may be diverting focus from preventing breast cancer.
Pinkwashing, in the form of the “Race for the Cure” and all the race’s
accoutrements, supports the idea that if a person sees their doctor in a regular and
responsible way, that person simply will not die from breast cancer. This message
disregards voices like those of Marilyn Hacker, those who seek to understand and
acknowledge mortality, rather than ignore it (as we shall see below). Failure (or perhaps
refusal) on behalf of the mainstream breast cancer awareness movement to engage in
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dialogue about the mortality associated with breast cancer amounts to dismissal and
delegitimization of this aspect of the breast cancer illness narrative. The discourse
generated by the master narrative, and utilized by the breast cancer awareness movement
ostensibly supports breast cancer awareness, but it fails to help breast cancer patients
cope with their own mortality. This neglect of terminal breast cancer patients is
exploitative and unethical, and it demonstrates the extremity of the fear that our society
harbors of the deviant, abject female body.
Marilyn Hacker’s poem “August Journal,” a contemporary breast cancer illness
narrative, calls attention to the fact that breast cancer does, in fact, come with a very real
risk of death: “If I’m one of the victims, who survives?/If I’m—reach for it—a survivor,
who/are the victims? The heroic dead,/the ones who died in despair, the ones who died in
terror and despair/and having to be brave…It is exceptional to die in bed/ at
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ninetyeight…” (Hacker 24). Here, Hacker seeks acknowledgement of the dead, and
acknowledgement of the frightening mortality rate of breast cancer. This desire for
openness about mortality clashes with the message sent through pinkwashing.
Pinkwashing does not include room for acknowledgement of death. There are no
pink breast cancer awareness funereal bouquets, no pink caskets. The front page of the
Susan G. Komen website serves as a stellar example of pinkwashing’s relationship (or
lack thereof) to death (Susan G. Komen). The page includes several tabs and other pages

Original use and analysis of this poem comes from Bahar, Saba. “'If I'm One of
the Victims, Who Survives?': Marilyn Hacker's Breast Cancer Texts.” Signs.
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full of resources: three main tabs on the front are labeled as though mimicking voices: “I
have breast cancer,” “I had breast cancer,” “Someone I care about has breast cancer.”
(Susan G. Komen). Visitors to the site are meant to categorize themselves under one of
those three choices and click on the page which applies to them. Notably, there is no tab
labeled “Someone I care about died from breast cancer” or “End of life planning.” Under
another tab labeled, “The Breast Cancer Journey,” searchers find a timeline labeled with
landmarks along the “journey,” but true to pinkwashing form, the timeline stops at the
mark which reads “Living with Stage IV.” The pinkwashing message is one that focuses,
sometimes unrealistically so, on the will to survive, which Nuland cautions against: “the
prevailing temperament of our times [is that]...death is regarded as the final and perhaps
the ultimate challenge of any person's life—a pitched battle that must be won...But the
fact is, death is not a confrontation. It is simply an event in the sequence of nature's
ongoing rhythms...the confrontation with disease should be approached with the
realization that many of the sicknesses of our species are simply conveyances for the
inexorable journey [to]…nonexistence,” (10). In reality, death is another stage of life, and
illness is one way by which we arrive at that stage. The reason for this strategic
avoidance of death, and the overwhelming support of the “early detection equals a cure”
message, is that death doesn’t sell. Nonprofits like the Komen Foundation, as well as the
corporations that partner with them to sell their products, seek to make money. The
general public isn’t interested in buying products with dying people associated with them;
further, dead people can’t buy products. The pinkwashed movement has no interest in,
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and no need, to appeal to people who might be dying or seek to acknowledge death. The
movement and its various involved constituents need to appeal to consumers, and
consumers are much more comfortable with a hopeful message that breast cancer can be
cured because biomedicine has everything well in hand.
While the prognosis for breast cancer recovery now can often be fairly positive, and
optimism mustn’t be dismissed in favor of overly gloomy prognostications, this
unrealistic emphasis on survival on behalf of the pinkwashing movement, precludes
legitimate emotional (and practical) preparation for death and fosters a culture of death
denial. It also dismisses the necessary and psychologically healthy grieving process for
two categories of people: those who are faced with their mortality as a result of breast
cancer, and those who grieve for loved ones lost to breast cancer. While it appears
hopeful, the “early detection means a cure” message is perhaps the darkest and most
insidious of all the master narratives of breast cancer, because it chooses to ignore those
who are dying, who need us to acknowledge their mortality (as Hacker does above), in
favor of selling products.
The message appears even more insidious when racial disparities are analyzed. The
situation is even more dire for black women: according to ParkerPope, in 2015, the
incidence of breast cancer among black women in the U.S., which had historically been
significantly lower than that of white women, became roughly equal to the incidence rate
of white women. However, ParkerPope notes, the rate of black women dying from breast
cancer, which has historically been higher than than of white women, remained
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significantly higher than that of white women. That means that, while the pinkwashed
movement is out selling perfume and Ford Mustangs, more and more black women are
dying of breast cancer. And the movement doesn't adequately acknowledge or respond to
either the problem of death generally or the inequity of the mortality statistics. On a
practical level, death denial precludes the dying and their families from making the
necessary plans—financial, funerary, spiritual—which could ease the transition for the
dying person and the family, and spare the family significant turmoil and trauma. From a
philosophical perspective, death denial holds much more significant implications than
mere logistical planning. Here, we must return to phenomenological precepts.
Phenomenology, as I stated in the beginning of this chapter, is concerned with the
meanings of our subjective experiences. Jenkinson essentially argues that dying is a
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valuable phenomenological experience. Like Nuland, he claims it should not be viewed
as a pitched battle or a moment to be resisted and avoided. Resisting the notion of dying,
even as our metabolic systems shut down, means that we, our selves, are not engaging in
the phenomenological experience of dying: “But this is our body doing what it knows
how to do when it cannot continue as it once did. This is our body being itself at the end
of its days, but we are doing none of it,” (80). Further, he claims that the inability to
engage with dying deprives us of the ability to make meaning of our lives and our deaths:
“Your dying changes your eye, it changes what you see, and in that way your dying
For an analysis of death denial in American culture which includes a
phenomenological perspective, see Jenkinson, Stephen. Die Wise: A Manifesto for Sanity
and Soul.
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begins first in your seeing. Your dying changes what your life means,” (italics
Jenkinson’s) (91). Dying can add meaning to life, and it can also be a meaningful
experience in itself. It can be part of the narrative of self. If the pinkwashed breast cancer
awareness movement excludes discussion of death, it may preclude people from engaging
with, and making meaning from, their own dying and the dying of others. That the
movement would do so in effort to sell products, is unethical. Further, the movement
continues to underemphasize the significantly higher rate of death of black women. As a
culture, their human value is erased; as individual people, their ability for themselves and
their families to prepare for their deaths is inhibited. Finally, and most significantly, they
may be deprived the opportunity for meaningmaking in their own lives and deaths.
Additionally, while this master narrative and the agencies in the movement who
make use of it don’t actually threaten people with death, the threat is implied nonetheless:
if you visit your doctor promptly for visits, you will not die of breast cancer; if you don’t
visit your doctor for visits, who knows what may happen to you. This maneuver reifies
the idea that death is something to be feared and resisted, and thus perpetuates the cycle
of death avoidance in the contemporary breast cancer awareness movement.
6. The Knowledge and Authority of Biomedicine and the Subjugation of Women’s
Knowledge
The idea that the knowledgeable physicians could cure the disease, combined with
the concept of early detection which puts people in a position to be held accountable for
their illness, contributed to two other elements of the breast cancer master narrative: the
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authority of biomedicine, and the idea that patients assumed some responsibility for the
outcome of their diagnosis. Gardner calls this a “myopic metanarrative focused on a
linear cancer experience that included primarily early detection…” and cites a 1944
ParkeDavis pharmaceutical ad as a perfect example (4). The ad contrasts two women:
one, a healthy white woman with her two children who has, ostensibly, recovered from
her breast cancer because she ‘decided to take no chances,’; the other woman, a lonely
white woman sick in bed, reads a telegram which says that her cancer has progressed
beyond the point of treatability. This ad reinforces two messages: the blame for incurable
cancer rests at her feet; with early diagnosis, a woman will inevitably be cured by her
doctor. Thus, women should follow the instructions of their medical professionals
without fail and without question. The power of medicine is demonstrated through
pinkwashing’s emphasis on detection, treatment, and cure through annual visits to
physicians and frequent mammograms. One example is the NFL’s “A Crucial Catch”
campaign, as Karuna Jaggar observes, in which the NFL players wear pink cleats and
wristbands for breast cancer awareness. The subtitle of the campaign slogan is “early
detection saves lives,” a statement reminiscent of the vastly oversimplified ASCC
campaign which began over a hundred years ago. With the “Crucial Catch” campaign, we
have a form of pinkwashing which implies that salvation from breast cancer lies entirely
and easily in the domain of medical examination and treatment, particularly through
mammography screening. Further, according to Cork Gaines, only 8% of the money
made from pink merchandise from the “Crucial Catch” campaign actually goes to cancer
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research and programs (and even then, it goes to general cancer research and programs,
not specifically to breast cancer). Gaines notes that almost 88% goes to the retailers and
manufacturers of the products. That means that these companies make millions at the
expense of clear and accurate messaging about breast cancer treatment. Notably, the
concept of professional football, arguably the most masculine of professional sports and
certainly maledominated, enacting this campaign, subtly mimics the power of paternalist
allopathic medicine: just as the strong football player will catch the ball if the right play is
made; so will the powerful physician assuredly catch and cure breast cancer if the proper
precautions are taken. Even the imagery of the player making the “crucial catch” of the
football essentially mimics the squeezing and massaging motions of a manual breast
exam. While the message may not be deliberate but rather the result of the master
narrative, it is still pretty clear: put your life in the hands of biomedical protocol and
you'll be saved. It should be noted that this oversimplification creates a disadvantage not
only for patients, but for physicians as well: if patients come in believing that preventing
or curing breast cancer is as simple as getting a mammogram, they may hold their doctors
fully accountable for their physical wellbeing, blaming them when prognosis and
treatment are not as simple as the commercial media has led them to believe it should be.
The point here is not to vilify physicians and healthcare professionals who are culturally
perceived as powerful and knowledgeable; rather, the goal is to point out that our culture
has inherited a systemic imbalance of power between patients and physicians, and that
the message of pinkwashing reifies that imbalance. That reification perpetuate situations
154

in which patients and doctors are potentially alienated from one another, and in which
patients are perceived as having less authority or power.
Today, we can see that imbalance of power in Blackstone’s exploration of the
culture of Komen volunteers: “Pamela…told me about an experience that led her to
question the priorities of the medical community and its respect for issues, such as breast
cancer, that primarily affect women…she tells her doctor at every appointment that she is
convinced that there is something about the environment …causing increasing numbers
of [women] to become inflicted with breast cancer. Her doctor…tells her the women she
knows have simply had bad luck…Pamela told me ‘He just brushes me aside. It’s like he
thinks I’m paranoid or something,” (359). Here, Pamela clearly needs her physician to
hear her concerns about the ways in which cancer is impacting herself and her friends,
but he dismisses her, causing her to struggle further to deal with her fears. While,
certainly, many doctors are caring, attentive people who conduct exams in a reciprocal
way, this example demonstrates that an asymmetrical power structure can sometimes
present itself between physicians or surgeons and their patients. Bahar notes that, “…the
glorification of the surgeon’s struggles, along with cultural norms of modesty and
discretion as appropriately ‘feminine’ contributed to silencing any expression of
suffering, discomfort, and pain” (102728). In cases like Pamela’s, or those of women
who've had the Halsted mastectomy, the surgeon or physician wields an extraordinary
amount of power to either overtly construct her surgical and treatment experience, or to
engage with (or dismiss) her illness narrative and thus her new identity. In the interest of
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fairness and full disclosure, it should be noted that work in the healthcare industry is
increasingly difficult, given the demands for efficiency handed down by managed care
organizations. According to Rabin, doctors are often expected to complete patient
consultations within fifteen minutes. Their resources are limited by strictures which are
often beyond their control. However, it’s important to acknowledge that, while healthcare
providers are educated authorities on the science of medicine, patients may bring to the
table an acute awareness of their own bodies and their own embodiment, and also a
human need for compassion, to have their doctor assist them in the construction of their
illness narratives, and thus their selves. Both of those points of view must come to bear in
a relationship to create effective treatment and recreation of identity in illness, which
allows for patient empowerment and healing.
The subjugation of female knowledge is another phenomenon of western medicine
which gives power to the master narrative of breast cancer. According to feminist scholar,
Jennifer Fosket, medical knowledge has been legitimized: “Medical knowledge has been
seen as the benevolent application of the objective knowledge derived through scientific
methods…the traditional conflation of biomedical knowledge with truth and objectivity
means that the profoundly social and constructed nature of such knowledge is
overlooked, ignored or denied,” (18). Drawing on Foucault, Fosket claims that the
legitimization of medical knowledge means the subjugation of other types of knowledge,
such as women’s knowledge of their bodies, because of their lack of grounding in
scientific knowledge (24). In her analysis of epistemic knowledge and pregnant women,
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Freeman identifies this type of problem as “epistemic injustice” :
Being recognized as a knower whose claims have legitimacy and are taken
seriously and having the ability to exercise agency are basic human values that are
necessary in order to navigate social, public, and private domains. When one’s
claims are not taken seriously and when one is rendered powerless as a result, this
constitutes an epistemic injustice. (45)
Carel concurs, noting that, “epistemic injustice is caused by biases and negative
stereotypes about illness that can lead interlocutors to treat ill persons’ reports with
unwarranted disbelief or dismissiveness,” (Phenomenology of Illness 180). Note that
neither scholar argues that the patient’s knowledge should be elevated above the doctor’s,
or seen as superior to the doctor’s; rather, both scholars claim that problem is when the
patient’s knowledge is dismissed as having little or no value in the clinical experience.
In the context of breast cancer, examples of epistemic injustice are not hard to find.
For example, in her field study of Komen volunteers, Blackstone recounts the story of a
woman named Lora who, despite identifying herself as a woman with “lots of
confidence,” made several visits to her doctors regarding a lump which concerned her,
and was not able to convince them the lump was worth investigating. As a result, she
began to worry she was “crazy and maybe overreacting or paranoid,” (360). Here, Lora’s
intuition about her own body is dismissed in favor of medical knowledge, on the basis
Freeman’s use of the term “epistemic injustice,” and her work in the article to
which I refer, are both drawn directly from Miranda Fricker’s seminal work, Epistemic
Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.
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that medical knowledge is, ostensibly, more scientific and therefore more credible. She is
discredited as a knower, and therefore subject to epistemic injustice, and her doctor may
have what Freeman would call “inflated epistemic authority,” (53). The doctor believes
(without warrant) that his knowledge is superior to hers, that it trumps her knowledge.
While this epistemic injustice could be detrimental to her relationship to her doctors and
to her narrative sense of self, it also could be physically harmful to Lora if her doctors are
negligent in detecting a recurrence in her cancer.
We saw a similar dismissal in the previous chapter recounted by the writer Maxine
Kumin, when her diagnostician calls to tell her that she has noninvasive intraductal
carcinoma. She asks him what that means, and he responds in a way that essentially
excludes her from being a knower in the conversation: “It means you have three choices.
You can do nothing. You can take tamoxifen. Or you can have a mastectomy. You’ll have
to come in and let me explain this to you,” (Kumin 19). Carel calls this type of dismissal,
epistemic exclusion, and defines it as a situation which someone is “[denied] the role of
contributing epistemic agent,” (182). In Kumin’s case, her knowledge is not viewed as
inferior; it is not even acknowledged. Additionally, when they do meet, he is dismissive
of Dr. Susan Love, whose book about breast health Kumin has been reading. The doctor
doubly subjugates women’s knowledge: he dismisses Kumin’s ability to interpret the
records of her own body and he also dismisses the knowledge possessed by Dr. Love,
surgeon and widely acknowledged breast cancer advocate.
The subjugation of black women's knowledge by medicine, and the ways in which
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that subjugation is tangled up in relationship between black women and medical
hegemony, is very complex and in itself could be the subject of many articles. For the
current discussion, it might be most useful to note a subjugation of black women’s
collective knowledge relative to public health and breast cancer. The higher mortality
rates for black women have long been attributed to socioeconomic factors and the ways
in which they overlap with class: “Racial disparities in socioeconomic position suggest a
link between one's class and one's survival...workingclass women are more likely than
affluent women to be already suffering from other adverse health conditions...the
meaning of race itself becomes multifactorial,” (Eisenstein 97). However, this may be an
oversimplification of the case. We may perhaps have been focusing for too long on
statistics generated by public health researchers, and not on something that black women
may have known for some time, as Gatison points out: “It has only been in recent years
that some attention has been paid to other environmental and psychosocial stress factors
that affect Black women’s health. Black women have always known these stress factors
exist,” (“The Cost of Strength”). Gatison goes on to discuss studies which posit possible
links between racial discrimination, stress, and breast cancer, some which concluded that
there is a link between stress and breast cancer (“The Cost of Strength”). She seems to be
implying what interviewee Ngina Lythcott says more straightforwardly: “Discrimination
is toxic for us all...living as 'other' creates chronic tension and forces you to live
protecting yourself from the next psychic wound,” (Eisenstien 99). In other words, black
women have long had the innate knowledge that simply existing as a black woman in the
159

United States is physically and emotionally difficult, that it takes its toll on the body one
way or another. The epistemic authority lies with public health entities and biomedical
scientists, but those with epistemic authority are only just now catching up.
As we discuss epistemic authority, it is pertinent to return to the previous chapter’s
mention of the concept of documentation as the ultimate power. In Chapter 2, readers
were asked to note the relationship between written documentation and surveillance in
Foucault’s theory of disciplinary systems. Documentation is the epitome, the physical
embodiment, of the power of the one who is performing the surveillance in the Panoptic
structure. Documentation of the body’s surveillance is one of the strongest and most
powerful ways in which the agents of the disciplinary system can exert control over the
behaviors of those imprisoned inside it. In the example above with Maxine Kumin, the
power dynamics of the holder of documented knowledge (her doctor) and the person
inside the disciplinary system (Kumin) are brought to life. The doctor uses control of her
medical documents in order to set behavioral expectations for her: he expects her to come
into his office and acknowledge his power and knowledge as the physician. When she
refuses to abide the expectation, he uses his epistemic authority to enact discipline
through refusal to cooperate. Then, he commits epistemic exclusion by dismissing her
knowledge of her illness. Because they have epistemic authority, the power of
documentation stays in the hands of medical professionals, for the most part. This type of
documentation may support the master narrative concept of the omniscient doctor, and is
the epitome of the power of the Panopticon at work. For example, a patient who stops
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taking her Tamoxifen because the side effects are overwhelming may be labeled
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“noncompliant.” This label may cause further problems in patientdoctor relationships,
and may be difficult to shake off, as Danielle Offri (herself a medical doctor), notes: “As
soon as a patient is described as noncompliant, it’s as though a black mark is branded on
the chart, 'This one’s trouble,’ flashes into most doctors’ minds, even ones who don’t
want to think that way about their patients.” This particular type of documentation, then,
exerts power over patients, sometimes even in cases in which doctors attempt not to
oversimplify their patients’ experiences. In contemporary western culture, when it comes
to illness, the preferred, legitimized type of knowledge is that of biomedical science, and
that knowledge is what primarily constructs the documentation about the patient. The
person who constructs the patient’s documentation becomes the more powerful entity,
resulting in an imbalance of power in the patientdoctor relationship. Also, the narrative
of self in illness is not only constructed autonomously, but through others and with
others. So, a relationship between a healthcare provider and a patient in which the patient
is narratively disempowered, or in which the patient is subject to epistemic injustice may
change, impede, or even harm the construction of the patient’s narrative of self. The
subjugation of women’s knowledge reifies and gives power to the master narrative of the
authority of biomedicine in our disciplinary system, and may lead to epistemic injustice
or epistemic exclusion, as well as other potential detrimental effects.

According to Offri, “‘noncompliant’ is doctor-shorthand for patients who don’t
take their medications or follow medical recommendations.”
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Notably, this imbalance of narrative power may be disadvantageous for doctors’
too: if they perceive themselves as having significant power and control over the
narrative of another, they may consequently blame themselves when treatment does not
go to plan, as Charon notes in her discussion of how doctors handle death: “Doctors may
look at death with the worry that they have caused it—purposefully, passively, through
negligence or error,” (25). Similarly, Nuland notes feeling like a failure when one of his
patients dies from a sudden, massive heart attack: “I was crying, in great shaking sobs. I
realized, too, that I had been shouting at McCarty, demanding that he live…and weeping
all the time with the frustration and sorrow of my failure, and his,” (7). Nuland goes on to
discuss how he came to the understanding, later in his career—McCarty is his very first
patient to die—that death is not a failure on the part of either the patient or the physician.
Interestingly, he notes that a reciprocal relationship to his patients helped him come to a
more complex understanding of his role in his patients’ stories: “It is the cardiologist’s
skill as a physician that enables him to befriend his patient and to know him—it is
inherent in the art of medicine to appreciate that the testing and the medications are of
limited usefulness without the talking,” (36). Freeman claims that people in relationships
like Nuland describes above, in which both the patient and the doctor can make valid
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epistemic claims which are then equally respected by one another, are epistemic peers.

See Freeman, Lauren. “Confronting Diminished Epistemic Privilege and
Epistemic Injustice in Pregnancy by Challenging a ‘Panoptics of the Womb.’”For further
discussion of the ways in which doctors can facilitate reciprocity during examinations,
including co-authoring of the patient's illness narrative, see Charon, Rita. Narrative
Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness.
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It is the epistemic equality and reciprocal narrative constructed between doctors and
patients which facilitates a balance of power. As Foucault notes, one way in which to
resist the power of the Panopticon and the disciplinary society is to establish “horizontal
conjunctions” and illness narratives have the power to do just that.
It is possible for patients to exercise agency and empower themselves in the
construction of their selfstories by creating their own documentation of their illness
through counterstories. These counterstories exist in disruption of, or discordance with,
the master narrative, as Nelson notes: “The proper target of a counterstory is a master
narrative that has been generated by an abusive power system to impose on a particular
group an identity the system requires,” (155). The purpose of a counterstory is to resist
the master narrative and assist in the creation of an identity which does not match the
expectations set by the master narrative. Counterstories have the power to create
intersubjective relationships between the teller and the audience/listener/reader. These
intersubjective relationships, these “horizontal conjunctions,” foster empathy and
pluralize our notions of breast cancer experiences for those who read them. In order to
facilitate this process, we must be willing listeners or readers, ready to acknowledge the
significance of the epistemic authority of the teller; we must be open to experiences
outside the disciplinemechanism of the master narrative, and willing to engage in the
storyteller’s construction of self.
7. Heteronormativity
As we noted in the previous chapter during our discussion of Foucault’s figurative
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Panopticon and its application to society, systems of discipline are generally incompatible
with nonbinary labels. Disciplinary systems force things (or people) to be labeled
according to dichotomies: “…all authorities exercising individual control function
according to a double mode; that of binary division and branding (mad/sane;
dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal),” (Discipline and Punish 199). In the case of
breast cancer, the master narrative concept of heteronormativity seeks to delimit the
female body safely within the confines of the male/female gender binary. As we
discussed in Chapter One, heteronormativity generally means a mode of thinking in
which heterosexual relationships are considered the norm, and gender roles within
heterosexual relationships are considered the definitive roles. In heteronormative
thinking, women are identified as wives and mothers in nuclear families, and they
perform traditional gender norms of femininity; in heteronormative thinking, members of
the LGBTQ community are considered abnormal and marginalized from general
discourse.
In the early stages of the breast cancer awareness movement, nonheteronormative
people were overtly policed and disciplined by medicine, as we saw in Chapter One, in
KnopfNewman's observation of a 1935 medical report (which initially appeared in the
work of Leslie Reagan) which called breast cancer “the penalty women pay for failing to
bear and...nurse children,” (18). The ad implied that the punishment for refusal to
conform to maternal, nurturing gender roles was breast cancer. This reportage, according
to KnopfNewman, “suggested that women had to succumb to their biological destinies
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as wives and mothers,” (18). As a result of this kind of early messaging, women felt
social pressure to look, behave, feel, and act, “normal,” in the wake of their diagnosis and
treatment, as we see in midcentury movements (such as Therese Lasser’s “Reach for
Recovery” campaign, discussed in Chapter One). While not as overt as the 1935 medical
study which directly attributed breast cancer to a woman's choice to defy gender norms
by not having children or not breast feeding children, pinkwashing supports and utilizes
concepts of heteronormativity in its campaigns.
Breast cancer threatens heteronormative concepts of what it means to be
traditionally “feminine”; through losing a breast (or both breasts) or hair via chemo,
people in breast cancer treatment cannot maintain a “normal” heteronormative
appearance. Often, people feel they must return to “normal” and will go to great lengths
to do so. Following treatment, patients endure many physical modifications which make
them feel or appear “normal,” such as uncomfortable clothing, wigs, and prosthetics.
Terese Lasser’s Reach for Recovery organization encouraged breast cancer survivors to
wear a prosthetic to disguise the fact that they’d had a mastectomy, which intensified the
secrecy and shame surrounding mastectomies (Gardner 339). Her manual for recovery,
which includes illustrations of recovery exercises depicting a white woman wearing heels
and coiffed hair, and a “Letter to Husbands,” to address their reactions to their wives’
mastectomies, concludes with her reminder for women: “Remember that you are the
same person today that you were before—IN EVERY WAY,” (339). Though she meant
well, Lasser supported the emphasis on returning to precancer heteronormative
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normalcy, ignoring the voices and feelings of those who legitimately looked and felt
different in many ways, after their breast cancer treatments (339). Narratives of those
who refuse to perform traditional gender appearances are marginalized from the
discourse. This kind of exclusion and threatening of nonheteronormative people is still
present in the current movement.
Many breast cancer organizations are guilty of focusing their efforts almost
exclusively on the heteronormative concept of femininity. The Susan G. Komen
Foundation, for example, utilizes a fashion show (Blackstone 358). The foundation
charges admittance and solicits funding from corporate sponsors (358). Then, survivors
receive complimentary wigs and makeovers before the fashion show, in which they
display themselves by strutting down a runway like models (358). Komen also “displays”
survivors at “Race for the Cure” events, a choice which is meant to honor them, but
which also supports the idea that they are “suitable for display” (358). In both cases, the
women are meant to exemplify breast cancer patients who can still perform
heteronormative concepts of femininity, getting makeovers and having long hair, and
being typically “pretty” enough to display. These displays send the message that, during
and after their breast cancer diagnosis, the social expectation is that they will do their
utmost to maintain an appearance of outward heteronormative femininity.
Even the choice of color of the ribbon itself emphasizes the fact that people should
focus on heteronormativity. As we have already recounted from Fernandez in Chapter 1,
Amy Langer, (Executive Director of the National Alliance for Breast Cancer
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Organizations) offered a revealing response when she was asked about the color choice
for the original ribbon: “It's about body image, it's about nurturing, it's about
femininity…” (as cited in Fernandez). This concept, of course, implies a vast
oversimplification of the term “feminine.” It includes only those who have
“feminine”looking bodies (those who have, or appear to have, breasts) and those who
are “nurturing” (those who value motherhood). Additionally, this attitude around the
color choice equates health and femininity. If “healthy” and “pink” are equated, the
implication is that those who don’t identify with pink are somehow unhealthy, or will be
excluded from the concept of “healthy.” Langer’s attitude essentially sends the message
that the pink campaign represents women who define femininity using the same
definition that the campaign does. That language, when internalized, results in people
with breast cancer policing themselves, feeling pressured to look and act
heteronormatively feminine, particularly if they’d like to be able to identify as part of the
breast cancer awareness movement (which is so closely tied to pink and pinkwashing).
This pressure to look heteronormatively feminine in order to be part of the breast cancer
awareness movement creates a division: heteronormative women in the movement, and
nonheteronormative people distanced from the movement. Foucault notes that division is
critical to maintenance of power and control: he claims that “constant division between
the normal and the abnormal” brings about “a whole set of techniques and institutions for
measuring, supervising, and correcting the abnormal,” (Foucault Discipline and Punish
199). Those who are not heternoromative are labeled “abnormal” in the context of the
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pinkwashed movement (because, as we noted in Chapter 2, disciplinary societies need to
ascribe to binary divisions; if they are not “normal” they must be “abnormal”). This
labeling happens in other contexts as well, but is especially acute in the context of
pinkwashing, since such an emphasis is placed on girliness and femininity. If these
people do not conform to what is “normal,” their bodies will be subject to control and
discipline that ranges from marginalization to potentially decreased health outcomes.
Through this aspect of the master narrative of breast cancer, we ensure that the abject
breast cancer body fits suitably into a safe binary divide through which we can label and
control it.
This emphasis on heteronormativity in the contemporary breast cancer awareness
movement and the pinkwashing strategies it utilizes, means that members of the LGBTQ
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans*, and queer) community are often marginalized from the
mainstream movement. While Lorde's The Cancer Journals and A Burst of Light are seen
as seminal texts in discourse around breast cancer, and are often cited and circulated, they
stand out as one of the few texts written by a black woman and one of very few written
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by a member of the LGBTQ community. In 1990, Susan Hester founded the
MaryHelen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Breast Cancer, named for her partner who
died of breast cancer at the age of forty. The organization did and still does tremendous
work in advocating for and supporting lesbians with breast cancer, but it is still far less

Other texts from members of the LGBTQ community, such as Brownworth's
Coming Out of Cancer, will be examined as counterstories in Chapter 4.
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wellknown than organizations like Susan G. Komen. While Lorde's text is widely
praised, and there are now several groups like the Mautner Project, the master narrative
of breast cancer still reifies the concept of breast cancer as a mostly hetero issue, as we
shall see.
One significant struggle for those who identify as LGBTQ is the expectation that
they perform heteronormative femininity. The breast cancer awareness movement
straightforwardly aligns itself with the belief that breast cancer is a women's disease;
further, it uses pink and pink products to support the idea that it is a disease and a
movement associated with girly femininity. Girly femininity may not be an identity with
which all people with breast cancer are comfortable, including those in the LGBTQ
community who identify with varied manifestations of gender and gender performance,
such as lesbians who identify as butch, or those who identify as nonbinary. But the
breast cancer awareness movement's association with heteronormative femininity backs
members of the LGBTQ community into a painful existential corner, as S. Lachlann Jain
notes: “...at least one aspect of shame of breast cancer for those who inhabit
nonnormative genders lies in the seeming destiny of biological gender. Breast cancer
demands a surrender to femininity and to the mortality doled out by the feminine body,”
(504). Breast cancer cites a body as female, and the movement supports the idea that the
female body must perform heteronormative femininity. Tig Notaro, an openly lesbian
comic, notes this phenomenon in her interview with Grigoriadis about her breast cancer.
On the day she is diagnosed, a person on the street mistakes her for a man, but she is
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acutely aware of her femaleness: “Usually I have a sense of humor about that...I just got
diagnosed with breast cancer in both breasts; that’s how much I’m not a man … not
today, not a man.” Jain notes, in concurrence with the argument presented above, that
gender norms in the breast cancer awareness movement are a way of monitoring and
correcting gender behavior: “...the relentless hyper and heterosexualization of the disease
results in something of a recursive process through which gender is produced and
policed,” (505). This production and policing of gender marginalizes people who are
nonnormative, as Catherine Lord notes in her breast cancer narrative: “I do not want to
be a woman who is her breast cancer. I do not want to wear a pink ribbon and go on
walks in crowds,” (12). Lord, a lesbian, seeks to break out of the pattern in which breast
cancer identifies her as a woman, and also the expectation that her identity as a woman
means she must wear pink and go on breast cancer walks. But choices like hers are not
represented in the master narrative of breast cancer.
Jain claims that the movement and its pinkwashing strategies promote
heteronormative femininity so zealously that they result in a “redoubling of femininity
that fissures through the entire biomedical complex of cancer treatments,” (503). A
primary example of the way in which this redoubling of femininity is evident in the
biomedical complex is the mastectomy procedurethe emphasis on femininity is present
in how choices around reconstructive surgery are handled by family, friends, medical
professionals, and communities. According to Jain, “mastectomy necessarily cites gender,
mastectomy queers a woman in a homophobic world,” (521). Because we identify a
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woman so acutely with breasts, says Jain, if we remove breasts, the woman no longer
bears the social signifiers of her gender. Robin Warshaw's interview with Vonn Jensen
includes similar observations. Jenson, a gender nonbinary person who founded the
“Flattopper Pride” movement for those who choose not to have reconstructive surgery,
agrees that mastectomy raises some conflict about our social norms about gender and
gender performance: “If you take a woman who has breast cancer and she loses her
breasts...which is how we define a woman, she might still feel very much like a woman.
So what does that mean about our concepts of female bodies and socialized gender
norms?” Because mastectomy causes a person to lose the body part which signifies her as
a woman, society expects that people who undergo mastectomy will also undergo
reconstructive surgery to fix the ostensible problem. Jerilyn Goodman noted this
phenomenon in her discussion with her doctor: “I met with the plastic surgeon who, when
I said 'I'm not sure I want reconstructive surgery,' replied incredulously, 'Why not?!”
(141).This example supports Jain's claim that notions of heteronormative femininity
supported by the master narrative of breast cancer are present in biomedical treatments.
This point is further strengthened by the JAMA:Surgery study by Morrow et al. which
showed that, as of 2014, roughly 58% of women who have a mastectomy choose not to
undergo reconstruction at all. Though the biggest percentage of women do not choose
reconstruction, some members of the medical community still ascribe to the sociocultural
notion that a woman would be expected to have breasts, and the wider social community
still expects women to have breasts as well. Christine Middlebrook most profoundly
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notes the expectation that women have breasts (or, at least, appear to have breasts) in a
story she tells about dropping her prosthesis on the floor of her gym's locker room:
“Embarrassment floods me like a hot flash. The prosthesis, out in the open, is far more
embarrassing than the Amazonian scar across my chest. The prosthesis is proof that I am
trying to pass!” (176). The use of the word “pass” here is important, because it is often
applied to nonwhite people attempting to pass as white, or nonheterosexual people
trying to pass as straight. While she is a straight woman, Middlebrook is cognizant of the
notion that a women are identified by their breasts. In a world of twobreasted women,
and a movement that very much supports femininity associated with breasts, she feels
that her breast loss detracts from her identity as feminine, and she feels compelled to
abide social norms. Our culture's emphasis on breasts as signifiers of femininity is so
strong that she needs a prosthesis to “pass” as something she already is. Issues around
mastectomy and reconstruction are more pronounced for members of the LGBTQ
community, as is noted by Melanie Barker's interviewee, Susan DiPronio, who identifies
as lesbian and genderqueer: “Straight people don't get it. You fight all your life for your
identity, and then something like breast cancer happens to you, and that's a huge part of
your identity is your body...sexuality is so tied with physicality and the physicality of
who you are starts to change.” While one could argue that certainly straight or cisgender
women's bodies are also a huge part of their identity and sexuality, it's important to
remember that their identities as heteronormative are socioculturally accepted, while
LGBTQ people have had to negotiate living nonnormatively in a predominantly
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heteronormative world. When they are diagnosed with breast cancer, they are then
confronted with a movement, a cultural narrative, and a huge consumerist trend
(pinkwashing) that all work together to remind them of the ways in which their narratives
of self are nonnormative, rather than create cultural space for those narratives.
Identity is not the only major concern for members of the LGBTQ community with
breast cancer: lack of access to treatment as a result of that nonnormative identity is also
a problem. Misunderstanding, lack of information, discomfort, and bias about
nonnormative identities can be an impediment to healthcare, as we see from Jensen's
commentary during Jensen's interview with Warshaw:
If you're a person who's queer or gender nonbinary, the medical community is a
scarier place than it is for somebody who is normative. When you're worried
about cancer, the last thing you should be worried about when you go to the
doctor is if they're going to be prejudiced against you and say hurtful, harmful
things.
Parvin concurs that bias is a problem: “The biggest issues seem to be problems with the
healthcare industry...homophobia is the biggest risk for lesbians,” (91). This is a
significant issue because, as the Susan G. Komen website notes, “Lesbian, gay, and
bisexual women have a greater risk of breast cancer than other women,” (“Facts for
Life”). If lesbians are at higher risk, shouldn't the breast cancer awareness movement be
reaching out to them specifically, and with greater effort? Shouldn't it seek to aid
healthcare providers in dispelling myths, providing information, and overcoming bias? It
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doesn't. It utilizes the master narrative, and the master narrative of breast cancer reifies
concepts of heteronormative femininity. That emphasis on heteronormative femininity
may foster problematic concepts about lesbians and breast cancer, as we see from further
text on the Komen website: “...these women may be more likely to never have children or
have them later in life. Lesbians also tend to have higher rates of obesity and alcohol use.
All of these factors increase breast cancer risk,” (“Facts for Life”). While these comments
may be statistically correct, the presentation of them is vastly oversimplified. They ignore
the historical sociocultural dismissal of families with LGBTQ parents as violating
American values, a factor which may impact a couple's decision or ability to have
children either biologically or through adoption. These statements also vastly
oversimplify possible causes of obesity and smoking and drinking habits, some of which
may relate to public health concerns, cultural environments, or other factors. As they
stand, these statements read as victimblaming. Though the page is careful to articulate
that breast cancer in lesbians is “not because of their sexual orientation,” it follows that
claim immediately with the language above, the subtext of which is “Lesbians may be
more likely to engage in behaviors that may cause breast cancer (“Facts for Life”).” It's
worth noting, as well, that of the massive resources available on the Susan G. Komen
website, this is the one page that deals exclusively with LGBTQ concerns, and it amounts
to roughly two pages of printed information, including graphics. This page is another
example of the ways in which gender and gender performance is policed and disciplined
by the breast cancer awareness movements and its pinkwashing affiliates: people who
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display nonnormative gender characteristics or behaviors are victimblamed and
subsequently marginalized. Jensen, during the interview with Warshaw, notes feeling
marginalized by the resource material she initially found after diagnosis: “...any
information I was looking for was designed for straight people and didn't speak to me.”
A similar example of information which does not speak to the LGBTQ community
is found on the Komen site, under a small section about trans* people and breast cancer,
which states that “at this time, data on the risk of breast cancer among transgender people
is limited,” (“Facts for Life”). This, too, is correct, but subsequent content on the site may
be alienating and inadvertently hurtful. The site offers a few recommendations which are
meant to help trans* people. The most revealing is that the person should find a health
provider with whom they feel comfortable and then “once you find a provider you like,
see him/her on a regular basis,” (italics mine) (“Facts for Life”). This language is
remarkably presumptive. First, it supposes that it's easy or affordable for anyone, much
less a trans* person, to find a provider with whom they feel comfortable. It ignores the
huge difficulty of this task for trans* people. Second, in direct address to the trans*
community, in which gender identity is complex and not always binary, it presumes
gender binaries as standard. This linguistic choice directly indicates the organization's
support of gender binaries and heteronormativity, policing trans* identities and
marginalizing LGBTQ people.
Heteronormativity is the standard approach to gender and gender identity in the
breast cancer awareness movement and pinkwashers. Use of the master narrative
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(through pink, girly products, for example) heteronormativity as the standard. Therefore,
most of the information, materials, products, and resources are heteronormative.
The discussion of gender identity, sexuality, and breast cancer is complex and
nuanced. Breast cancer, and its subsequent treatment (mastectomy) brings to light many
questions about social norms regarding gender in our country, as Jain articulates: “...the
absence of the breast introduces a new set of interpretive problems for the odd mix of
gender and illness, internal and external health and appearance, that cancer and its
cultures presents,” (515). The analysis and conversation should be ongoing and these
concerns should be examined further and with more depth than this particular work can
allow. What is clear, though, is that the mainstream breast cancer awareness movement
and its affiliated pinkwashing strategies are heteronormative. As such, it polices
nonnormative gender identities and does not support narratives of self that are not
heteronormative, and this practice marginalizes and has the potential to silence people
who do not identify as heteronormative. This marginalization and silencing happens at
the expense of the narrative constructions of self of a significant segment of the
population.
8. The Ideal Breast Cancer Patient
If heteronormativity is the master narrative which assures that the female body (in
appearance) abides the proper binary divide, then the expectation of the “ideal” breast
cancer patient assures that the female character and mannerisms also fit the proper binary
mode. The expectation of people to perform heteronormative femininity during and after
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breast cancer and treatment means that they are expected to be demure, strong, and
enduring. It requires that people engage in commodified notions of “hope,” as
characterized by the movement. Those who refuse to engage in these behaviors become
scapegoats and are victimblamed. Expectations for heteronormative female behavior
create a dichotomous attitude toward the breast cancer patient' s responsibility for illness:
the patient becomes either the hero or the scapegoat. The hero is the “ideal” breast cancer
patient, who is also known as either the warrior or a fighter. The scapegoat, the victim
who is also at fault, becomes the cautionary tale, the example of what can happen if a
person refuses to engage in correct heteronormatively feminine emotionality and
behavior.
The hero is characterized by ability to have doubtless faith in doctors and remain
positive and enduring throughout treatment. The hero is, quite literally, the embodiment
of mind over matter, because the hero overcomes cancer through sheer force of will.
KnopfNewman cites former First Lady, Betty Ford, as a primary example. Just before
her biopsy, the New York Times ran an article in which they described her emotional state:
“Although she knew that she might have to undergo a breast removal, Mrs. Ford was
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described by aides as in ‘really good spirits,’” (Hunter 22). Throughout her ordeal, Ford
was pictured smiling, welldressed, and composed. Photos published in national news
outlets one week after her surgery showed her sitting up in bed next to her husband, with

For further analysis of First Lady Betty Ford's media image during breast cancer,
see Knopf-Newman pp. 58-85
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perfect makeup, coiffed hair, and a frilly housedress, holding open a large leather
portfolio filled with ‘Get Well’ messages from congresspeople (KnopfNewman 74). As
we noted in Chapter 1, shortly after her Halsted procedure, Ford was pictured cheerfully
throwing a football to her husband, a physical movement which would have been difficult
(if not nearly impossible) and painful for a woman having just undergone such a
procedure (KnopfNewman 75). According to the depiction of the ideal, a breast cancer
patient should remain strong, stalwart, cheerful, and endlessly optimistic. The ideal
patient also finds purpose and meaning in her cancer, as Tamara Joe Stevens
demonstrates: “To have the ability to encourage others to remain positive and live life to
its fullest despite their prognosis, I believe, is my Godgiven purpose now,” (Herndl 224).
Ehrenereich, too, notes the frequency and zeal with which this “relentless bright siding”
is spread: “…in our implacably optimistic breast cancer culture, the disease offers more
than the intangible benefits of spiritual upward mobility. You can defy the inevitable
disfigurements and come out…prettier, sexier, more femme…for those willing to get with
the prevailing program, opportunities for selfimprovement abound,” (49). The ideal
breast cancer patient is one who always looks for the silver lining, never appearing angry
or pessimistic, seeking to make illness a journey from which something may be gained.
The best example of pinkwashing enforcing the concept of breast cancer patient as
hero, is the Susan G. Komen website homepage, which features pictures and stories of
survivors. The survivor story of Maura Bivens, a woman with dark hair with bright red
streaks, pictured in her karate gi and her black belt, uses the “fighter” metaphor:
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“Although a trained fighter, Maura Bivens never expected to cross swords with breast
cancer…But not once did she surrender to the disease. This is the story of a tenacious
woman who survived despite the odds,” (“Maura Bivens”). This language implies the
possibility, and even probability, for reversal of the worst of breast cancer prognoses, as
long as the patient maintains the positive, heroic attitude.
The notion of the strong, heroic warrior takes on a more pronounced role in the
lives of black women with breast cancer, according to Gatison. She claims that in illness,
black women are expected to shoulder the “strong black woman” mantle:
Any sign of vulnerability or weakness is tantamount to failing oneself, family, and
community. The strong Black woman ideology does not allow space for Black
women to express their feelings related to traumatic experiences (much like the
ways in which Black women swallowed sexual violence on their bodies during
slavery and today as victims of intimate partner violence). The strong Black
woman trope has become a barometer of how Black women’s behavior should be
evaluated in adverse situations. (“Historical Context”)
This manifestation of a problematic concept of the master narrative of breast cancer is
much more complex for women of color, as we see in this passage. The “strong black
woman” mantle carries with it a cultural legacy which involves black women's ability to
take back the traumatic history of their bodies and their health in this country. To some
extent, they are culturally expected to accept the title: not to do so may imply denying the
power of the cultural reclamation of black women's agency; to do so means that her
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illness experience is oversimplified and she can't be honest with her community about the
difficulty, sadness, and trauma involved in the diagnosis and treatment of breast cancer.
The message that people with breast cancer should be heroic warriors
oversimplifies and skews the reality of the experience, as Raz notes: “Conventional
wisdom says that suffering ennobles…cancer patients aren’t by definition strong. Nor are
we heroes...None of us needed advice. We needed new models of experience. We needed
new metaphors. No sinking ships. No heroic victims,” (xvii). Couser notes the same
problem, claiming that the tendency to valorize the cancer patient by using hero
metaphors is dangerous: “[this type of narrative]…sometimes resorts to a rather facile
formula for recovery; in doing so it makes implicit (and finally irresponsible) claims for
the power of mind over malignancy,” (Couser 49). Thus, any moments of perceived
difficulty or weakness brought about by breast cancer, up to and including death, are
implicitly the fault of the patient. These claims are not only irresponsible, they are
unethical: they create a cultural situation in which those who refuse to behave ideally or
heroically are marginalized. The master narrative creates expectations and, because the
master narrative is a “repository of common norms” as Nelson tells us, we are
uncomfortable when those expectations are not met. But marginalizing a person who does
not feel emotionally compelled to take on the “hero” mantle means we are not open to
intersubjectively engaging in the construction of that person's new narrative of self, the
creation of a new identity. That person, by virtue of exclusion, is disciplined by society
for refusal to perform the expected social role. Black women who refuse to perform
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heroically, with constant strength, risk being marginalized not only by the breast cancer
awareness movement, but also by their cultural communities.
If we use language which implies that those who survive cancer are “heroes” or
“fighters,” whose willpower allowed them to “survive despite the odds,” we legitimize
and support the dangerous problem to which Couser refers: if the mind has power over
malignancy, then people are responsible for their own malignancy and illness, and those
who die from breast cancer simply didn't try hard enough. That we would claim, through
engaging in pinkwashing, to be supportive of people with breast cancer, and then
simultaneously employ language which blames them for health conditions which are
clearly beyond their control, is the epitome of hypocrisy: we are engaging in a practice
that appears supportive, but actually marginalizes and excludes those whose narrative of
self is not constructed around the hero archetype. Further, by virtue of the implication
that those who die are failures or not fighters, we engage in victimblaming. These
occurrences demonstrate the frightening extent to which we police people’s behaviors,
particularly around illness, in our society. Nelson notes that this kind of victimblaming
often takes place in the presence of master narratives (160). She claims when a person
tells a narrative which opposes the master narrative and cannot easily be accommodated
within the master narrative or explained away, our society tends to undermine the
cognitive authority of the person: “One morally dubious way to undermine cognitive
authority is to blame the victim. A strategy for doing this is to deny the victim’s
complaints of being harmed and to accuse the victim of imagining things or being
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oversensitive,” (161). We see many examples of this type of victimblaming in breast
cancer, as Herndl observes, “to present the disease as an issue of will and of one’s
recovery as a matter of attitude is to indirectly claim that those who die from the disease
just had the wrong attitude,” (236). Bahar, too, notes this in her observation of the
discourse of the Susan G. Komen “Race for the Cure”: “...it casts patients as 'heroines of
their own lives,' placing the burden of individual choice and responsibility squarely on
their shoulders,” (1030).
As we have already noted above, the narrative self of illness is not an individual
construction, nor is it entirely autonomous; it involves others. If we use language that
individualizes and places responsibility on the shoulders of those with illness, we engage
in morally dubious victimblaming and exclude ourselves from those people’s
construction of their narrative selves. We distance ourselves from them when we should
be engaging with them.
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This refusal to engage with those who are nonnormative may

have serious implications for these people.
Some might argue that this analysis makes too much of language that is ostensibly
intended to support and empower women. Yet if we analogize this type of victimblaming
with anotherthat which takes place as a response to rapewe see that the situation is
dire indeed. When young women are sexually assaulted, they are often blamed for
wearing promiscuous clothing, drinking too much, or putting themselves in bad
In the beginning of the fourth chapter of this text, I will demonstrate the potential
impacts this refusal to engage with non-normative women may have, therefore justifying
why we should engage with their narratives of self.
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situations. All of these accusations place gendered social expectations on these young
women for their behavior, and these expectations for behavior imply that the young
women are responsible for the bad things which may happen to them if they transgress
those expectations. That is the way in which we undermine the victim's authority and
deny the harm, as Nelson mentions above. Similarly, those with breast cancer are
expected to behave in certain gendered ways (such as performing the role of ideal breast
cancer patient) and if they transgress those expectations, they are held accountable for
their illness or its impacts. In both cases, we have generated a cultural message to women
which is, essentially, ‘Bad things happen to you because you refuse to behave according
to the gender norms constructed for you. If you had just acted like a nice, wellbehaved
lady, you'd be safe now.’ Thus, much of the language of pinkwashing is invested in
perpetuating gender norms we know are antiquated and destructive, not empowering or,
as some would like to believe, progressive. The language, and engagement in it, is
another form of internalized selfpolicing for gender roles and heteronormative behavior.
For the archetypal ideal breast cancer patient, the concept of “hope” also plays a
vital role: the idealized breast cancer patient is expected to be full of hope. DeShazer has
identified this same phenomenon—an overwhelming focus on being positive, hopeful,
and upbeat—in what she calls “survivor discourse,” (95). Barbara Ehrenreich calls this
phenomenon “the tyranny of cheerfulness,”: “In the mainstream of breast cancer culture,
one finds very little anger…The stance toward existing treatments is occasionally critical
…but more commonly grateful; the overall tone, almost universally upbeat,” (48). We
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need only take a cursory survey of the Susan G. Komen website to see her observation
played out in this “survivor story” by Loraine Hutchinson: “I want to encourage, inspire
and motivate…I want to inspire women who hear my story and are fighting breast cancer
to know that there is hope and to fight on,” (“Loraine Hutchinson”). We find similar
sentiments of inspiration, motivation, and hope, on clothing, hats jewelry, angel pins,
scarves, candles, coffee mugs, pillows, license plates, and even customized checks
(Ehrenreich 46). It's everywhere and inescapable, and those who've been diagnosed often
receive these items as wellintentioned gifts. The version of hope which is part of breast
cancer culture’s rhetoric becomes an expectation of those diagnosed with breast cancer.
To emphasize the moral problem of having the expectation for hopefulness and
optimism, we must return to the latter part of Nelson’s definition of master narrative, that
they “inform our moral intuition.” Further, Nelson claims, they “exercise a certain
authority over our moral imaginations,” (6). She cites the Passion of the Christ and
wellknown fairy tales as examples of master narratives which shape and inform our
moral imagination (67). These are narratives which may help to shape our moral
judgments. For example, in reading the fairy tale, “Beauty and the Beast,” we may
acquire the moral sense that physical beauty is not as valuable as inner beauty. We may
subsequently apply that moral sensibility to the lives of ourselves and others, believing
that it’s morally good to behave in such a way that exhibits value for inner beauty over
outer beauty. The master narrative of breast cancer includes the expectation that those
with breast cancer be hopeful and cheerful; so, that message may have shaped, to some
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extent, our moral judgment. We may believe that, in breast cancer, we, and others, should
be hopeful and cheerful, and that that is a good thing to do. If the master narrative of
breast cancer has shaped our moral intuition in such a way, we are subject to making the
moral judgement that those who refuse to engage in cheerfulness and hopefulness are
somehow wrong or immoral. That judgment is how we categorize people with breast
cancer into dichotomous groups of either “hero” or scapegoat.” Women who are hopeful,
cheerful, and enduring, are heroes; those who are not have transgressed against the
master narrative, so we perceive that we may justifiably scapegoat them, at least to some
extent, for their illness experience. As Ehrenreich notes: “…in the seamless world of
breast cancer culture…cheerfulness is more or less mandatory, dissent a kind of treason,”
(50). “Hope,” as it’s defined by the breast cancer awareness movement, becomes the
measuring stick by which all breast cancer patients are judged “ideal” or “scapegoat.”
Ehrenreich observes that those who refuse to execute the movement’s notion of
hope are marginalized and policed, made into scapegoats: as part of an experiment, she
posts an angry comment about her breast cancer treatment on the Susan G. Komen
website (50). While some sympathize (even if they don’t, precisely, relate), most are
critical. One woman tells her she has a “bad attitude,” and another suggests that she “run,
not walk, to some counseling,” (50). This woman’s response to Ehrenreich demonstrates
the problem with the “tyranny of cheerfulness”: it results in the social expectation that
other emotions (those not part of the master narrative, such as anger) are behaviors that
should be modified, treated, or regulated. King, too, notes this problem: “the dominant
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discourse of breast cancer survivorship…leaves little room for alternative, less positive
understandings of the disease experience and its longterm effects,” (102). The rhetoric
of hope is used to police and control the voices of those who refuse to perform the role of
ideal breast cancer patient: if they don’t want to engage in the master narrative’s
definition of hope, they are simply shamed out of the discourse.
Gatison notes that this problem of the pressure to be hopeful may be particularly
acute for black women, who are culturally expected to engage in what she calls
“faithtalk” about their illnesses. Faithtalk, according to Gatison, is a religious or spiritual
mode of discussing illness in which the speaker “makes harmony out of disharmony”
(“Spoken Word”). When engaging in faithtalk, members of black communities are
expected to demonstrate their faith in god, but acknowledging the difficulty of diagnosis,
illness, or treatment, may result in judgment from the community:
Some see talking about your illness and the resulting side effects from the
treatment as a faithless act— speaking about the negative brings about the
negative. In this situation, words must be carefully framed around the
acknowledgment that God is in control and that His will be done. (“Spoken
Word”)
The expectation for faithtalk to be positive is one example of the ways in which the
expectation for hopefulness has intersected with cultural norms for women of color, to
create an experience of breast cancer unique to black women: black women are also
policed for lack of optimism, but the policing comes through a faith mode which is
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intertwined with community.
Another problem Ehrenreich notes, when it comes to the tyranny of cheerfulness, is
the way in which it infantilizes women (46). A cursory internet search proves her point:
dozens and dozens of websites (one, notably titled, “www.choosehope.org”) sell
pinkwashed items which seem made for children or young adults, including stylized
charm bracelets, pink Converse allstar tennis shoes, minibackpacks, pink gloves with
giant pink and white pompoms on each fingertip (what adult could execute any daily
activities wearing these?) and, the example which Ehrenreich identifies in her article,
teddy bears. DeShazer notes this phenomenon, too, in her discussion of Miriam
Engelberg’s satirical comic pamphlet, Something Unpleasant and You (105108).
Engelberg observes that medical pamphlets often distributed to breast cancer patients to
educate them about the effects of chemo are condescending and oversimplified, and often
include images of women, ostensibly in recovery, smiling, laughing and feeling great; in
response, she designs her own comic pamphlet in which some of the women are bald, but
still smiling, saying things like “I loved having surgery!” and “Plus, we get all these great
prescriptions!” (as cited in DeShazer, 106). The best example, by far, of the way in which
the “tyranny of cheerfulness” infantilizes women, however, is one Ehrenreich finds in a
tote bag distributed by the Libby Ross foundation: crayons and a journal in which women
can “express themselves.” She speculates that this treatment of women may reflect some
gender ideology in which women are assumed to be in a state of arrested development,
but also notes that this a phenomenon specific to breast cancer: “Certainly men diagnosed
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with prostate cancer do not receive gifts of Matchbox cars,” (4647). This infantilization
of women contributes to their cultural construction as simple, motherly, emotive,
nurturing creatures. These women fit neatly into the heteronormative concept of
femininity. Hope, and its infantilization of women, reifies the master narrative of the ideal
breast cancer patient who is submissive, heroic, and a optimistic fighter.
Ultimately, the expectation of optimism and cheerfulness from breast cancer
patients has a depoliticizing effect, according to Ehrenreich, “transform[ing] breast
cancer into a rite of passage—not an injustice or tragedy to rail against, but a normal
marker in the life cycle,” (49). The rhetoric of hope reduces the significance of breast
cancer, to individual people and to our culture and our public health. It attempts to negate
and silence the anger and frustration which often motivates political action, which leaves
us vulnerable, as Audre Lorde notes: “…silence about any area of our lives is a tool for
separation and powerlessness” (7). This offensive and ironic use of the word “hope,” is
actually the method by which our disciplinary society keeps people quiet and controlled
within the system: people internalize the master narrative’s concept of hope, then they
begin selfpolicing and policing others, diminishing narratives which may include anger,
and keeping them regulated.
Above, Lorde notes that silence is a tool for separation and powerlessness. That
separation is evident in Blackstone’s field study of Komen volunteers. She notes that the
women with whom she interacts prefer not to identify themselves as either activists or
feminists. They choose to distance themselves from women whose stories of the
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experience include anger because, as one member said, “I don’t burn the flag or my bra
or anything,” (361). The women in Blackstone’s study are distinctly not interested in
actions which might be construed as political. She notes that this sentiment is common
among the volunteers:“Carla and other women at Komen are reluctant to adopt identities
that might make them appear to be too contentious,” (361). Blackstone puts this problem
succinctly when she notes, “The Komen women’s insistence on being perceived as
positive is directly linked to the idea that women, especially feminine women, are not
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supposed to be political or divisive,” (362). Komen’s rhetoric of hope and optimism is
in direct conflict with political activism for breast cancer, as Brenner notes in the
documentary, Pink Ribbons, Inc. in the context of criticizing pinkwashing: “People say,
anger is not helpful. Actually anger is helpful, depending on what you do with it. And I
think if people actually knew what was happening, they would be really pissed off. They
should be,” (Pool, Dir.). Anger, as Brenner notes, can often motivate people to action. But
the rhetoric of hope and optimism often does not leave room for anger and thus may not
spur waves of revolutionary changes as readily as language that does encourage what
Brenner might label “helpful” anger. The notion of hope and positivity gives these
women a way to believe they are working for a cause without having to “rock the boat,”

It's worth noting that, with the current political climate in the United States, this
notion may be shifting: women who identify as traditionally feminine, like the one quoted
in Blackstone's piece, may be becoming more political and/or divisive. That phenomenon
is, and should be, subject to further examination and discussion. In the context of the
Komen organization specifically, however, this particular participant feels that the Komen
organization is not the place in which to enact major political behaviors.
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but, because of its powerful role in the master narrative, it works in direct opposition to
frustrationfueled political action.
The master narrative’s notion of hope is what Audre Lord might have called
“superficial farce” and, to paraphrase Lorde, it obscures realities which, when considered,
might prove threatening to the status quo (76). It polices and disciplines reactions to
breast cancer which fall outside the culture of cheerfulness and optimism. It attempts to
frustrate political anger and activism which might be necessary in order for our cultural
understanding of breast cancer to evolve. It is the pinkwashed notion of hope that actually
undermines and obscures the important healing role of realistic hope, joy, and happiness,
and Lorde warns us against such phenomena: “I believe it is this love of my life and
myself…which has been largely responsible for my strong and healthy recovery from the
effects of my mastectomy. But a clear distinction must be made between this affirmation
of self and the superficial farce of ‘looking on the bright side of things,’” (76). Hope,
uncorrupted by causebased marketing and the master narrative of the breast cancer
awareness movement, is a powerful force for healing; however, it is also a philosophical,
poetical notion, one of life’s great intangibles. It is, as Emily Dickinson once wrote, “the
thing with feathers.../[that never] asked a crumb  of me.” 75 Perhaps, hope, in breast
cancer awareness movement, should not demand so much of those who wish to engage in
it. Hope which demands so much of people with breast cancer, and shames them for not

See Dickinson, Emily. “Hope is the Thing With Feathers.” Published online by the
Poetry Foundation.
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measuring up, is not hope at all, but masked discipline meant to keep people in line. This
false hope distracts them from witnessing all the compelling alternative narratives of
breast cancer which may have the potential to change the status quo (and thus threaten
the social order on which the breast cancer awareness movement has come to depend, for
its loyal consumers). But realistic and informed hope, hope that has not been made into a
commodified falsehood, lies in the pursuit of diverse and subversive narratives of breast
cancer which may help restore a person’s moral selfworth and allow them to feel
comprehensive healing. Hope lies in pluralizing the master narrative to accommodate
people whose experiences do not fit neatly within it; it lies in the inclusion of the black
and LGBTQ communities, as well as other women who choose not to engage in the
master narrative, in our cultural understanding of breast cancer. In the next, final, chapter,
we will turn to those narratives.
In this chapter, we’ve established the ways in which our the contemporary breast
cancer awareness movement takes advantage of the master narratives of breast cancer,
and supports and perpetuates a disciplinary system which policies and controls those with
breast cancer. We now know the master narrative of breast cancer and its main
components: the claim that detection equals cure, the imbalance of the authority of
medicine and the subjugation of the patient’s knowledge, the emphasis on
heteronormativity, and the notion of the “ideal” breast cancer patient. We know the
aspects of the abject female breast cancer body each of those concepts is meant to
control. We also know the urgent compelling need to hear and include counterstories of
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breast cancer: that those stories may affect people’s moral selfworth and contribute to the
reconstruction of their identity in illness. In the final chapter, we’ll examine some
compelling research that supports the idea that engaging with and helping to construct
illness narratives is important for health outcomes. Finally, we’ll analyze some examples
of counterstories and learn the ways in which they pluralize our understanding of the
breast cancer experience, benefit those who write them, and improve our sociocultural
understanding of illness.

192

CHAPTER FOUR: COUNTERSTORIES
Now, we have seen the ways in which the master narrative of breast cancer
supports a Foucauldian disciplinary system that polices and potentially silences those
with breast cancer who do not behave according to the expectation of the master
narrative. Pinkwashing, as a major strategy of the breast cancer awareness movement,
supports and reifies the oversimplified messages of the master narrative. Because of its
powerful and ubiquitous presence in contemporary U.S. culture, the master narrative's use
of pinkwashing may therefore may result in epistemic injustice and silencing of a number
of people. But what are the compelling reasons for significant portions of the population
to engage in stories which resist the master narrative of breast cancer? And how do
counterstories help us do that? In this chapter, I will address those questions. First, we
will examine some significant psychological research which demonstrates that women
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whose experiences are witnessed by others may have improved outcomes for quality of
life and longterm prognosis. I posit that when these women have their experiences
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witnessed, they are acknowledged as epistemic peers. That recognition may create an
I will be ascribing mainly to Rita Charon's definition of "witnessing," which I
will discuss and augment below.
77
As we noted from Freeman's work in chapter three, a relationship in which a
people are epistemic peers means that their claims can be acknowledged by one another
as valid; essentially, it is a relationship in which both people are recognized as knowers.
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intersubjective relationship in which the ill person is supported in efforts to restore a
damaged identity, and in which that person's moral worth is reconstituted and moral
agency enacted. Next, I will analyze a series of counterstories—stories which resist the
master narrative—in order to substantiate the ways in which counterstories can be useful
for many of those diagnosed with breast cancer. These stories may aid in the efforts of
those people to have their experiences witnessed and and their reconstruction of identity
acknowledged.
As I have noted a number of times, we need to pluralize the master narrative in
order to acknowledge and engage with these people, but what exactly do we intend when
we say that it needs to be pluralized? In order to elaborate on and clarify this notion of
pluralization, we should return to Nelson's discussion of the purpose of counterstories.
According to Nelson, "counterstories...don't merely reflect a shift in understanding. They
set out to cause a shift," (italics hers) (156). Further, she notes that a counterstory seeks to
replace problematic aspects of the master narrative (153); in fact, according to Nelson, "a
counterstory could itself be a master narrative, though it never oppresses the individual it
identifies. Indeed, optimally successful counterstories must be master narratives, since
success consists precisely in the counterstory’s becoming...socially shared," (157). So,
when I claim that we need to pluralize the master narrative, what I mean is that we need
counterstories which can then contribute to a new master narrative which is socially
shared, causes a shift in thinking, and is not oppressive. In this chapter, I will use the key
points above to endeavor to prove that pluralizing stories of breast cancer beyond the
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current master narrative is vital to our culture’s improvement of the ways we understand
and treat those with breast cancer.
1. What is Witness?
Before we can discuss the compelling need for counterstories for pluralization of
the master narrative, we must understand what exactly is comprised by the act of
witnessing a story of illness. As is noted above, I have chosen to ascribe to Charon's
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concepts of witness, but I will also augment her framework with concepts from Fricker
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and Carel. First, in addressing witness, Charon notes that sickness opens doors. She
claims that "we find our kin through our bodiesnot among blood relatives but among
those who share our corporeal dispositions," (178). This concept is echoed by Carel's
emphasis on intercorporeality: "...the lived body encompasses not only one's experience
but also the social aspect of one's experience of one's own and others' bodies, as well as
how others' experience of the body might impact on their own experience of the body,"
(Phenomenology of Illness 54). So, witnessing first involves attentiveness to how our
experiences of our bodies and the bodies of others relate to one another. Carel claims that
this intercorporeality leads to empathy and intersubjectivity (53). Charon's discussion of
witness includes an excerpt from an online discussion group with several healthcare
professionals about the fact that sickness opens doors. In his discussion of one patient’s
experience, one physician noted a response which speaks to the creation of
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See Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.
See Carel, Havi. Phenomenology of Illness.
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intersubjectivity and empathy: "While I displayed empathy (therapeutic validation) little
was based on compassion...I was simply...to listen professionally...compassion emerged
from the interaction, not caused it," (179). Witnessing also involves engagement in
intersubjective relationships,80 which Charon calls the meeting of two authentic selves
(51); witnessing means openness to empathy and compassion. Sharing a narrative offers
people the opportunity to engage their own subjectivity with another’s subjective
experience. Finally, Fricker claims that "to be wronged in one's capacity as a knower is to
be wronged in a capacity essential to human value...they are degraded qua knower, and
they are symbolically degraded qua human," (italics hers) (20). If we take that to be true,
then an important part of bearing witness is the acknowledgement of a person's capacity
as a knower, which is an acknowledgement of that person's essential humanness, as one
physician notes in Charon's online discussion: "It is true that many people...who are
facing death find the need to "narrate" their experiences as a part of the search for
meaning that in some ways characterizes the human condition." Because witness means
acknowledging a person as a knower, bearing witness to someone's illness story means
that a relationship will be created in which the people involved are epistemic peers: the
people involved in the relationship are both acknowledged as knowers.
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Now, let's examine the concept of witness in the context of the master narrative of
breast cancer. The master narrative, as we know, can potentially silence or exclude certain
For a more thorough discussion of intersubjectivity, see Chapter 3, pg. 112
See Freeman, Lauren. “Confronting Diminished Epistemic Privilege and
Epistemic Injustice in Pregnancy by Challenging a ‘Panoptics of the Womb.’”
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people's experiences, implying that their knowledge of their illness experience is
somehow inferior. This occurrence qualifies as what Fricker calls a "testimonial
injustice": a kind of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as
a knower," (20). The master narrative of breast cancer, and the exclusion it causes, has
the oppressive power to wrong someone in her capacity as a knower. The master
narrative of breast cancer is an oppressive one, but counterstories, as Nelson notes, "aim
to alter...an oppressed person's perception of herself," (italics hers) (7). Counterstories,
according to Nelson, set out to repair the damage inflicted by the oppressive master
narrative, but also to restore moral agency (154155). Here, we come back to witness.
Because the self is not autonomous but rather creates itself in the context of, and in
relationship to, other selves, we need others to acknowledge and engage in the
reconstruction of identity in illness. That is what witnessing does. Further, witnessing
counterstories supports the teller's endeavor to restore moral agency, as Nelson noted
above. Charon appears to concur: "Our narrative efforts toward...intersubjectivity enable
us...to commit acts of particularized and efficacious recognition that lead beyond
empathy to the chance to restore power or control to those who have suffered," (181). In
order to ensure that we pluralize the current master narrative of breast cancer to create a
new, socially shared understanding of the illness and the identities of those who have it,
we must bear witness in the way laid out above. Then, we will be supporting the
reconstruction of identity and the restoration of moral agency. This restoration of moral
agency may help to catalyze a shift, as Nelson tells us, that good counterstories should
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do. This is not to say that we, as a culture, are obligated to create the shift in thinking;
rather, if we support the restoration of moral agency to those whose moral agency may be
somewhat diminished, their increased agency may organically contribute to a shift in
cultural thinking about breast cancer.
2. Witness, Community, and Breast Cancer Stories
A survey of published breast cancer narratives reveals that, anecdotally, many
find relief through sharing their stories with their communities (whether those stories are
in print essays, poetry, or visual art). For example, Ellen Goldsmith writes in her poem
“Chemotherapy,” “Tired from the inside out/I need new words for tired” (88). In her
commentary, she claims that, “taking on the topic of breast cancer in my poetry allowed
me to be with and look at my illness. Bringing poems to my poetry group, getting
reactions...was healing,” (88). Similarly, Betsy Bryant felt compelled to write about her
distress, as she exhibits in poems like “Breast Exam”:
I am breathing, breathing deeply,
trying to detect alarm in your fingers.
Your faint voice calls me back, 'Fine, everything feels fine.'
Fine as the quicksand I am still sinking in… (97)
Bryant, in her commentary, notes that during her treatment, she wrote almost daily:
“Writing has been a refuge for me as long as I can remember. The process gave silent
witness to my pain, bewilderment, and joyous victories. I expressed myself with ruthless
honesty and felt more liberated and whole as a result,” (97). While Bryant does claim that
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her writing bore “silent witness,” (italics mine) readers should note that she did place the
poem in a widely published anthology of art and writing on breast cancer, so she did seek
to share her story with her community as part of her writing experience.
Some find healing in sharing and are able to share and publish their stories readily.
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Moreover, stories which resist the master narrative of breast cancer (counterstories) are
readily accessible in published versions as well. Those who experience stories which
don’t readily comply with the master narrative can find the stories of others, through
published material and support groups, as well as a variety of online media. Those texts
might make them feel as though their experiences are not isolated, and as though they are
safe to share their own experiences with others like them. Why is it so important for us,
as a culture, to pluralize the master narrative of breast cancer when those living
counterstories already have those resources? The answer is twofold: first, we already
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know from several examples given in Chapter 3 that there are a significant number of
people reporting that the material they find, the texts they read, don’t adequately speak to
their experiences, such as Vonn Jenson, who claims that most of the material found
doesn’t address Vonn’s position as a queer person. Similarly, Marilyn Hacker and
Christine Middlebrook, find it necessary to confront the hard questions about breast
cancer mortality that the pinkwashed breast cancer awareness movement ignores. We
Below, I will elaborate on Nelson’s theory of counterstories, what defines them,
and how they work.
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See the sections “Early Detection Means a Cure,” “The Authority of Medicine
and the Subjugation of Female Knowledge,” ”Heteronormativity,” and “The Ideal Breast
Cancer Patient.”
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know that these people need more from their culture and the breast cancer awareness
movement. The second part of my response to that question is that the ill need the
acknowledgement of their social world, as Frank notes. People living with breast cancer
who clearly feel that their social and cultural communities are not acknowledging and
validating their experiences are not getting what they need. Pluralizing the master
narrative and pressing American culture to shift to a new mentality about breast cancer
may prompt a new awareness of the situations of those living with breast cancer as a
chronic condition. Charon notes that concepts of narrative medicine can be drawn from
culturally experienced tragedies, such as the Holocaust because “…we can recognize in
catastrophic and public suffering that which is always present and needful of attention in
local and private suffering,” (181). If we can make public the suffering of people living
counterstories, instead of enacting the master narrative, we can help those people recover
from the damage done by the master narrative and restore their moral agency. Thus,
counterstories for the pluralization of the master narrative need to be part of the larger
cultural discourse of breast cancer, not just specialized niche experiences.
Herndl, in her analysis of the purposes and effects of mammographies, notes that
intersubjectivity generates the critical healing element of illness narratives, and she
implies below that that intersubjectivity can occur when the ill person's story is shared,
particularly in breast cancer stories:
…we assume the responsibility of telling, but we understand the other as one who
can, will, and should respond to us...this constructs a relationship between self
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and other that is built on connection and reciprocity rather than subordination.
When breast cancer autobiographers construct a sense of self, I think they are
doing so implicitly with this notion of “responseability” in mind; their sense of
“living out loud” is in part to reconstruct a sense of self, but that relation of self
and body becomes a model for a relation between self and other. (225)
The use of the word “reciprocity” by Herndl is interesting here, as well, because it recalls
Foucault’s notion of the need for “horizontal conjunctions” in order to resist disciplinary
mechanisms such as the one we have identified in the master narrative of the breast
cancer movement. Additionally, the term "reciprocity" reminds us that intersubjectivity is
an experience in which both parties engage with the subjectivity of the other,
experiencing the way in which the other lives in the world. The story told by the person
with breast cancer is one by which the woman or trans person reconstructs a narrative of
self, but also one which calls for response, because it creates the new understanding of
how the person will relate to others. In his discussion of the nature of suffering in illness,
in which he enumerates the conditions of suffering, Frank appears to concur: “The fifth
condition of suffering is its social nature…people tell uniquely personal stories but they
neither make up these stories by themselves, nor do they tell them only to themselves.
Bodies and selves are…culturally elaborated (171). Stories of breast cancer need cultural
engagement and response, in order for those with the illness to reconstruct narratives of
self, create new relationships to others, and to create the horizontal relationships which
resist the the master narrative. If we don’t engage in the stories of those who need us, we
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risk epistemic injustice, but we may also deprive them of opportunities for healing
which may impact their health outcomes and even their longterm survival (as we shall
discuss further below). Christine Middlebrook notes the need for witness in her
autobiographical account of her experience of dying from aggressive breast cancer: “Who
I am could not endure the torture of that room. Without the periodic witness of James or
Jonathan, who knew who I was, I could not know myself. Not to know oneself is to die,”
(italics Middlebrook’s) (62). While Middlebrook was figuratively “dying” during the
course of her brutal treatment, her husband and children somehow held and guarded her
identity, her sense of self. The sense of self is intersubjective and symbiotic, based on
connections to others. Through their connections to her, they knew her deeply, so that
during a time so terrible and painful that she could not even get a sense of herself, her
family could provide her with one. Middlebrook's family and friends were a community
which bore witness to her experience so that she could reconstruct herself. Charon's
work best encapsulates the relationships between witness and community: "Bearing
witness creates community. Bearing witness to the suffering of individuals creates
community...it is in these communities that a return to wholeness or health happens,"
(196).
3. Breast Cancer as a Chronic Condition: The Compelling Need for Breast Cancer Stories
Across the U.S., more and more women live in the wake of breast cancer

See Chapter 3. Epistemic injustice occurs when we “[downgrade] certain person’s
testimonies and interpretations,” (Phenomenology of Illness 184).
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diagnosis and treatment. According to Bodai and Tuso, an estimated 3.5 million women
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were living in the aftermath of breast cancer as of 2015. The word “aftermath” here is
key: even after a patient has survived cancer, much more of the ordeal is left to be
endured. It's worth noting, however, that many of these issues begin, not in the aftermath
of remission or cure, but in the aftermath of diagnosis. While many women suffer from a
variety of problems surrounding their breast cancer diagnosis and treatment, a significant
number of them specifically suffer from depression, anxiety, or (at the least) clinically
significant levels of symptoms for depression and anxiety which, according to the
research presented here, can have a detrimental effect on other aspects of their health and
treatment. These detrimental effects, as we shall see below, can appear and endure years
after treatment is completed, even after remission. In fact, according to Bodai and Tuso,
breast cancer is now considered a “chronic condition." As the number of women living in
the aftermath of breast cancer increases, it’s reasonable to extrapolate that the diversity of
these people, of their lives, lifestyles, and cultural experiences of illness, will also
expand. More people will experience breast cancer in ways not represented by the master
narrative. Therefore, it becomes more pressing for us to turn our attention not only to the
lasting effects of diagnosis and treatment on patients and their wellbeing, but also to the
experiences of a variety of people during their breast cancer and treatment. Some

See Bodai, Balazs, and Phillip Tuso. “Breast Cancer Survivorship: A
Comprehensive Review of Long-Term Medical Issues and Lifestyle Recommendations.”
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research, as we shall see below, may indicate that those who feel their experiences are
witnessed may be more likely to have more positive outcomes. This phenomenon is one
reason why we, as a culture, need to be prepared to hear and acknowledge stories which
resist the master narrative: there is a growing population of people whose experiences
aren’t that of the master narrative, and they need to be acknowledged in order to
reconstruct their narratives of self, be supported in the restoration of their moral agency,
and possibly acquire improved outcomes related to adherence, mental stress, and
longterm survival.
Concerns and insecurities about selfidentity often arise in the wake of common
treatments for breast cancer, mastectomy and chemotherapy; these treatments often have
lasting effects which may lead to distress. People who have had mastectomies (in the
literature, these are called, “mastectomies,”) often struggle with reconstructing their
selfimages and reshaping their identities in the wake of their surgical procedures:
“Mastectomy causes many changes in women's self perceptions and social interactions.
These complex factors require women to reevaluate their selfconcept and self
image...Mastectomies are particularly disturbing to women. The body mutilation affects
several aspects of female identity, including lifestyle. Ways of thinking and female
attitudes in general are affected after the mastectomy,” (Hoga et al. 318319).
In addition to extraordinary physical impacts such as scars, disfigurement, problems with

Studies which support this claim will be discussed in depth in later sections of
this chapter.
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fertility or their ability to have children, women who have breast cancer treatment may
deal with other significant challenges as well, including sensitive skin, ongoing pain,
cognitive impairment, shortterm memory problems, emotional difficulties, and overall
struggles with their identity (Bahar 1026). Abel and Subramanian note that the vast
collection of mammographies share a major theme, the search for a new identity: “Who
am I now that I am a person with breast cancer? To some extent, that question derives
from the trauma of diagnosis and treatment as well as from the aftereffects...Lingering
issues that have received less attention may make identity issues even more urgent,” (37).
As we know from Chapter 3, when we attempt to recreate the self in illness, we are not
autonomous; we look to others. But often, the person's new identity is not simply and
easily encapsulated by the master narrative, and friends and family are focused on
physical wellness or survival, and overlook struggles with identity. These issues are also
frequently overlooked in longterm care for breast cancer patients. Bodai and Tuso
observe:
Survivorship care programs provide an important component of the patient
treatment pathway but fail in the elaboration and communication to the patient
regarding many issues relevant to longterm survival. Most longterm care plans
inadequately address the most important medical issues involving the longterm
consequences of survivorship.
Here, they refer to a variety of concerns related to ongoing physical wellness, but also
include a multitude of other problems, including relationships and communication
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between patients, physicians, and families, which may play a role in nonadherence or
noncompliance.
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Right now, many healthcare strategies focus on simply eradicating the cancer.

For example, Pat Garland, after her treatment, discussed with her physician the fact that
she was experiencing debilitating cognitive problems and extreme hot flashes, but her
doctor seemed focused on her prognosis, whereas Pat was interested in maintaining a
quality of life: “The doctors kept saying ‘You’re going to get better. They said breast
cancer was not debilitating. They said it had a good prognosis as far as living was
concerned,” (42). While Pat was glad to be alive, living in the wake of breast cancer
treatment was not simple or easy. Abel and Subramanian note that, “there are many
parallels between the experiences of breast cancer survivors and people reporting chronic
fatigue syndrome, Gulf War syndrome…like the sufferers of those invisible and often
‘contested’ diseases, these women…faced widespread skepticism…and watched their
social and work lives narrow,” (4). Behaviors resulting from struggles with identity may
lead to the diminishment of social and work lives, but may also pose significant risks for
health outcomes, according to Bower: “Behavioral symptoms cause significant disruption
in patients’ quality of life and may also have implications for treatment adherence,
morbidity, and mortality,” (768). As we have seen above, struggles with identity can be

To avoid digression, I have admittedly simplified this notion a bit. Cancer
treatment and survival is complex and multifactorial. However, Bodai and Tuso concur
that healthcare practitioners need to place more emphasis than they currently do on
long-term survivorship problems and concerns.
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side effects of the chronic condition of breast cancer (Hoga et al. 318319; Abel and
Subramanian 37), and relationships to others are critical to reestablishing that identity.
We need others to bear witness. If that is the case, is it possible that those who struggle to
to have their stories witnessed may suffer from poorer prognosis and treatment
outcomes? Below, I will analyze cancerrelated depression as one facet of the struggle
with identity; my analysis will endeavor to demonstrate that witness which creates
empathy may alleviate, to some extent, the struggle with identity and therefore,
depression. Breast cancer and treatment, while complex and multifactorial, can involve a
variety of problems, only one of which is the struggle with identity: that struggle may
impact a person's longterm quality of life and prognosis. Thus, we should attend to that
problem, as a culture.
One of the most common (and therefore most widely studied) side effects
associated with breast cancer is depression or depressive symptoms (Kyranou et al.
7980; Bower 774). Additionally, several studies have noted that depression is associated
with higher mortality rates (Suppli et al. 3831; Bjonrklett et al.198; Kyranou et al. 7980).
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There is some debate about the amount of women who experience depressive

symptoms of breast cancer, and the extent to which those women experience symptoms
(Bower 774: Kyranou et al. 7980) but it’s reasonable to conclude from the research
examined here that anywhere from 1830% of women with breast cancer may have some
expression of depression or depressive symptoms, while also acknowledging that women
88

These studies will be discussed further below.
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who have been diagnosed with breast cancer have a higher likelihood of experiencing
symptoms of depression. Additionally, clinical depression or depressive symptoms may
be even more common than statistics demonstrate, as a few studies noted (Kyranou et al.
97). Other women, by virtue of the fact that cancer and its treatments often bear some of
the same symptoms of depression, may not be diagnosed (Suppli et al. 3837). While
current studies indicate that levels of depression or depressive symptoms in women
dealing with breast cancer are already significant, further work may demonstrate that the
numbers of women suffering from cancerrelated depression are even higher than we
currently estimate. In any case, a significant number of women deal with depression or
depressive symptoms during or after breast cancer treatment.
While women who have breast cancer are much more likely to demonstrate
depressive symptoms than women who do not, the risk for depressive symptoms is not
necessarily reduced as time passes after the experience. While one study claimed that
“depressive symptoms are most pronounced during the first year after diagnosis,”
(Bjorneklett et al. 198), another study showed that cancerrelated depression could appear
in significant amounts of breast cancer survivors for years afterwards: “...the prevalence
of clinical depression is reported to be between 10% and 30% within the first five years
after diagnosis,” (Suppli et al. 3831). By examining the rate at which breast cancer
patients and survivors received antidepressants and noting their hospital interactions with
staff, Suppli et al. found that women still had a significantly increased risk of depression
diagnosis up to eight years after treatment (3834). All of these women are, therefore, also
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at risk for poorer survival rates and poorer health outcomes. Depression also impacts
compliance, recurrence, and recovery (Bjorneklett et al. 198). Kyranou et al. concurred,
also finding that depression was related to poorer quality of life and, additionally, longer
hospital stays (7980). Finally, depression has been associated with higher mortality rates
(Suppli et al. 3831; Bjonrklett et al.198; Kyranou et al. 7980). Cancerrelated depression
has potentially grave impacts on the patient’s longterm prognosis.
4. Communication, Support, and Improved Outcomes
It may be tempting for some to assume that the simple prescription of an
antidepressant or antianxiety medications is in order; however, for a variety of reasons,
medication may not be the best option. In fact, in some cases, certain types of
antidepressants cannot be used because they may be contraindicated with cancer
treatment medications. Medical scholars are still debating whether certain selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors can inhibit the conversion of Tamoxifen (a drug used
almost universally, which inhibits the recurrence of cancer) to its active metabolite,
thereby negating some (or all) of the Tamoxifen's usefulness (Suppli et al. 3837).
Additionally, a study performed by Vega et al. notes that pharmacological intervention
coupled with other forms of intervention may have more impact than any one
intervention alone. Additionally, medicinal routes may simply not appeal to all patients,
or may not be feasible options for a number of other reasons. In any case, the purpose of
the current discussion is to explore the possibility that witness may be a way to
potentially address issues of identity; in this case, I am particularly examining depression
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as a sideeffect of breast cancer which affects identity. We now know that counterstories
are a way in which women can attempt to repair the identity damaged by the master
narrative and regain moral agency; bearing witness to those counterstories supports the
attempt to regain identity and moral agency. Can witness potentially improve treatment
outcomes as well? I posit that, because witness has the power to repair the damage of an
oppressive identity of the master narrative and restore moral worth, it can potentially
improve some of the problems which result from the struggle with identity (such as
depression). Many of the studies below examine open communication and support as a
method for improved outcomes; I contend that, while these studies don't specifically use
the term "witness," as I have defined it above, this communication and support from
physicians and family may qualify as a form of witness or, at the very least, the
beginnings of witness. While more work needs to be done to specifically study the impact
of witness on people with breast cancer, what we see below is enough to indicate that my
theory is potentially valid and worth pursuing.
Many studies examine possible interventions—support groups, narrative therapy,
relaxation techniques—to treat emotional distress resulting from breast cancer. Of those,
many collectively emphasize the need for cancer patients to have open communication
and support, as Bower notes: “interventions that emphasize support and emotional
expression may be more useful for women with advanced stage disease,” (775). Further,
emotional support and open communication may offer improved outcomes. Mallinger et
al. note: “In studies with cancer patients and cancer survivors, increased emotional
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support and more open communication have been associated with better psychological
outcomes,” (359). Finally, Mallinger et al. concluded that, “efforts to enhance productive
communication between patients and their family members may help women cope with
and overcome the challenges of breast cancer survivorship,” (355). We already know
from the information presented in studies above that women who feel psychological
distress such as depression and anxiety have overall poorer health outcomes, including a
potentially higher risk or mortality. If that is the case, and it is also the case that people
who have open communication and support have better psychological outcomes, it stands
to reason that, at least for some, communicating openly and feeling supported may
indirectly lead to improved general health outcomes, perhaps even improved mortality
rates.
Malligner et al. note that the desire to cope with any stressful life experience
through discussion is common and healthy:
Sharing and talking about one’s experiences, thoughts, ideas, and emotions is a
positive adjustment behavior, and discussion of traumatic life events has been
identified as a key component of successful coping. Talking about a traumatic
event may help the individual make sense of the experience, find meaning, and
achieve emotional resolution. (55)
Open communication and support such as this may be helpful in alleviating psychological
problems because it is in this way that patients are encouraged to engage in
intersubjective relationships to others. Through these intersubjective relationships in
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which they tell the stories of their experiences, they reconstruct their narratives of self.
The hypothesis that open communication and support allows a patient to
reconstruct a narrative of self through intersubjectivity is supported by a Spanish study
which examined the effects of mindfulnessbased narrative therapy (MBNT) (paired with
pharmacological intervention) on cancerrelated depression. Narrative therapy, according
to Vega et al., is defined as “a psychosocial form of therapeutic intervention [based on the
premise that] reality is constructed through language and narrative description in the
intersubjective field between human beings." The word “intersubjective” is key to our
discussion. The practice of MBNT is focused on, to some extent, recreating reality, but
that venture can only be undertaken when the patient has a willing other to engage with.
Vega et al. explain that, in this type of therapy, “...the therapist serves as a witness to the
client's storytelling and a coeditor of the unfolding narrative." The therapist becomes the
patient’s necessary witness to the reconstruction of the narrative self, and the researchers
found that strategy to be somewhat effective. Vega et al. found that medication along with
MBNT resulted in “greater compliance and improvement in functional dimensions of
QOL [quality of life]." This study would seem to support the idea that, not only does
intersubjectively shared narrative have the power to alleviate depression, it does so in a
way which also resolves physical health risks (lowered adherence to treatment, lower
quality of life). Additionally, Vega et al. demonstrates that the effective application of
narrative techniques to depression must involve an intersubjective relationship to others:
reality cannot be reconstructed by the patient without the manipulation of the
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intersubjective field “between human beings." The research noted here, as well as that
above, would seem to collectively indicate that witness, in the form of open
communication and support, may allow for the creation of the intersubjective relationship
which is necessary to reconstruct the patient’s narrative of self, and the subsequent relief
of some aspects of psychological distress such as depression.
5. Counterstories
Now that we have established the importance of witness and its potential impacts
on breast cancer patients, their reconstructions of self, their moral agency, and some
aspects of their longterm outcomes, we turn to counterstories. In order to engage in
witness for many of the people who need us, we must understand counterstories and their
purpose in resisting the master narrative.
Nelson claims that counterstories are the method by which a person resists
degrading representation and restores worth and agency (150). Counterstories have the
specific mission of undermining the master narrative: “They ordinarily proceed by filling
in details that the master narrative has ignored or underplayed…they are…narrative acts
of insubordination,” (8). Those who tell counterstories seek to repair the damage done to
their identities by the master narrative (154), and to regain moral agency that has been
constricted by the master narrative (155). It should be noted, here, that moral agency,
according to Williams, is generally defined as the human capability to be held
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accountable for actions based on reasoned knowledge, to some extent.89 Master narratives
which are oppressive, then, can be understood as depriving those whom they oppress of
the ability to act on, or be accountable for, decisions related to their reasoned knowledge
of a given situation. Counterstories, by resisting and replacing the oppressive aspect of
the master narrative, change the depiction of the subject of the master narrative from one
who has diminished ability to act on reasoned knowledge, to one who has increased or
complete ability to do so.
Counterstories, Nelson claims, are constructed in two key steps: the first is that
the oppressive aspects of the master narrative are identified and noted as
misrepresentations; the second is that the counterstory alters “the oppressed person’s
version of herself,” (7). Nelson claims that these steps help to repair the narrative self
(150). She also notes that there are several things a counterstory must do in order to be
successful. These aspects of the counterstories’ potential success cast some light on our
discussion of the need for cultural acknowledgement and integration of counterstories.
First, Nelson claims that counterstories cannot merely exist: they must be embraced by
the wider culture (in much the same way the master narrative is) (151). Counterstories
must also be acknowledged and embraced not only by those who write them, but by
those who have benefitted from the oppressive master narrative as well (151). Nelson
tells us that those who have benefitted from the master narrative must be moved by

The concept of moral agency, and its definition, is debated by philosophical scholars.
For a more comprehensive overview, see Williams, Garreth. “Responsibility.”
89
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counterstories to understand that the master narrative is "morally degrading" to those who
are oppressed by it, and give up their position of privilege (151). In the context of the
definition of moral agency established above, we can understand Nelson's notion of
moral degradation to mean that one who is subject to being morally degraded means that
they have reduced moral agency; their capacity as moral agent is less respected, in this
case, than those who have the privilege of working within the master narrative. Finally,
Nelson notes that, in order for counterstories to be effective, those who write them must
come to accept them as constitutive of their identity (151). From Nelson's description of
effective counterstories, we can see that the resistance of the master narrative is
imperative; moreover, it is work that must be done not just by those writing
counterstories. It is work that must be done by our culture as well.
From Nelson's framework, I will proceed below to give examples of
counterstories which resist the master narrative and seek to provide altered versions of
selves; specifically, altered versions of selves which resist and rewrite a given aspect of
the master narrative. Because, in Chapter 3, I systematically proceeded through the
problematic concepts of the master narrative—that early detection means a cure, that
biomedicine is the authority and treatment guarantees survival, that having breast cancer
means performing heteronormativity, and that people are expected to be ideal breast
cancer patients—I will proceed in the same manner below. For each concept, readers will
see examples of counterstories which fit Nelson’s description, demonstrating the
compelling nature of counterstories and the powerful need for the pluralization of the
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master narrative. The texts used below are narratives from diverse people, including
black women and those who identify as members of the LGBTQ community. I have
deliberately avoided older, more wellknown counterstories, such as that of the beloved
Audre Lorde. Lorde and her ilk, our predecessors in breast cancer narratives, have left a
tremendous and powerful legacy. However, works like those of Lorde and Carson have
been examined and discussed at length, in deeper contexts, and by a multitude of
established scholars; here, I think it’s especially important to explore counterstories
which can offer the freshest expressions of what it feels like to live with breast cancer in a
pinkwashed world.
6. Early Detection Still Means You Have Cancer
In previous chapters, we saw that the abject breast cancer body is a body
perceived to be out of control and subject to medical management of its excess. In the
context of the breast cancer awareness movement, the “early detection leads to a cure”
message is the way in which the abject female body is subject to policing and discipline
through medical management of illness. Promotion of regular mammograms, for
example, is one way in which this message is spread. Ehrenreich notes the presentation of
the message in breast cancer walks: “Beaming survivors, proudly displaying their athletic
prowess, are the best possible advertisement for routine screening mammograms, early
detection, and the ensuing round of treatments,” (51). The idea that, “early detection
means a cure,” (particularly if a person gets regular mammograms) is an oversimplified
notion that the writers of some counterstories seek to dispel. Christine Middlebrook is
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one of those women. In her story, she documents her aggressive premenopausal breast
cancer, even as she is dying from it. Her story resists the oversimplification of the early
detection message, and replaces it with the idea that breast cancer can be fatal, even when
we've had our mammograms: “I didn’t know, as I believe the world does not know, about
the virulence of premenopausal breast cancer. I didn’t understand the intentional vagaries
of the words early detection, which imply that finding a potentially lethal disease early is
the same as discovering its cause and curing it,” (2). In this passage, Middlebrook fulfills
the first condition for a counterstory by correcting the notion that early detection is a
nearguarantee for those with breast cancer to be cured. As we discussed in the previous
chapter, the notion that people should get regular mammograms, and that those who don’t
are somehow accountable for their illness, creates a situation in which people are
victimblamed for their breast cancer, and that is the oppressive aspect of the master
narrative. Middlebrook fulfills the second condition for counterstory by pointing out the
“intentional vagaries” of the message. By noting that it’s the message which is
problematic, not the patient’s behavior or choices, she reverses the notion of
victimblaming implicit in this master narrative concept. Winnow reclaims the same
notion on behalf of lesbians: “When they talk about prevention, they are talking about
early detection…and then they pass it off as prevention…We don’t control our
environment. We know that as lesbians we don’t control the society,” (24). Here, Winnow
also corrects the oversimplified idea that “early detection means a cure." Further, by
claiming that lesbians have a stronger sense of the things beyond their control, she
217

removes the capacity for victimblaming: one cannot accept or feel blame for something
one already knows and acknowledges is beyond control.
Winnow is not alone in acknowledging that breast cancer may be beyond the
control of early detection, that it might even be fatal. Comic Tig Notaro gave a historic
performance at The Largo in 2012, in which she revealed her recent diagnosis of
potentially fatal bilateral breast cancer to the audience (Notaro). Early in the show, she
hears a woman sympathetically exclaiming, “Awwww,” as Notaro recounts aspects of her
diagnosis (Notaro). After a few offthecuff cracks to the audience, Notaro chuckles,
looking at the woman but speaking to the broader audience: “It’s Ok. It’s OK. It’s OK,"
(Notaro). The audience laughs at the irony of the role reversal: the woman with cancer is
comforting the ostensibly healthy woman. Then Notaro goes deadpan: "It might not be
OK. I'm just sayin," (Notaro). The audience laughs again then goes silent, save for a few
nervous chuckles, confronted with the reality of Notaro's admission (Notaro). The
counterstory to the oversimplified message that, “early detection equals a cure” is that
even when it’s detected, it’s still cancer, and that might not “be OK.” The major subtext,
of course, implied by the idea that it might not be OK, is that the possibility exists that
you might die. In just these two sentences, Notaro tells a counterstory: she resists the idea
that early detection always means a cure, and she replaces it with the idea that even, with
early detection, breast cancer is potentially lifethreatening. Notably, just a few moments
later, Notaro suggests to the audience that she transition away from the dark material and
tell more lighthearted jokes. A man from the audience yells, "No! This is fucking
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amazing." (Goolsby and York, Dirs.). Notaro, chuckles and pauses. The audience cheers
uproariously, so loudly that, for a moment, she can't go on with the set. In a subsequent
documentary about the groundbreaking set, Notaro comments on this moment by noting
that when the audience member yelled that comment, that was when she knew she'd done
the right thing in making her diagnosis part of her set (Goolsby and York, Dirs.). Crude as
his comment is, it (along with the audience's subsequent response) indicates that Notaro
and the audience entered an intersubjective space which resulted in her feeling like her
counterstory was witnessed.
The notion that people die of breast cancer, that it can’t always be controlled by
early detection via mammograms, is not one that’s included in the “early detection means
a cure” concept, which is problematic because it excludes from the movement the people
who in fact, do die of breast cancer. The exclusion of acknowledgement of death from the
popular breast cancer awareness movement creates a silence in which many find it hard
to break, for fear that they may somehow “jinx” their outcome, as Middlebrook observes
in her daughter’s reticence to discuss her poor prognosis: “Talking about my dying,
Maggie…is not going to kill me. Not talking about it will not save my life,” (31). Here
again, Middlebrook’s counterstory corrects the master narrative by noting that she may
die. The oppressive aspect of this part of the master narrative is that it potentially silences
dying patients; Middlebrook resists that notion by talking about her illness, and refusing
to let others be silent about her illness. She replaces that aspect of the master narrative by
reclaiming the silence which has affected her life and the life of her daughter, not only in
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their conversation, but by documenting her dying and publishing her story. She also
reclaims the silence around death by acknowledging its inevitability, controverting our
culture’s death denial: “But what is a cure, I ask myself? If we have drummed away
cancer, what then? Will I live forever? Of course not,” (51). When faced with her own
death by a rare and aggressive breast cancer, Ruthann Robson finds that her oncologist
predicts she will not survive, and that her editor does not find her story “good copy,”
(53). She vows to tell her story anyway. Robson aligns her rebelliousness in confronting
death with her rebelliousness in becoming a writer, and in coming out: “I remind myself
that my Sunday school teacher told me I couldn’t be a dyke and my high school English
teacher told me I couldn’t be a writer…I grew up to be a dyke writer…I will live to tell
the tale…If only for today, this bald dyke lives,” (53). Robson seeks not to resist physical
death but rather to resist the figurative death caused by the silencing of her voice, of her
narrative of self. The message that, “early detection means a cure” creates a silence
around death, a silence in which some people may be excluded. Notably, they both
indicate that narrative is the method by which they intend to go on living: silence
destroys the narrative of self, which is its own figurative death. By complicating the idea
that "early detection means a cure," Middlebrook and Robson tell counterstories: they
break down this problematic concept of the master narrative, and replace it with the idea
that breast cancer still means a confrontation with one's own mortality.
7. Biomedicine as Fallible and the Epistemic Authority of the Patient
The idea that breast cancer is easily curable, combined with the concept of early
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detection which put people in a position to be held accountable for their illness,
contributed to two other elements of the breast cancer master narrative: the imbalance of
knowledge and power between physicians and patients, and the idea that people with
breast cancer assumed some responsibility for the outcome of their diagnosis. These
problematic concepts of the master narrative allowed the abject breast cancer body to be
policed and disciplined, as Ehrenreich observes: “…I can tell you from a few hours of
investigation that the career of a breast cancer patient has been pretty well mapped out in
advance for me: You may get to negotiate the choice between mastectomy and
lumpectomy but…you’re doomed to chemotherapy, meaning baldness, nausea, mouth
sores, immunosuppression, and possible anemia,” (44). Her use of language around the
relatively limited options for breast cancer treatment, and her feeling of being “doomed”
to chemotherapy, indicates the authority with which medicine has constructed the breast
cancer “career.” Robson indicates the way in which the medical authority, like that noted
by Ehrenreich, puts responsibility for outcomes of treatment onto the patient. She notes
this in an observation her doctor, who she finds comforting by the way in which she
confronts the grim reality of Robson’s illness: “She certainly isn’t like the doctors who
write those popular healing books…These doctors are always positive… “Personal
responsibility” is their mantra. Which is pretty close to blame if you ask me,” (48). In this
case, Robson appreciates the fact that her doctor simply acknowledges the possibility of
death that comes from Robson’s illness, and does not presume an authority which deflects
the blame for the outcome back onto Robson. She and Robson both know that she is
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likely to die. Therefore, the doctor does not exclude Robson from being a knower in this
situation. She does not subjugate Robson’s knowledge of what is happening to Robson’s
own body. The authority of medicine in illness sometimes does result in the subjugation
of knowledge of the ill person, as Carel notes: “It seems to us that it is frequently the ill
person’s ability to offer relevant assertions that is being questioned, rather than their
ability to make assertions at all. The patient in such cases is ‘recognized as unable to
participate in activities whose content is intrinsically epistemic’,” (Phenomenology of
Illness 199). As noted in Chapter 3, women are particularly subject to having their
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knowledge subjugated to biomedical science. In the case of breast cancer narratives, this
subjugation may result in epistemic injustice. Further, it supports cultural norms by which
people with breast cancer are somehow viewed as responsible for their diagnosis or poor
outcomes if they do not subject themselves to the authority of biomedicine.
In her memoir, Seeing the Crab, Christina Middlebrook also constructs a
counterstory against the power of medicine and the inevitability of a cure. In reflecting on
her worst moments of treatment, in the wake of highdose chemotherapy, Middlebrook
mediates the power of medical language by equating the experience to the physical death
of her body (rather than using the word “treatment”). In the opening line of the chapter,
“Witness,” she tells the reader, “It is difficult to remember being killed, “ (57) and then
later in the chapter she elaborates: “They had thought all of me, body and soul, was going
to die. But I had known that if my body was going to die, I was not going to accompany
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See chapter three, page 36.
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it,” (61). By acknowledging the physical difficulty of her treatment, and calling it a
physical death (though, not a death of the soul), Middlebrook focuses on how the
experience feels to her. The irony here is that the treatment, while aggressive and painful,
is meant to keep her alive. Middlebrook, though, seeks to complicate our sociocultural
notions of the experience. She wants readers to understand that, while the therapy may
actually keep her physical being alive for the time being, her body as she has previously
known it will never be the same—it will die.
Furthermore, Middlebrook shirks the oppressive identity of herself as one who
does not have epistemic power by indicating that she knew how to preserve her narrative
of self, even in the face of the “death” of aggressive treatment. Many have felt the social
pressure to endure chemo with stoicism and bravery, or to keep secret the brutal and often
disturbing details of what actually happens to the body. The message of these
counterstories is that the authority of medicine is fallible; treatment is often a difficult and
painful series of efforts which does not always cure breast cancer (and can even feel like
it's killing the patient, rather than helping her survive). Moreover, and more importantly,
they demonstrate that those with breast cancer should be encouraged to use their
epistemic power as knowers, and that medical professionals should engage in
relationships to their patients as epistemic peers. They will also empower patients in the
construction of their narratives of self, and form Foucault’s “horizontal conjunctions,”
and resist the disciplinary mechanism at work in the master narrative.
8. Breast Cancer Beyond Heteronormativity
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As we noted in the previous chapter, one concept of the master narrative of breast
cancer is that it expects people with breast cancer to perform heteronormative femininity.
It seeks to delimit the female body safely within the confines of the male/female gender
binary. The master narrative enforced by pinkwashing and all its overtly traditionally
effeminate accoutrements, allows for policing and discipline of those who do not fit
comfortably within the realm of heteronormative femininity. Counterstories of this
section note the need to acknowledge people whose notions of femininity do not
necessarily match the master narrative and its expectation for the heteronormatively
feminine. Instead, these stories acknowledge the voices of those who struggle with the
idea of reconstructive surgery or the wearing of a prosthesis as normalized and expected,
as something people do so as to make others more comfortable. Middlebrook notes the
phenomenon: “A friend says that, because of a prosthesis, no one ever thinks about her
motherinlaw’s mastectomy. (‘Except your motherinlaw,’ I think to myself, picturing
my own empty chest in the mirror. ‘What do you think your motherinlaw thinks when
she gets dressed each morning?’) (78). These are the counterstories of those who seek to
complicate or alter concepts of the female breast as a cultural signifier of the feminine,
and people who complicate traditional notions of femininity altogether.
Counterstory tellers attempt to loosen the ties between breasts and concepts of
female beauty, such as Carol Bonicelli does in her painting, Venus Revisited (143). In this
painting, the artist has capitalized on the traditional vision of Venus, icon of feminine
beauty, but the painting has been altered to incorporate the counterstory. First, it is
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painted with rather flat dimensions and simplified colors, with fewer detailed
brushstrokes than the original, which indicates its contemporaneity. This choice is
important because viewers must understand that the woman pictured is a contemporary
woman in order to get the point. Second, the view of our modern Venus is much closer
up, from just below her navel to just above her head, which forces the reader to focus
directly on her torso and very little else. Third, and most critically, Venus is surrounded
by a frame of very delicate, feminine, vines, one of which has crept across the left side of
her chest, forming a tendrillike scar where her left breast should be. Her right hand, as in
the original painting, rests on her chest, but in this case it rests just above the vine/scar,
her pinkie finger serving as a pointer to draw the viewer’s attention directly to the scar.
By using the image of Venus, but redefining her as a contemporary woman with a
mastectomy scar, Bonicelli seeks to redefine how we consider contemporary feminine
beauty; this is the aspect of the painting which resists the master narrative. Bonicelli
replaces the master narrative's concept of heteronormative femininity by focusing the
viewer’s attention on the notion that the loss of a breast does not make her less whole, or
less beautiful or even less feminine; simply a different version of femininity from the
original. This painting is a counterstory in that it deconstructs the master narrative’s
accusation that mastectomy scars are ugly or unfeminine; it alters the selfperception of
the oppressed by using one of the world’s most famous icons of beauty to demonstrate
the way in which mastectomy scars can be reclaimed within the realm of beauty.
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Other counterstories of breast cancer by members of the LGBTQ community
complicate our cultural concepts of the feminine. Two writers of breast cancer narratives
liken the experience of reconstructing their identities in the wake of breast cancer to the
process of coming out. Lord says that, “It’s like coming out of the closet. You don’t do it
just once, and once you’ve done it you can never stop…cancer…is an identity I must
state, or choose not to state, at every encounter,” (18). This observation notes the way in
which these women are doubly marginalized by the experience of cancer. Even before her
illness, cultural heteronormativity put Lord in a position in which she had to constantly
acknowledge her sexual identity as a lesbian. She came out, but she often needed to
remind others around her, those who assumed heteronormativity, that she did not fit that
mode. Further she had to do it again and again. Now that she has cancer, she is doubly
nonnormative. This counterstory resists the master narrative's association of breast
cancer with heteronormative femininity; it replaces the master narrative's emphasis on
heteronormativity by instead aligning breast cancer with homosexuality.
Robson, too, tells a counterstory in which she resists notions of traditional
heteronormativity, and instead aligns her experience of breast cancer with homosexuality:
“I guess I somehow believe that I can write my way out of this mess. The way I’ve
written myself out of other messes, like heterosexuality for instance,” (50). Here, Robson
indicates that the same narrative inclinations which helped her construct her sexual
identity will be extended to reconstruct her identity during cancer. This identity, of
course, is also bound up with her sexual identity, as she observes when she discusses her
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love of hair, and her sadness at losing hers: “I loved hair, including my own. Especially
my own…At night, I fanned it across my lovers’ fantasy breasts,” (50). Long hair, of
course, is culturally signified as feminine, and having it splayed across one’s body is a
common male fantasy. She will not miss her hair because it makes her feel feminine,
which is the common heteronormative connotation of hair loss during breast cancer and
treatment. Robson uses her counterstory to replace this aspect of the master narrative's
concept of heteronormativity: she will miss her hair but because it has connotations of
connection with other women to whom she is attracted. This, coupled with her initial
comment above about feeling the need to constantly "come out," demonstrates the ways
in which her subject position as a lesbian and her subject position as a person with cancer
overlap: both require the personal and sexual reconstruction of her identity through
counterstory. Like Lord, she is marginalized by what Jain calls the “redoubled”
femininity of the breast cancer awareness movement. She has to reconstruct her narrative
of self and body, but she also may have to reconstruct her sexuality (after having already
done so) in the context of a heteronormative world. Just like normative women, Lord will
have to create a new narrative of self in which she understands her body and how it
relates to other bodies. Because the master narrative operates on the assumption that all
people rewrite their narratives of self in a heteronormative way, Lord creates a
counterstory by resisting that idea, and replacing it with the concept that she will have to
rewrite her narrative of self as a lesbian. She seems to indicate for her readers that the
experience of breast cancer, because it requires "coming out," may be more closely
227

aligned with the experience of homosexuality rather than heteronormativity, which
echoes Jain's comment from the previous chapter that breast cancer "queers" a woman.
(Notably, in order to tell her counterstory, Lord queers the breast cancer experience as
well.) This phenomenon is one of the many compelling reasons why the master narrative
should be pluralized in order to acknowledge nonnormative people: if we do not do so,
we doubly marginalize them, twice subjecting them to the inability to have their
narratives of self heard and acknowledged. We are doubly depriving them of the cultural
and community witness of their counterstories, putting them at risk.
9. The LessThanIdeal Breast Cancer Patient
As we noted in the previous chapter, the expectation of the “ideal” breast cancer
patient assures that the female character and mannerisms also fit the proper binary mode.
The expectation of women and trans* people to perform heteronormative femininity
during and after breast cancer and treatment means that they are expected to be demure,
strong, and enduring. The heroic idealized patient is characterized by the ability to submit
to the authoritative knowledge of allopathic medicine and remain positive throughout
treatment. She is, quite literally, the embodiment of mind over matter, because she
overcomes cancer through sheer force of will. This aspect of the master narrative requires
that people engage in commodified notions of “hope,” and endless optimism as
characterized by the movement, as Barbara Ehrenreich observes: “…a collection of brief
narratives with a foreword by Nancy Brinker and a share of the royalties going to the
Komen Foundation, is filled with such testimonies to the redemptive powers of
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disease…What does not destroy you…to paraphrase Nietzsche, makes you a spunkier,
more evolved, sort of person,” (49). The mention of Nietzche here offers us the
opportunity to return to some of the pathologized notions of the female body which we
have inherited from previous centuries. The female body was (and in many ways, still is)
considered a deformed version of a male body; male bodies are the ideal or the standard.
The body with breast cancer, already deformed, becomes abject and marginalized from
the ideal even further. Ironically, it can never be ideal. The spunky, evolved hero is the
“ideal” breast cancer patient, but can never be the ideal body. The archetype of the ideal
breast cancer patient is merely a way of socioculturally managing the abject body, which
is why, if a person with breast cancer does not behave as the ideal breast cancer patient,
that person risks being scapegoated or marginalized. Ehrenreich’s sarcasm in the above
passage is evident. Here, she expresses a brief but compelling counterstory in which she
deconstructs the idea of the ideal breast cancer patient, and replaces it with a breast
cancer patient more like herself: cynical, snarky, and annoyed.
Additionally, the pinkwashed role of the ideal breast cancer patient is one which
strongly affects the experiences of women of color, and in specific ways, as Gatison
notes:
Being stoic and never complaining means simply being that infamous strong
Black woman who lives through some of the “what if” scenarios that come to pass
and just deals with them. By falling in line with the march of the pink ribbon as a
(s) hero, a warrior, a breast cancer survivor, and a strong Black woman of faith,
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one is in a way, being forced into a type of silence. (“Cancer Journals of
Inspiration and Courage”)
Black women’s experiences are also silenced by the idea that the ideal breast cancer
patient of the master narrative should be strong, heroic, and warriorlike. However, black
women must also operate within the inherited cultural legacy of the strong black woman
of faith, as we noted in Chapter 3, and therefore their potential for marginalization is
increased exponentially: if they refuse to perform as ideal breast cancer patients, they
may be scapegoated; if they refuse to perform the role of the strong Black woman of
faith, they may be distancing themselves from their cultural community and their cultural
legacy. Interestingly, Gatison’s remarks only partially fulfill the requirements for a
counterstory. By pointing out the potential for silencing, she has deconstructed the
oppressive aspect of the master narrative. However, she doesn’t offer an alternative to it.
Perhaps that was simply not her intention for that text. Or perhaps it is more difficult for
her to do given her position as a black woman who is subject to the master narrative of
breast cancer and its specific reverberations within her cultural community. This is why
the pluralization of the master narrative of breast cancer may be especially important to
women of color: if we can create and socially share a counterstory in which women are
not expected to be idealized, enduring, warriorheroes, we may create more support for
the moral agency of women of color, and their ability to recreate an identity without
feeling marginalized by their communities or our culture.
King notes the problematic expectation that those with breast cancer act cheerful
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and demure, and not show their anger about the illness:
She was mad, real mad,
but she had been taught
to be good
and couldn’t show it. (33)
Here, King claims that the woman to whom she refers in the poem “could not show” her
anger, because she had been taught that it was unacceptable to do so. This statement
implies that this woman is subject to the concept of the master narrative that ideal breast
cancer patients are relentlessly positive and do not show negative emotions such as
sadness or anger; otherwise, they risk being scapegoated. Again, King calls out the
problem with this concept and also alters the notion of the ideal breast cancer patient
simply by publicly decrying that this woman could to be free to express her experience,
to expect others to engage with her reconstruction of self.
Middlebrook highlights the fact that the ideal breast cancer patient is expected to be
enduring and positive: “I think dying is difficult enough without having to achieve a
pleasant attitude about it,” (198). Middlebrook resists the pinkwashed idea that breast
cancer patients constantly be full of hope and cheer. Furthermore, she replaces that aspect
of the master narrative by refusing to "achieve" a pleasant attitude. The word “achieving”
is significant here: in the world of ideal breast cancer patienthood, having a pleasant
attitude is an accomplishment, something one is publicly lauded for, considered a hero
for, and given figurative gold stars. Refusing to do so, on the other hand, risks getting
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identified as a scapegoat. Here, Middlebrook tells a counterstory in which she
deconstructs the master narrative’s concept that women dying from breast cancer should
be stalwart and enduring, replacing it with the idea that she, like Ehrenreich, is allowed to
be unpleasant.
Potentially being subject to blame is one fate which often backs women and trans
people with breast cancer into the position of feeling like they have to be demure about
their illness, that they should not speak too openly about the struggles, pain, and reality of
it (like Betty Ford tossing her husband the football, fooling all of America into believing
that a Halsted mastectomy is nothing at all). DeShazer notes that blunt comedy is one
strategy by which people disengage from roles that define them as sweet and demure. She
claims that, “Humorous breast cancer [memoirists]…prefer a postmodern sense of
contingency that deflects rather than embraces sentimental discourses. Middlebrook’s
darkly crude but humorous story of her cancer support group illustrates the point:
“Elimination, that’s another secret the nasty creature keeps. In the support group, Jay
asks, ‘Can we talk shit here?’ Yes. We can. Cancer support groups are the only place
where we can talk shit, for real. Black, bloody stools, we agree, are not good,” (184).
Sweet, strong, demure breast cancer patients are most definitely not supposed to talk
about shit, and yet, Middlebrook does. In this passage, she uses dark but forthright humor
to expose the nastiness of cancer for what it is, rather than try to hide it for the sake of
presenting herself as a hero. Instead, she reclaims the identity of the breast cancer patient
by showing that breast patients talk about shit, and that they do so with other cancer
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patients, and that it’s OK, even necessary, for them to do.
Similarly, Notaro refuses to abide the pat, sweet, sentimentalities which breast
cancer patients are often told to abide, to turn to for hope, in the discourse of the illness.
The one platitude Notaro chooses to deconstruct is the wellknown phrase, “God doesn’t
give us more than we can handle.” For her standup audience, she breaks down the
ridiculousness of this expression from her perspective as a woman who has nearly died
from Cdiff, then lost her mother to sudden accidental death, then been diagnosed with
breast cancer, all in a few months: “You can always rest assured that God never gives you
more than you can handle. And you just picture God going, ‘I think she can take a little
more.’ And the angels are just standing back like , ‘God, what are you doing?!’”(italics
mine) (Notaro). Again, Notaro uses ironic humor to demonstrate the ways in which such
an expression seems totally unable to encompass the tragedy of what she’s experienced.
She resists the master narrative by refusing to have her story defined by generic concepts
of hope. She seeks to replace the image of the enduring hero with the dark humorist, as
she notes when she says, "The good Lord giveth and the good Lord taketh away. But
sometimes the good Lord taketh and just keep takingiteth. It's kind of like tit for tat.
That's kind of what's going on right now," (Notaro). She does not try to perpetuate
sentimental notions of the hero; she counters the master narrative of the enduring, ideal
breast cancer patient, and replaces that image with dark but humorous truth about breast
cancer.
Counterstories like these create a new concept of what it means to have breast
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cancer, but the mere fact that they exist is not enough. As a culture, we must be willing to
bear witness to these counterstories, which means acknowledging the imbalance of power
and the privilege which comes with the current master narrative perpetuated by the
contemporary breast cancer awareness movement and pinkwashing. Only when we are
willing to embrace these counterstories, bearing witness to them as a cultural community,
can we remedy the injustice created by the current master narrative, engage in the
recreation of identity for many more women and trans people, and encourage their moral
agency in their experience of illness. Moreover, in witnessing counterstories, we may be
offering chances for improved outcomes and prognosis for some people struggling with
identity. Therefore, counterstories are not just one aspect of the breast cancer experience
that apply to some women and trans people; they are a cultural imperative, telling us the
ways in which the current movement must change if we truly want to do better for all
people with breast cancer, and not just those whose stories make fundraising easy or
convenient.
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CONCLUSION
In this text, we have seen the ways in which antiquated, problematic constructions
of the female body have historically caused it to be construed as pathologized, and the
ways in which those constructions of the female body were integrated into the early
breast cancer awareness movement. The movement, along with public discourse around
breast cancer in the 20th century, took up these notions and used them to its advantage in
order to discipline, police, and regulate abject breast cancer bodies. In the latter part of
the 20th century, breast cancer awareness organizations which utilized the practice of
pinkwashing, codified these concepts into a master narrative of the breast cancer
experience which we still see today. This master narrative expresses distinct messages
which are exclusive of the unique experiences of many women and trans* people
diagnosed with breast cancer. Those experiencing breast cancer are struggling to recreate
their own identities in the wake of illness and treatment; this recreation of self necessarily
calls for relationships between the self and other, and between self and community. Thus,
the exclusion caused by the master narrative can be detrimental to the recreation of
identity which is vital to the person with breast cancer. Further, we know that having
some community to bear witness to a breast cancer experience can potentially lead to
improved prognosis and longterm outcomes. The fact that our cultural community may
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not be fully bearing witness to the experiences of a variety of women and trans* people
with breast cancer, may mean that those people are subject to poorer health outcomes
than those whose experiences are easily and readily witnessed through the master
narrative. Because of this compelling need to bear witness to stories more diverse than
the master narrative currently allows, we must engage in, and embrace counterstories of
breast cancer. We must make these counterstories a more integrated part of cultural
discourse around breast cancer in order to do justice to the people experiencing the
illness, and attempt to create new master narratives which are not oppressive to those
with breast cancer. If we do not, we risk subjecting many people diagnosed with, or dying
from, breast cancer to further exclusion and/or injustice.
Willingness to hear and acknowledge narratives of self about the experience of
breast cancer can impact the identity and health outcomes of a person diagnosed with
breast cancer. Because of its implications regarding identity, epistemic injustice, and
longterm health outcomes, this research is compelling for both laycaregivers and
clinicians. Not all women and trans* people diagnosed with breast cancer fit the story
told by the pinkwashed master narrative. In order to facilitate the construction of a more
genuine (less profitoriented) understanding of the experience of breast cancer, and fully
support those who are diagnosed, we must be willing to first resist the master narrative
perpetuated by pinkwashing. Second, we must support and engage with counterstories
which may replace our current, oversimplified master narrative.
In order for us to continue this work, much is left to be done. First, there is a
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compelling need to understand the cultural experience of women of color when
diagnosed with breast cancer. In order to do so, we need to fully examine the history of
black women's bodies in the context of medical history in the United States, and analyze
how that relationship might affect perceptions of, and adherence to, medical treatment for
breast cancer. This analysis is extremely complex and requires the incorporation of many
factors related to racial disparities in healthcare, generally. Additionally, we need to
analyze the ways in which the contemporary breast cancer awareness movement has
excluded or silenced the experiences of women of color in the U.S., and make a further
effort to create a breast cancer awareness movement which operates from the premise of
intersectional feminism, embracing women of color and the LGBTQ community.
Very little is known about the experiences of lesbian and bisexual women with
breast cancer and, as of this writing, the narratives of those women are not widely
included as part of our cultural understanding of the breast cancer experience. We need to
begin to understand the legacy Audre Lorde left, not only for women with breast cancer,
but for people who are not heteronormative who have breast cancer. There is an
extraordinary dearth of knowledge about the experiences of trans* people with breast
cancer, even though their exposure to hormones may make them more susceptible to the
illness. At the time of this writing, publicly accessible narratives of trans* and queer
people with breast cancer are still very rare. Perhaps it is necessary for a cultural shift
away from our current master narrative in order for members of the trans* and queer
community to share their experiences in a more public venue, or to have them made more
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available to the public; all the more reason for us to open ourselves to understandings of
the breast cancer experience beyond the master narrative.
How do we proceed from this new understanding of breast cancer in our culture?
Clinicians and caregivers alike must bear in mind that the pinkwashed master narrative to
which we are constantly exposed is not, by far, the experience of all people with breast
cancer. But they must also bear in mind the reality that many people do identify with the
master narrative, and their lives are enriched by the activities of organizations like the
Susan G. Komen Foundation. Breast cancer is an extraordinarily complex illness which
brings to light not only questions of mortality, but questions of gender identity and
sexuality, as well as questions of social, political, cultural, and epistemic power.
Additionally, breast cancer research has not advanced to the extent that it is an illness that
we might label as "curable." In fact, as we know from the final chapter of this work, it is
now considered a "chronic illness." If that is the case, while we continue the efforts to
find a cure (as we do with many types of cancer), we must also take into account, and
bear witness to, the lived experiences of those diagnosed with breast cancer, in order to
offer them the highest possible level of support.
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